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Abstract 
The thesis rests on the argument that the literature on Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) and the law has, so far, largely neglected the contribution that 
private law makes or could make to the promotion of CSR. The primary research 
question of this thesis is therefore to analyse the extent to which English private law 
already promotes and/or could better promote CSR. 
Based on the analysis of four substantive areas of private law (company law and 
corporate governance, contract law, consumer law and tort law), one of the overall 
contributions of this thesis is to demonstrate that private law plays an important role 
in the regulatory framework of CSR. Whilst this analysis shows that there are 
limitations in the promotion of CSR in English private law, it is argued that private 
law already makes an important contribution to the promotion of CSR. Moreover, it 
could make an even better contribution if some of its limitations were addressed. 
The analysis in the substantive chapters demonstrates the different ways in which 
private law promotes CSR: First, CSR is, at least in part, law. Secondly, private law 
provides mechanisms to incorporate and to enforce CSR commitments. Thirdly, 
private law contributes to hybrid regulatory approaches to CSR, i.e. systems where 
different forms of regulation such as private law, public law and soft law standards 
interact. The thesis demonstrates that the effectiveness of the regulatory system in 
promoting CSR can be enhanced by regulation through public and criminal law of 
companies in their home state, in combination with national private law. However, if 
private law were to make an even better contribution then some changes would be 
needed to the areas of private law analysed in the substantive chapters. The thesis 
will therefore conclude with a list of substantive recommendations for changes to 
English private law. 
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Chapter 1: The aims and the scope of the thesis 
 
1.1 Private law and Corporate Social Responsibility 
The public concern about the impact of corporations on, for instance, the 
environment and their employees has increased in the wake of the global economic 
and financial crisis. This crisis has strengthened the interest in the concept of 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR).1 Many corporations have adopted CSR 
standards pledging to conduct business in a responsible manner.2 The engagement 
of companies with CSR is partly due to the negative reputational effects of reports 
about irresponsible conduct of companies, for example human rights violations 
committed by the subsidiaries and suppliers of Western companies in the 
developing world such as the use of child labour or excessive working hours.3 CSR 
has also become an important issue on the political agenda. The UN has given 
prominence to CSR through the work of Professor John Ruggie from Harvard 
University who worked as Special Representative on the issue of human rights and 
business (SRSG) until 2011.4 Upon completion of his mandate, he published the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights which were called ‘a landmark in 
the CSR debate’.5 Moreover, the EU Commission has recently published a 
communication on CSR which contains an action agenda for the period 2011-2014.6 
                                                          
1
 The debate surrounding the definition of CSR will be discussed in the second chapter. This thesis 
uses the following definition of CSR by Campbell and Vick: ‘At a minimum the term implies an 
obligation on the part of large companies to pursue objectives advancing the interests of all groups 
affected by their activities – not just shareholders but also employees, consumers, suppliers, creditors 
and local communities. These interests are not just economic, but also include environmental, human 
rights and ‘quality of life’ concerns. The obligation to be socially responsible is usually conceived of as 
being over and above the minimum requirement imposed on companies by formal legal rules, although 
this is not invariably the case.’, see: K Campbell and D Vick, ‘Disclosure Law and the market for 
corporate social responsibility’ in D McBarnet, A Voiculescu and T Campbell (eds), The new corporate 
accountability (CUP 2007) 242. 
2
 A study published in 2010 shows that 77 out of the 100 constituent FTSE100 firms had adopted 
codes of conduct which contain the CSR commitments of the companies. See: L Preuss, ‘Codes of 
Conduct in Organisational Context: From Cascade to Lattice-Work of Codes’ (2010) 94 Journal of 
Business Ethics 471, 475. 
3
 C Soosay, A Fearne and B Dent, ‘Sustainable value chain analysis – a case study of Oxford Landing 
from “vine to dine”’ (2012) 17 Supply Chain Management: An International Journal 68. 
4
 The website of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises gives a useful overview about the work done 
within the mandate, available at: http://www.business-humanrights.org/Home (last accessed: 
09/04/2013). 
5
 J Ames, ‘Taking responsibility’ (2011) European Lawyer 15. For the Guiding Principles see: Report of 
the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, 21
st
 March 2011, 
available at: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf (last 
accessed: 01/04/2013). 
6
 European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and social committee and the committee of the regions: A renewed 
EU strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social Responsibility’ COM (2011) 681 final, available at: 
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In February this year, the EU Parliament adopted two resolutions on CSR in which it 
highlights the importance of company transparency on environmental and social 
matters.7 
Different academic disciplines such as Management Studies, Economics, Politics 
and Law analyse CSR from a range of perspectives and methodologies. However, 
the link between law and CSR remains unclear and contentious. Particularly 
business leaders continue to understand CSR as going beyond legal requirements.8 
This understanding is often based on the fact that a great deal of CSR activity is 
self-regulation, such as private CSR standards which are, inter alia, developed by 
corporations themselves or private actors (e.g. NGOs), sometimes acting alone, and 
sometimes in conjunction with corporations.9 Much of the legal literature has 
focused on international law, for example by analysing the role of the UN or the 
OECD.10 The literature on CSR and the law has, so far, largely neglected the 
contribution that private law makes or could make to the promotion of CSR. 
However, private law plays an increasing role in relation to CSR, for instance, 
through the incorporation of these private CSR standards into business relationships 
(e.g. contracts), the duty for directors to promote the success of the company for the 
benefit of its members as a whole in s172 (1) Companies Act 2006 and the liability 
of companies for violations of CSR principles in tort. The underlying primary 
research question of this thesis is, therefore, to analyse the promotion of CSR in 
English private law.11 With its private law perspective, this research shall contribute 
to filling this gap in the existing literature on CSR and the law. 
This thesis focusses on private law for four reasons. First of all, as indicated, the 
existing literature on CSR and the law has primarily concentrated on international 
law. So far, private law seems to have been largely sidelined despite its increasingly 
                                                                                                                                                                    
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sustainable-business/corporate-social-
responsibility/index_en.htm (last accessed: 09/04/2013) 
7
 The resolutions passed on 6
th
 February are: First, Report on corporate social responsibility: 
accountable, transparent and responsible business behaviour and sustainable growth 
(2012/2098(INI)); Committee on Legal Affairs, available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A7-2013-
0017+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN (last accessed: 19/05/2013); Secondly, Report on 
Corporate Social Responsibility: promoting society’s interests and a route to sustainable and inclusive 
recovery (2012/2097(INI)); Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A7-2013-
0023+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN (last accessed: 19/05/2013). 
8
 See The Confederation of Business Industry (CBI), available at:  
http://www.cbi.org.uk/ndbs/content.nsf/802737AED3E3420580256706005390AE/9D502144AC9F6443
80256F58005BD16C (last accessed 03/10/2012). 
9
 R Mushkat, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility, International Law, and Business Economics: 
Convergences and Divergencies’ (2010) 12 Oregon Review of International Law 55. 
10
 Zerk, Multinationals and Corporate Social Responsibility: Limitations and Opportunities in 
International Law (CUP 2006) 27. 
11
 The term ‘promotion‘ is discussed in section 1.2 of this thesis.  
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important role for the legal regulation of CSR, for example in company law. 
Secondly, whilst much of the literature on CSR and the law is interdisciplinary and/or 
based on socio-legal perspectives (e.g. reflexive governance which is a process-
oriented legal theory that looks at the learning and exchange of different social 
subsystems)12, the focus here allows an in-depth analysis of the existing and 
possible legal effects of CSR in English private law in order to contribute a legal 
perspective to the ongoing discussion about CSR and the law. Thirdly, the CSR 
instruments of international governing bodies, such as the UN, are predominately 
soft law recommendations and guidelines, whereas private law provides individuals 
with remedies for breach of their rights. Private law could therefore be a tool to 
legally enforce CSR commitments. Fourthly, the UN Guiding Principles emphasise 
the importance of home state regulation of multinational corporations.13 The home 
state is considered to be the state in which the multinational corporation is 
incorporated.14 In contrast, the host state is the state in which the multinational 
enterprise, either directly or through its subsidiary, operates.15 The focus on home 
state regulation in the Guiding Principles suggests that national private law, which is 
closely linked to national legal systems, could play an important role for the future 
regulation of CSR.  
Against this background, the thesis will analyse four areas of private law which have 
been chosen due to their relevance for the promotion of CSR. These areas are: 
First, company law and corporate governance; secondly, contract law; thirdly, 
consumer law; and fourthly tort law. Company law and corporate governance are 
the basis for the CSR engagement of companies, for example, through directors’ 
duties or reporting duties. Contract law is used here as many companies incorporate 
their CSR commitments into their supply chain contracts, for example, the contracts 
that an English company forms with its suppliers that are based abroad. Moreover, 
                                                          
12
 C Scott, ‘Reflexive governance, meta-regulation and corporate social responsibility: the “Heineken 
effect”’ in N Boeger, R Murray and C Villiers (eds), Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility 
(Edward Elgar 2008) 174. 
13
 There is no agreed definition of the term ‘multinational enterprises’. The OECD Guidelines on 
Multinational Enterprises state that a clear definition was not required for the purpose of the guidelines, 
but then say the following about multinational enterprises: ‘These usually comprise companies or other 
entities established in more than one country and so linked that they may co-ordinate their operations 
in various ways. While one or more of these entities may be able to exercise a significant influence 
over the activities of others, their degree of autonomy within the enterprise may vary widely from one 
multinational enterprise to another. Ownership may be private, state or mixed.’ See: OECD Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises (OECD 2000), Guideline I Concepts and Principles, para 3, available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf (last accessed: 09/04/2013). Muchlinski opines that it 
may not be possible to define the term ‘multinational corporation’ with ‘any degree of accuracy’. He 
states that an important feature of multinationals is their capacity to operate across national borders in 
terms of their business and managerial structure, their production and their trading. See: P Muchlinski, 
Multinational Enterprises and the Law (2nd ed, OUP 2007) 7 - 8. 
14
 B Cragg, ‘Home is where the halt is: Mandating Corporate Social Responsibility through home state 
regulation and social disclosure’ (2010) 24 Emory International Law Review 735, 751.  
15
 ibid. 
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consumer law is analysed in this thesis, as it might provide consumers with tools to 
enforce compliance of companies with their publicly adopted CSR commitments. 
Finally, as the violation of CSR principles can in some circumstances also constitute 
torts, for example negligence, tort law is included as the fourth private law area. 
Even though CSR is a global issue, this thesis focuses on English law. The reason 
for this choice is that this work concentrates on private law which is closely 
embedded in national legal systems. Comparisons to other legal systems will be 
made occasionally, but it is beyond the scope of this thesis to substantially compare 
the way English private law engages with CSR with the private law of one or more 
other legal systems. The thesis thus aims to provide an overall picture of CSR in 
English private law, inter alia, by looking at English contract law, torts law, company 
law and consumer law. The results of this work can then be the basis for 
subsequent comparative analyses with other legal systems. Each of the substantive 
chapters will contain a brief overview of the jurisdictional scope, i.e. when English 
courts have jurisdiction to hear a dispute and when English law is applicable. 
1.2 The aims of the thesis: The research agenda 
The primary research questions of this thesis are to what extent English private law 
already promotes CSR and to what extent English private law could better promote 
CSR. With these linked research questions, it is intended to show both the 
weaknesses and the strengths of private law in the promotion of CSR.  
The word ‘promote’ is not a legal term.16 It is used here to describe the role that 
English private law plays in the support, encouragement and further progression of 
CSR. In a legal context, the promotion of CSR could, inter alia, mean the following: 
Requiring, facilitating, enabling, incorporating and enforcing CSR. The aspect 
‘requiring’ means that private law could, for example, through directors’ duties or 
reporting duties, require directors to pursue CSR principles. Moreover, private law 
could also facilitate or enable the pursuing of CSR commitments, for instance, 
through discretion given to directors in directors’ duties that they may pursue objects 
advancing the interest of all stakeholders of the company and not just the 
shareholders. Through contract law mechanisms, private law could enable 
companies to incorporate CSR commitments into their contracts with others. Finally, 
private law could provide tools to enforce CSR principles, for example, through the 
                                                          
16
 To promote’ is defined in the Oxford Dictionary of English, inter alia, as ‘support’, ‘active 
encouragement’ and ‘further progression’, see: http://oxforddictionaries.com/ (last accessed: 
20/10/2012). 
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enforcement of contractual CSR obligations, the enforcement of CSR commitments 
through consumer law or through liability in tort law. In short: The term ‘promotion’ is 
used here to denote that private law advances the socially responsible conduct of 
companies.  
With its analysis of the promotion of CSR in English private law, this thesis aims to 
reveal the central position of private law in the regulatory framework of CSR. This 
position is, so far, not sufficiently reflected in the literature. The analysis of the four 
substantive areas of private law (company law and corporate governance, contract 
law, consumer law and tort law), brought together, will build on the existing literature 
which has so far only discussed the relationship between singular aspects of private 
law with CSR such as torts law or company law. On the basis of this approach, links 
will be drawn between the different areas of private law, for example, the influence 
of corporate theory on company law and corporate governance and the engagement 
of a company with CSR, for example, its voluntary incorporation of CSR policies into 
supply contracts. Overall, the analysis of the different areas of private law will show 
how English private law contributes or could make a better contribution to the 
promotion of CSR. 
Moreover, the analysis of the primary research questions will also help to answer 
the secondary research question, which is to what extent English private law 
contributes to the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights into English law. The UN Guiding Principles are intended to be 
implemented by countries and companies.17 The UK government has made a 
political commitment to the Guiding Principles.18 Due to the overlap between CSR 
and the Guiding Principles, the results of the four substantive chapters will also 
provide answers to the question to what extent English private law could be used by 
the UK government for the implementation of the Guiding Principles. However, it 
needs to be taken into account that the government will necessarily need to review 
                                                          
17
 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘New Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council’, available at: 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=11164 (last accessed: 
10/04/2013). 
18
 UK Trade & Investment, ‘Business and Human Rights’: ‘The Government is fully committed to 
implementing the Guiding Principles as part of its strategy on business and human rights and expects 
UK businesses to operate at all times in a way respectful of human rights whether in Britain or 
overseas.’, see: 
http://www.ukti.gov.uk/de_de/export/howwehelp/overseasbusinessrisk/item/print/308520.html?null (last 
accessed: 16/02/2013). UK Trade & Investment is a UK government department that works in the area 
of international trade promotion. See also: Foreign Office Minister Jeremy Browne, ‘A UK vision for 
business and human rights’, Speech delivered on 6 July 2012, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/a-uk-vision-for-business-and-human-
rights?view=Speech&id=784585582 (last accessed: 09/04/2013). 
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both public law and private law when it develops its national plan on the 
implementation of the Guiding Principles into English law. 
1.3 Methodology 
The thesis will be based on a doctrinal analysis of primary sources such as cases 
and statutes as well as secondary sources such as academic literature, Law 
Commission papers and the CSR reports of companies. Although the thesis is 
primarily doctrinal in nature, it will also engage with some of the socio-legal literature 
regarding regulation, such as that concerning meta-regulation. 
Van Hoecke defines legal doctrine as a hermeneutical discipline because it focusses 
on the interpretation of texts and documents according to standard methods.19 In his 
view ‘the core business of legal doctrine is interpretation’.20 Legal scholars often 
argue about a choice among diverging interpretations. For Birks a doctrinal legal 
approach ‘criticises, explains, corrects and directs legal doctrines’.21 It allows the 
answering of a concrete legal question.22 Van Gestel and Micklitz identify shared 
features of doctrinal legal research in Europe and the U.S.: First, the basis for 
arguments is found in authoritative sources, such as existing rules, principles, 
precedents and scholarly publications. Secondly, legal doctrine tries to present the 
law as a system. Thirdly, decisions in cases have to fit into a coherent system.23 
Van Hoecke summarises his analysis of legal doctrine as follows: 
Legal scholars collect empirical data (statutes, cases, etc.), word hypotheses on their 
meaning and scope, which they test, using the classic canons of interpretation. In a 
next stage, they build theories…which they test and from which they derive new 
hypotheses… Described in this way, doctrinal legal scholarship fits perfectly with the 
methodology of other disciplines.
24 
 
 
                                                          
19
 M van Hoecke, ‘Legal Doctrine: Which Method(s) for What Kind of Discipline?’ in M van Hoecke (ed), 
Methodologies of Legal Research: Which Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline? (Hart Publishing 
2011) 4. 
20
 ibid, 3 
21
 P Birks, ‘Editor’s Preface‘ in P Birks (ed), What are Law Schools For? (OUP 1996) ix. 
22
 M van Hoecke, ‘Legal Doctrine: Which Method(s) for What Kind of Discipline?’ in M van Hoecke (ed), 
Methodologies of Legal Research: Which Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline? (Hart Publishing 
2011) 4. 
23
 R van Gestel and H-W. Micklitz, ‘Revitalizing Doctrinal Legal Research in Europe: What About 
Methodology?‘ EUI Working Papers (LAW2011/05, Department of Law) 26 (last accessed: 
20/05/2013). 
24
 M van Hoecke, ‘Legal Doctrine: Which Method(s) for What Kind of Discipline?’ in M van Hoecke (ed), 
Methodologies of Legal Research: Which Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline? (Hart Publishing 
2011) 11. 
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Moreover, the Council of Australian Law Deans notes that doctrinal research  
…involves rigorous analysis and creative synthesis, the making of connections 
between seemingly disparate doctrinal strands, and the challenge of extracting 
general principles from an inchoate mass of primary materials.
25
 
Whilst doctrinal researchers of the law tend to remain close to primary source 
materials (legislation and the leading cases) and are often hesitant ‘to move far 
beyond these mainstream materials (for example, ‘soft law’ regulations such as that 
found in codes of practice)26, this is not invariably the case. Vranken notes that the 
limits of ‘the system’ that is analysed in doctrinal research are not necessarily 
clear.27 Although doctrinal legal research is often relevant for legal practice and 
informs legal practitioners such as judges or solicitors, it is not identical to practical 
legal research, as it focusses on the understanding of the law and not just on its 
application.28 
The doctrinal method was chosen for this thesis as it is suitable to answer the 
underlying research questions, i.e. to what extent does English private law already 
promote or could better promote Corporate Social Responsibility?29 The thesis 
focusses on the use of private law as a means to promote CSR. Based on the 
doctrinal method, the four substantive areas of law addressed in the thesis, for 
example company law and corporate governance, can, inter alia, be analysed as to 
their overlap with CSR, their use as a means to incorporate CSR into legal 
relationships as well as their use as a means to enforce the socially responsible 
conduct of companies. With the interpretation of texts and documents, the doctrinal 
approach is suitable for the pertaining questions of the thesis, i.e. ‘what is the law in 
these areas?’ as well as ‘what changes are needed to that law in order to better 
promote CSR?’ It helps not only to find out what the law is, but also what rights 
parties procure for violations of CSR. Moreover, as the doctrinal method interprets, 
criticises and syntheses legal doctrines, it enables the research to look at private law 
                                                          
25
 Council of Australian Law Deans, Statement on the nature of legal research, taken from the CALD 
submissions to the Department of Education, Science and Training (DEST) in relation to the Research 
Quality Framework (RQF), May and October 2005. 
26
 R Brownsword, ‘An Introduction to Legal Research’ (2006) 4, available at: 
www.welcome.ac.uk/stellent/ 
groups/corporatesite (last accessed: 22/09/2012). 
27
 Vranken asks if those researchers that include codes of conduct, guidelines and other forms of self-
regulation into their analysis would step outside the field defined for legal doctrinal scholars when they 
argue that these factors should be included, see J Vranken, ‘Methodology of Legal Doctrinal Research: 
A Comment on Westerman‘ in M van Hoecke (ed), Methodologies of Legal Research: Which Kind of 
Method for What Kind of Discipline? (Hart Publishing 2011) 116. 
28
 M Siems and D Síthigh, ‘Mapping Legal Research’ (2012) 71 CLJ 651, 654. 
29
 As noted above, ‘to promote’ is not a legal term, it rather encapsulates, inter alia, the following: 
Requiring and enabling socially responsible conduct of companies, incorporating CSR and enforcing 
CSR. 
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as a whole in terms of its promotion of CSR and to make connections between 
these areas. 
1.4 The scope of the thesis 
As already noted, the thesis will be based on the analysis of four substantive areas 
of private law. These are: Company law and corporate governance, contract law, 
consumer law and tort law. 
First, the chapter on ‘Company law, corporate governance and CSR’ will provide a 
detailed analysis of how company law and corporate governance promote CSR. The 
chapter will start with an examination of how corporate theory (shareholder value vs. 
stakeholder value) influences the ways in which companies address CSR. 
Discussions about corporate theory are relevant for CSR, as the underlying theory 
of the firm influences the scope and aims of company law and corporate governance 
and, consequently, the ways in which companies are required or allowed to pursue 
CSR objectives. The chapter then analyses the extent to which the new directors’ 
duty in s172 (1) Companies Act (duty to promote the success of the company for the 
benefit of its members as a whole) and the reporting duty in s417 (2) Companies Act 
assist in the promotion of CSR. The chapter also addresses the role of shareholders 
in enhancing the socially responsible conduct of companies, for example through 
the derivative action (brought for a breach of s172 CA). The final part of this chapter 
focusses on the composition of the board and its possible impact on the pursuing of 
CSR. 
Secondly, the chapter on contract law will provide a detailed analysis of the 
promotion of CSR through supply chain contracts. The reason for the focus on 
supply chain contracts is that Western companies commonly incorporate CSR 
policies into their supply chain relations with their suppliers.30 The way this 
incorporation is usually done is by adopting a code of conduct which outlines the 
company’s CSR policy and the principles it expects everyone within the company to 
uphold. Many companies expect their suppliers to adhere to these principles, too, 
and consequently incorporate these codes of conduct into their supply chain 
contracts with their suppliers. Whilst the incorporation of CSR into supply chains has 
been extensively analysed in the management literature, there has only been little 
                                                          
30
 E Pedersen and M Andersen, ‘Safeguarding corporate social responsibility (CSR) in global supply 
chains: how codes of conduct are managed in buyer-supplier relationships’ (2006) 6 Journal of Public 
Affairs 228, 237; B Jiang, ‘Implementing Supplier Codes of Conduct in Global Supply Chains: Process 
Explanations from Theoretic and Empirical Perspectives’ (2009) 85 Journal of Business Ethics 77, 77-
78. 
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writing from a legal perspective so far.31 This chapter seeks to contribute to the legal 
CSR literature by providing a detailed analysis of the contract law rules pertaining to 
the incorporation of CSR into supply contracts. The chapter will analyse whether 
CSR policies become ‘part’ of the supply contracts and hence become enforceable 
(either by the Western company at the head of the supply chain or by, for example, 
an employee of the supplier). Secondly, the chapter analyses whether the Western 
companies are able to procure an appropriate remedy in contract law for these 
breaches. Thirdly, the Western companies (the buyers) must be sufficiently aware of 
breaches of these contractual terms pertaining to the CSR policies in order to at 
least consider using contract law to promote socially responsible behaviour among 
those companies in transitional economies where concerns about violation of CSR 
issues such as human rights are focused. 
The third chapter will analyse the extent to which English consumer law promotes or 
could better promote CSR. Consumer law is chosen as one of the four substantive 
areas of private law in this thesis as many companies make their CSR commitments 
public whilst consumers increasingly consider corporate responsibility in their 
purchase and consumption behaviour (described by the term ‘ethical 
consumerism’).32 Consumer law and CSR overlap where consumers are protected 
against false information about the CSR practices of companies. The chapter will 
analyse whether consumer law protects consumers in the situation where 
companies are in breach of their publicly announced CSR commitments, for 
example, if a company violates the principles of a code of conduct to which it has 
signed up and which it has published on its website. To that end, the chapter will 
analyse whether breaches of CSR policies by companies are encompassed by 
English consumer law at all (looking at the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading 
Regulations 2008 and the law of misrepresentation) and, if this is the case, then 
examine whether consumers procure an appropriate remedy in such a situation. 
Secondly, the chapter will address the question of how consumer law could better 
promote CSR. This section will particularly discuss the recent recommendations of 
the Law Commission about the introduction of consumer redress for misleading and 
aggressive practices which were published in March 2012.  
                                                          
31
 See for example for the management literature: J Leigh and S Waddock, ‘The Emergence of Total 
Responsibility Management Systems: J. Sainsbury’s (plc) Voluntary Responsibility Management 
Systems for Global Food Retail Supply Chains (2006) 111 (4) Business and Society Review 409. 
32
 See N C Smith, ‘Consumers As Drivers Of Corporate Social Responsibility’ in A Crane, A 
McWilliams, D Matten et al. (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility (OUP 
2008) 281; M Carrington, B Neville and G Whitwell, ‘Why Ethical Consumers Don’t Walk Their Talk: 
Towards a Framework for Understanding the Gap Between the Ethical Purchase Intentions and Actual 
Buying Behaviour of Ethically Minded Consumers’ (2010) 97 Journal of Business Ethics 139. 
14 
 
The fourth substantive chapter will analyse the extent to which English tort law 
promotes the socially responsible behaviour of companies. CSR and the law of torts 
overlap where tort law protects the interests that CSR requires companies to 
pursue, such as the adherence to human rights or the protection of the environment. 
The violation of CSR principles can therefore in some circumstances constitute torts, 
for example negligence. Based on a case study of corporate conduct that violates 
CSR principles, the analysis of the promotion of CSR in English tort law will consider 
if and, if so, how the different causes of action in English tort law encompass 
violations of CSR principles. The chapter will also analyse whether the tort victims 
procure an appropriate remedy against the tortfeasor. It will then address challenges 
of using tort law as an instrument for the promotion of CSR, for example, the 
existence of corporate group structures consisting of a parent company and several 
subsidiaries. 
The remainder of the thesis draws the threads of the analysis together. The final 
chapter will first discuss the limitations of private law in the promotion of CSR and 
then the contribution that private law makes to the promotion of CSR. The limitations 
are discussed under three headings: First, the continuing dominance of the 
shareholder value theory; secondly, the patchy coverage of private law; and thirdly 
the weaknesses of private law remedies. The contributions that CSR makes to the 
promotion of CSR are addressed subsequently under the following titles: First, the 
overlap between CSR and private law (leading to the argument that CSR is, at least 
in part, law); secondly, the mechanisms that private law provides for the 
incorporation and enforcement of CSR; thirdly, the contribution of private law to 
hybrid regulatory systems of CSR. The chapter will then discuss limitations of this 
research and the scope for subsequent research on CSR and the law, following the 
conclusion of this thesis. Finally, the chapter will provide a list of substantive 
recommendations for changes to English law that result from the analysis. Within 
the discussion of the limitations and the strengths of private law in the promotion of 
CSR, this chapter will also address the question to what extent English private law 
could contribute to the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights into English law. 
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Chapter 2: The regulatory framework of CSR; Literature 
review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is threefold. First of all, it will set up core material for the 
thesis. It will summarise the debate surrounding how CSR is defined and briefly 
introduce the various normative justifications that are used for CSR. Secondly, this 
chapter will provide an overview of the regulatory framework of CSR by looking at 
the following levels: International law, European Union law, domestic legislation in 
English law and private regulation. The purpose of this analysis is to demonstrate 
the significance of private law for CSR in its broader contexts. Thirdly, the chapter 
will critically review the existing literature on CSR and the law in light of the 
regulatory framework. The particular focus of the analysis is the question if and, if 
so, how the existing literature comprehends (or has failed to comprehend) the roles 
of private law in this regulatory framework.  
2.2 Key terminology 
2.2.1 The debate about the definition of CSR 
Although the term Corporate Social Responsibility is widely used, it is far from clear 
how it is defined.33 In fact, there is no generally accepted definition of CSR and the 
growing academic and public interest in the concept of CSR has only added to the 
number of existing definitions.34 It is often said that the debate about the definition of 
CSR is exacerbated by the interests of the different groups involved with CSR.35 
Horrigan observes that CSR has ‘many different definitions, grounded in many 
different standpoints from which it can be approached’.36 Nevertheless, a clear 
definition of CSR and related concepts would be useful in order ‘to avoid talking at 
                                                          
33
 B Horrigan, Corporate Social Responsibility in the 21
st
 century: Debates, Models and Practices 
Across Government, Law and Business (Edward Elgar 2010) 34. It is important to note that some 
authors refer to ‘corporate responsibility’ only thus omitting the word ‘social’. This is frequently done 
without explanation, for example by Horrigan in his book Corporate Social Responsibility in the 21
st
 
century (Edward Elgar 2010). Nevertheless, the concept is in this book, as in many other publications, 
still labelled CSR. Insofar as this thesis engages with or refers to literature which uses ‘corporate 
responsibility’, it will be examined in the same way as literature that refers to Corporate Social 
Responsibility, as the majority of authors still seem to have the same concept in mind. Moreover, 
Corporate Social Responsibility is the most widely used term. See for a discussion about the use of the 
term Corporate Responsibility: J Zerk, Multinationals and Corporate Social Responsibility: Limitations 
and Opportunities in International Law (CUP 2006) 32.  
34
 See for a discussion about definitions of CSR: C Villiers, ‘Corporate law, corporate power and 
corporate social responsibility’ in N Boeger, R Murray and C Villiers (eds), Perspectives on Corporate 
Social Responsibility (Edward Elgar 2008) 91-93. 
35
 J Zerk, Multinationals and Corporate Social Responsibility: Limitations and Opportunities in 
International Law (CUP 2006) 29. 
36
 B Horrigan, Corporate Social Responsibility in the 21
st
 century: Debates, Models and Practices 
Across Government, Law and Business (Edward Elgar 2010) 34. 
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cross-purposes’.37 The following part will therefore seek to define CSR for the 
purpose of this thesis. 
The Confederation of Business Industry (CBI) defines CSR as ‘the 
acknowledgement by companies that they should be accountable not only for their 
financial performance, but also for the impact of their activities on society and/or the 
environment.’38 Notably, the CBI definition adds that CSR is ‘voluntary’, ‘business-
driven’ and often goes ‘well beyond’ what is required by legislation. The UK 
government approaches CSR in a similar way: ‘Corporate Responsibility can be 
defined as how companies address the social, environmental and economic impacts 
of their operations and so help to meet our sustainable development goals.’39 It 
would specifically encompass ‘the voluntary actions that business can take, over 
and above compliance with minimum legal requirements’. 
The long-standing definition of the European Commission used until its 2011 
communication on CSR corresponded with this approach, as it defines CSR as ‘a 
concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their 
business operations and in their interactions with their stakeholders on a voluntary 
basis’.40  
All three of these definitions have in common that they define CSR as a voluntary 
undertaking. There thus appears to be a distinction between CSR and the law. CSR 
is characterised as corporate actions above and beyond legal obligations. The effect 
of these definitions is that law and CSR are separate concepts. In terms of the 
content of CSR, these definitions focus on the social and environmental impact of 
corporations. 
However, the view that CSR is, by definition, a voluntary matter is far from settled. 
Doubts have been raised whether or not CSR can still be considered to be purely 
voluntary, arguing that research has shown that CSR produces a variety of legal 
                                                          
37
 N Boeger, R Murray and C Villiers ‘Introduction’ in N Boeger, R Murray and C Villiers (eds), 
Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility (Edward Elgar 2008) 1. 
38
 Confederation of British Industry (CBI), ‘Issue Statement: Corporate Social responsibility’ (2001), 
available at:  
http://www.cbi.org.uk/ndbs/content.nsf/802737AED3E3420580256706005390AE/9D502144AC9F6443
80256F58005BD16C (last accessed: 03/10/2012). 
39
 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, ‘Corporate Responsibility’, available at: 
http://www.bis.gov.uk/policies/business-sectors/low-carbon-business-opportunities/sustainable-
development/corporate-responsibility (last accessed: 20/02/2012). 
40
 European Commission, ‘Green paper: Promoting a European framework for Corporate Social 
Responsibility’, COM (2001) 366 final, 20. 
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effects.41 There are several broader definitions in the academic literature which are 
more open to the question whether or not CSR is purely a voluntary commitment, for 
example the definition provided by Sheikh who defines CSR as ‘the assumption of 
responsibilities by companies, whether voluntarily or by virtue of statute, in 
discharging socioeconomic obligations in society’.42 Other scholars have followed 
this approach. For example, Zerk applies a broader approach to CSR. In her view, 
CSR refers to the notion that ‘each business enterprise, as a member of society has 
a responsibility to operate ethically and in accordance with its legal obligations and 
to strive to minimise any adverse effects of its operations and activities on the 
environment, society and human health’.43 She concludes that the reason for the 
controversies about how to define CSR might be that these definitions are often 
presented ‘with an agenda in mind’. Hereby Zerk indicates that business 
organisations and NGOs often argue for either a voluntary or mandatory 
understanding of CSR in order to promote their political agenda in this respect.  
Acknowledging that no clear consensus has yet been reached about what exactly 
CSR means, Campbell and Vick define CSR in the following way:  
At a minimum the term implies an obligation on the part of large companies to 
pursue objectives advancing the interests of all groups affected by their activities – 
not just shareholders but also employees, consumers, suppliers, creditors and local 
communities. These interests are not just economic, but also include environmental, 
human rights and ‘quality of life’ concerns. The obligation to be socially responsible 
is usually conceived of as being over and above the minimum requirement imposed 
on companies by formal legal rules, although this is not invariably the case.
44
 
It is an important aspect of this definition that, whilst it acknowledges that CSR is 
often perceived of as being voluntary, it also includes statutory CSR obligations. The 
strength of this approach is that it recognises that, for example, mandatory 
legislation sometimes addresses issues which are part of the CSR agenda, such as 
bribery and corruption offences. Campbell and Vick refer to the Anti-Terrorism, 
Crime and Security Act 2001 which, at the time the chapter from these authors was 
published, stipulated that UK companies and company directors could be 
prosecuted for bribery and corruption offences wherever they are committed in the 
world (ss. 108 – 110). Since then, these provisions (along with other previous 
statutory and common law provisions on bribery) have been repealed by the Bribery 
                                                          
41
 C Glinski, ‘Corporate codes of conduct: moral or legal obligation’ in D McBarnet, A Voiculescu and T 
Campbell (eds), The new corporate accountability: Corporate social responsibility and the law (CUP 
2007) 147. 
42
 S Sheikh, Corporate Social Responsibilities: Law and Practice (Cavendish 1995) 15. 
43
 J Zerk, Multinationals and Corporate Social Responsibility: Limitations and Opportunities in 
International Law (CUP 2006) 32. 
44
 K Campbell and D Vick, ‘Disclosure Law and the market for corporate social responsibility’ in D 
McBarnet, A Voiculescu and T Campbell (eds), The new corporate accountability: Corporate social 
responsibility and the law (CUP 2007) 242. 
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Act 2010.45 The Bribery Act replaced these provisions, inter alia, with the crimes of 
bribery and the failure of a commercial organisation to prevent bribery on its 
behalf.46 
The core of these different definitions is a shared belief that companies have a 
responsibility for the public good.47 There is, by and large, a consensus about the 
aims of CSR – to make corporations advance the interests of those who are affected 
by their activities, focusing in particular on the social and environmental impact of 
their work. However, as already noted, the definitions are less unanimous about the 
question whether CSR does or should achieve these aims by means of legal and/or 
voluntary concepts.48  
This thesis will adopt the definition from Campbell and Vick which does not exclude 
mandatory CSR regulation.49 This definition has several advantages. Firstly, it 
enumerates various groups (stakeholders) affected by a corporation. Secondly, it 
explicitly includes economic, environmental and human rights issues into the ambit 
of CSR, thus clarifying that these are specific issues that are encompassed by CSR 
in any case. The reference to ‘quality of life concerns’ allows for flexibility as to the 
exact scope of CSR. Thirdly, it is an advantage of this definition that, whilst it 
acknowledges that CSR is traditionally often perceived of as being voluntary, it also 
states that it can be mandatory. This approach reflects the situation that there are 
statutory legal requirements which overlap with CSR, for example, the duty to 
promote the success of the company pursuant to s172 (1) Companies Act 2006.50 
This definition thus supports one of the core arguments of this thesis, namely that 
CSR is, at least in part, law. Notably, the position that CSR is purely voluntary 
seems to be losing ground, as evidenced, inter alia, by the fact that, in its 2011 
communication on CSR, the European Commission puts forward a new definition of 
CSR that no longer classifies CSR as ‘voluntary’. According to the Commission’s 
new definition CSR is ‘the responsibility of enterprises for their impacts on society’.51  
                                                          
45
 Schedule 2 of the Bribery Act 2010 replaces ss108 – 110 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security 
Act 2001. 
46
 ss1, 7 Bribery Act 2010. 
47
 M Blowfield and A Murray, Corporate responsibility: A critical introduction (OUP 2008) 13. 
48
 These findings are confirmed by a study which is based on the analyses of 37 different definitions of 
CSR. See: A Dahlsrud, ‘How Corporate Social Responsibility is Defined: an Analysis of 37 Definitions’ 
(2008) 15 Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management 1. 
49
 See K Campbell and D Vick, ‘Disclosure Law and the market for corporate social responsibility’ in D 
McBarnet, A Voiculescu and T Campbell (eds), The new corporate accountability: Corporate social 
responsibility and the law (CUP 2007) 242.  
50
 s417 CA 2006: ‘Contents of directors’ report: business review’. 
51
 European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A renewed 
EU strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social Responsibility’ COM (2011) 681 final, para 3.1. 
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2.2.2 Theories of CSR 
Closely related with the debate about the definition of CSR is the question why 
companies engage or should engage with CSR. It is beyond the scope of this thesis, 
however, to discuss the different normative justifications for CSR in detail. Garriga 
and Melé classify the main CSR theories into four groups.52 They call the first group 
instrumental theories, as these theories assume that the corporation is purely an 
instrument for wealth creation.53 This view is evident in the famous statement from 
Milton Friedman that ‘there is one and only one social responsibility of business – to 
use it resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it 
stays within the rules of the game’.54 This theory of CSR is in accordance with the 
shareholder value theory of the firm.55 Companies may engage with CSR only in 
order to promote business. This approach has become known as the ‘business 
case’ for CSR.56 Consequently, social activities are only accepted if they increase 
the wealth of the company. The second group (called political theories) emphasises 
the social power of companies. According to this theory, companies must accept 
social duties due to the power that they wield.57 The corporate citizenship concept, 
which belongs to this group, focusses on the business responsibility towards the 
local community where it operates.58 The third group, the integrative theories, 
argues that firms should integrate social issues as they depend on society.59 And, 
finally, the fourth group focusses on the ethical values underlying the relationships 
between business and society. The stakeholder theory belongs to this group of 
theories, known as ethical theories. This theory argues that companies must 
                                                          
52
 E Garriga and D Melé, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility Theories: Mapping the Territory’ (2004) 53 
Journal of Business Ethics 51, 52. Millon distinguishes between two different theories of CSR which he 
calls ‘the ethical model of CSR’ and ‘the strategic model of CSR’. The ethical model (also called ‘the 
constitutency model of CSR’ in an earlier article by Millon) is based on the argument that the 
management of the company should balance the interests of shareholders and non-shareholders. It 
rejects the idea of maximising shareholder value. This model generally assumes that the interests of 
shareholders and non-shareholders conflict. The other model, the strategic model (called ‘the 
sustainability model of CSR’ in an earlier article by Millon), argues that CSR is undertaken by 
companies in order to promote the profits and shareholder wealth. The long-term prosperity of the 
company depends on the well-being of the company’s various stakeholders. This approach is based on 
the ‘business case’ for CSR. See: D Millon, ‘Shareholder Social Responsibility’ (2013) 36 Seattle 
University Law Review 912, 922 – 928; D Millon, ‘Two Models Of Corporate Social Responsibility’ 
(2011) 46 Wake Forest Law Review 523.    
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 ibid. 
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 M Friedman, ‘The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits’ The New York Times 
Magazine (New York, 13 September 1970). 
55
 This theory will be discussed in detail in the chapter on ‘Company law, Corporate governance and 
CSR’ in this thesis. 
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 E Kurucz, B Colbert and D Wheeler, ‘The Business Case for Corporate Social Responsibility’ in A 
Crane and others (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility (OUP 2008) 84. 
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 E Garriga and D Melé, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility Theories: Mapping the Territory’ (2004) 53 
Journal of Business Ethics 51, 55. 
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 D Melé, Corporate Social Responsibility Theories’ in A Crane and others (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility (OUP 2008) 68. 
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balance the interests of all stakeholders of the firm rather than purely pursue the 
interests of the company’s stockholders.60 The stakeholder theory will be discussed 
in detail in the chapter on ‘Company law, corporate governance and Corporate 
Social Responsibility’. 
2.2.3 Private law 
Whilst there is an ongoing debate about the question whether or not a public/private 
divide is justifiable in English law, it is necessary to, at least, adopt a working 
definition of private law in this thesis, due to the focus of the analysis.61 Oliver 
notices that more attention is paid to defining public law than to defining private 
law.62 The general assumption seems to be that private law is a residual area, i.e. 
the area of the law that is not public law. Hedley, too, admits that private law is, 
though much used by lawyers, only rarely defined in common law systems.63 
According to a common definition, public law is concerned with relations between 
the individual and the state as well as the distribution of power between public 
institutions and a range of non-governmental organisations.64 Loughlin defines 
public law as ‘simply a sophisticated form of political discourse; controversies within 
the subject are simply extended political disputes’.65 
Lord Woolf identifies the function which is performed as the essential criterion for 
distinguishing between public law and private law. If the function is a governmental 
activity, then it is public law.66 He defines private law as the system which protects 
the private rights of private individuals or the private rights of public bodies. Cane 
follows a similar approach, but simply calls the activity ‘private activity’ and ‘public 
activity’. The classification of an area of law into either public law or private law 
depends on a value judgment about whether the performance ought to be controlled 
by public or private law principles.67 Hedley notes that private law would often be 
described as ‘the law between private individuals that is contrasted with the law 
involving organs of the state which is public law’.68 Hedley’s definition mirrors the 
one suggested by Lord Woolf which looks at the function performed as the 
distinguishing factor between private law and public law. This thesis will adopt the 
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definition used by Lord Woolf as it clearly identifies private law with its reference to 
the rules which regulate private rights between private individuals. This definition 
encompasses those areas of law that are traditionally understood as private law, i.e. 
contract law, tort law and property law, but it also allows for expanding the scope of 
private law to cover areas such as company law, consumer law and commercial law. 
This definition accords with Oliver’s classification of several areas of law as private 
law, namely tort, contract law, company law and restraint of trade.69 On the basis of 
this definition, the areas of law analysed in the substantive chapters of this thesis 
are all private law (i.e. Company law and corporate governance, Contract law, 
Consumer law, Tort law). 
2.3 The regulatory framework of CSR 
This thesis adopts a broad understanding of regulation as ‘all mechanisms of social 
control or influence affecting behaviour from whatever source, whether intentional or 
not’.70 This definition potentially encompasses different forms of regulation including 
the traditional state-based regulation. This approach is in line with those who see 
regulation as a concept that includes law, but is not limited to law.71 This definition 
therefore conceives of regulation as ‘a broader social phenomenon than law’.72 
Regulation need not originate from the state. It also encompasses other means of 
exercising social control or influence to affect behaviour, including ‘unintentional and 
non-state processes’.73 The term ‘regulation’ can therefore be used to refer to a 
range of regulatory forms, including governmental and non-governmental, national, 
transnational and global ones. This broad understanding of regulation is important 
as CSR is particularly based on private regulation, for example codes of conduct 
developed by corporations themselves or third parties such as non-governmental 
organisations. 
2.3.1 International law level 
The CSR instruments of international governing bodies, such as the UN, are 
predominately soft law recommendations and guidelines.74 In the international law 
context, ‘soft law’ is used to denote ‘principles and policies which have been 
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negotiated and agreed between states, or promulgated by international institutions, 
but which are not mandated by law or subject to any formal enforcement 
mechanisms’.75 Influential soft law public international law instruments on CSR are 
said to be the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises76, the 1977 ILO (International Labour 
Organization) Tripartite Declaration Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social 
Policy (the ILO Tripartite Declaration)77 and the UN Global Compact.78  
2.3.1.1 United Nations 
An early CSR initiative was the Draft UN Code of Conduct on Transnational 
Corporations (the ‘Draft UN Code’).79 The UN attempted to address the challenges 
posed by multinational companies with the establishment of the United Nations 
Commission on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC), an intergovernmental forum 
for deliberations on multinational corporations.80 The UNCTC worked on the 
formulation of a code of conduct for multinational corporations.81 The UN adopted a 
draft code in 1983, and revised versions of it in 1988 and 1990.82 The final version of 
the draft code addresses a range of general political, social, economic and 
development issues, including human rights.83 Transnational corporations are 
required ‘to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms in the countries in 
which they operate...’84 The Code also containes guidelines regarding the protection 
of consumers85 and the environment.86 The UNCTC was closed in 1993 which 
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brought the work on the Draft Code to an end.87 The Draft Code was never adopted. 
Its legal status was never finally settled, but by 1990 the UNCTC had accepted the 
likelihood that the code would remain voluntary.88 Even though the code was never 
adopted, it has been argued that it is of historical significance as a document that 
demonstrates international consensus on the responsibilities of multinationals as 
early as during the 1980s.89 
An important UN source of CSR is the UN Global Compact which was launched in 
September 2000 by the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. He asked business 
leaders to voluntarily ‘embrace and enact’ principles of the Compact. The UN Global 
Compact was not created by states through a negotiated international treaty, but it 
was initiated by the UN General Secretary together with business actors and UN 
agencies. Members of the UN Global Compact are corporations, employers’ and 
employee’ organisations, state institutions and civil society organisations.90 Since its 
launch it has grown to more than 8,000 participants, including over 5,300 
businesses in 130 countries around the world.91 It was the underlying aim to provide 
for simple means of becoming a member of the Global Compact.92 The Global 
Compact contains ten principles on human rights, labour standards, environmental 
protection and about fighting corruption. The Global Compact was not intended to 
be a ‘regulatory instrument’.93 It is not a code of conduct.94 Still, corporations who 
have subscribed to it are required to submit examples of how they have complied 
with the Principles on an annual basis.95 The Global Compact has been subject to 
criticisms due to the lack of sanctions against corporations who do not comply with 
the principles. It has been argued that corporations only agreed to the Global 
Compact ‘after it had been degraded to a toothless instrument’.96 These criticisms 
eventually led to a control mechanism that enables the Global Compact to exclude 
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members who severely violate the principles.97 And, in fact, the UN reports in 2009 
that it has delisted more than 1,000 members for failure to meet the UN Global 
Compact’s mandatory annual reporting requirement, also known as the 
Communication on Progress (COP) policy.98 
The UN Sub-Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights 
published in 2003 the ‘Norms on the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations 
and Other Business Enterprises with regard to human rights obligations’.99 The 
underlying idea was that the Norms should be adopted by the member states. 
However, as the Norms tried to impose legally binding obligations on transnational 
companies, they were viewed rather critically by several member states and 
rejected.100 NGOs, on the other hand, welcomed them.101 The difference between 
the Norms and previous CSR initiatives is that they sought to extend the reach of 
international law to transnational corporations by directly imposing obligations upon 
them.102 It was essentially the aim of the Norms to impose on companies the same 
human rights duties as states have accepted under treaties.103 Due to the 
controversy about the Norms, the UN Commission on Human Rights finally failed to 
adopt the document.104 
The UN Secretary-General subsequently appointed Professor John Ruggie of 
Harvard University as Special Representative on the issue of human rights and 
business (SRSG).105 During his six-year mandate, Ruggie engaged in an extensive 
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consultation process and reported six times.106 Ruggie criticised the Norms for 
‘intermingling the respective roles of states and business’.107 In his 2008 report, 
Ruggie proposed a three-pillar framework for corporate accountability for human 
rights, which he describes as ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’. The framework ‘rests 
on differentiated but complementary responsibilities’.108 Ruggie’s work during his 
mandate led to the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights which were 
published in 2011.109 The Guiding Principles were endorsed by the United Nations 
Human Rights Council in June 2011.110 Human rights are an important element of 
the CSR agenda.111 The Guiding Principles have therefore been called ‘a landmark 
in the CSR debate’.112 The UN Guiding Principles are organised in three pillars: the 
state duty to protect human rights, the corporate duty to respect human rights, and 
the need for access to effective remedy mechanisms when abuses occur. The 
Guiding Principles distinguish between the duties of states and the responsibilities of 
companies in order to indicate that respecting rights is not an obligation that current 
international human rights law generally imposes directly upon companies.113 The 
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introduction to the Guiding Principles emphasises that the normative contribution of 
the Guiding Principles lies not in the creation of new international law obligations, 
but in elaborating the implications of existing standards and practices for states and 
businesses.114 
The Guiding Principles are intended to be implemented by countries and by 
companies.115 In its 2011 Communication on CSR, the EU Commission has 
stressed that it seeks to support the implementation of the Guiding Principles and it 
has invited EU Member States to develop national plans by the end of 2012 for the 
implementation of the UN Guiding Principles into domestic law.116 The UK 
government has made a political commitment to the Guiding Principles.117 However, 
at the time of writing, it has not yet published its national plan. As the Guiding 
Principles highlight, inter alia, the importance of home state regulation for the 
protection of human rights from business conduct, national private law could be an 
important part of this home state regulation. Private law could be used by the UK 
government to implement the Guiding Principles into English law. Due to their 
topicality and importance for CSR, and also the secondary research question, the 
UN Guiding Principles will be briefly outlined here. With regard to the first pillar, the 
state duty to protect human rights, the recommendations in the Guiding Principles 
contain operational principles about the ways in which states could meet their duty 
to protect human rights. 
Principle 3 provides that, in meeting their duty to protect, States should:  
 
(a) Enforce laws that are aimed at, or have the effect of, requiring business 
enterprises to respect human rights, and periodically to assess the adequacy of 
such laws and address any gaps; 
(b) Ensure that other laws and policies governing the creation and ongoing 
operation of business enterprises, such as corporate law, do not constrain but 
enable business respect for human rights; 
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(c) Provide effective guidance to business enterprises on how to respect human 
rights throughout their operations; 
(d) Encourage, and where appropriate require, business enterprises to 
communicate how they address their human rights impacts.
118
 
 
The commentary to Principle 3 (a) emphasises that there is often a ‘significant 
failure to enforce existing laws that directly or indirectly regulate business respect for 
human rights’.119 The commentary goes on to mention the examples of non-
discriminatory and labour laws, as well as environmental, property, privacy and anti-
bribery laws. States should consider whether these laws provide the necessary 
coverage and are being enforced effectively. 
In its second pillar, the Guiding Principles also provide a set of recommendations as 
to how corporations should meet their duty to respect human rights.120 These 
principles outline how corporations ought to avoid infringing the human rights of 
others and how they should address their human rights impact. Notably, the 
commentary emphasises that the responsibility of corporations to respect human 
rights ‘is a global standard of expected conduct for all business enterprises which 
exists independently of states’ abilities to fulfil their own human rights obligations 
and does not diminish those obligations’.121 Moreover, this responsibility of 
corporations would exist over and above compliance with national laws and 
regulations protecting human rights.122 As the principles pertaining to the 
responsibility of companies goes beyond what is necessary to comply with national 
laws, the implications of the second pillar for English private law are limited.123 
The third area of the Guiding Principles concerns the need for greater access by 
victims to effective remedies, both judicial and non-judicial. States are required, as 
part of their duty to protect against business-related human rights abuses, to provide 
sufficient access to effective remedies for victims of such abuses that occur within 
their territory and/or jurisdiction through judicial, administrative or other appropriate 
means.124 Access to justice has both procedural and substantive aspects. The 
operational principles distinguish between three different aspects: First, state-based 
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judicial mechanisms125; secondly, state-based non-judicial grievance 
mechanisms126; thirdly, non-state-based grievance mechanisms.127  
2.3.1.2 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
Another important international initiative for CSR are the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises which were first published in 1976128 and most recently 
updated in 2011.129 The negotiators of the Guidelines were the participating 
countries of the OECD, business associations, trade unions and some civil society 
organisations.130 The Guidelines contain voluntary recommendations on human 
rights, employment, industrial relations, the environment, bribery and consumer 
interests. The Guidelines make direct reference to some important international 
instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the ILO 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. These 
recommendations only address corporations whose headquarters are in states 
which adhere to the OECD Guidelines. Complaints can therefore only be brought 
against companies from those countries. It has been regarded as positive though 
that the OECD Guidelines apply ‘both to the Member States in charge of 
implementing them and to the multinational enterprises whose activities these 
Guidelines are supposed to govern (whether they operate on the territory of a 
member country or are based there)’.131 The OECD Guidelines have in recent 
versions involved the creation of National Contact Points as a ‘follow-up’ 
mechanism.132 The National Contact Points are responsible for encouraging 
adherence to the principles. They mediate disputes in case of alleged non-
adherence to the Guidelines. Complaints can be filed before such a National 
Contact Point. Civil society organisations have had access to this complaint 
procedure since 2000. The UK National Contact Point is a non-judicial mechanism 
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that does not have powers of enforceability and cannot impose sanctions on non-
complying companies, but it can investigate complaints.133 
2.3.1.3 International Labour Organisation 
The International Labour Organisation’s (ILO) Tripartite Declaration of Principles 
Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (Tripartite Declaration) aims 
‘to encourage the positive contribution which multinational enterprises can make to 
economic and social progress and to minimise and to resolve the difficulties to which 
their various operations give rise’.134 It was published in 1978 and amended in 2001 
and 2006.135 The amended version makes reference to the ILO’s 1998 Declaration 
on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.136 The Tripartite Declaration 
contains fundamental principles in the fields of employment, training, working 
conditions and industrial relations. The ILO Tripartite Declaration is comparable to 
the OECD Guidelines insofar as it is intended to be non-binding.137 The Declaration 
consequently lacks an enforcement mechanism for its provisions.138 
2.3.2 European Union level  
The EU addressed the CSR agenda later than the UN, OECD and ILO.139 The 
European Commission summarised its view on CSR in a Green Paper entitled 
‘Promoting a European Framework for Corporate Social Responsibility’, published in 
2001. As indicated above, the Commission defined CSR in this Green Paper as a 
‘voluntary concept’.140 The Green Paper focuses on the ‘business case’ for CSR.141 
The aim of the Green Paper was to start a debate on CSR, rather than ‘making 
concrete proposals for action’.142 Hence, the Green Paper recommends companies 
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to subscribe to existing international CSR standards, rather than develop their own 
ones.143 The Commission goes beyond its approval of voluntary CSR approaches by 
expecting companies to observe national and international legislation, including 
human rights principles.144 Further support for a voluntary approach to CSR can be 
found by the recommendations of the EU-Multi Stakeholder Forum on CSR which 
reported its conclusions in June 2004.145 Its underlying aim was to consider the 
integration of CSR into all EU policies.146 Notably, the position of the European 
Parliament in the CSR debate diverged from the Commission’s approach as it has 
always favoured a regulatory approach to CSR.147 The European Parliament 
suggested to the Commission that it should take inspiration from best practice at 
domestic level (which is not always purely voluntary).148  
Following the global financial crisis, the Commission published Green Papers on 
corporate governance in 2010-2011 in which it identified governance shortcomings 
in the financial industry and it also considered broader corporate governance 
reforms for companies generally.149 Moreover, the Commission also released a new 
communication on CSR in 2011 which contains an action agenda for the period 
2011-2014.150 The CSR policy outlined in the communication addresses a number of 
factors that, in the Commission’s view, ‘will help to further increase the impact of its 
CSR policy’, including improved company disclosure on social and environmental 
information.151 Among the points in the communication is the notion that public 
authorities should ‘where necessary’ complement voluntary CSR policies through 
regulation that, for example, promote transparency or create market incentives for 
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responsible business conduct.152 With this point the Commission underlines its slight 
deviation from its previous insistence that CSR was purely voluntary (as also 
indicated in the Commission’s new definition of CSR, mentioned above). Moreover, 
the Commission seeks to improve self- and co-regulation processes and it has 
launched a process with enterprises and other stakeholders in this respect.153 
Overall, the communication does not significantly deviate from the Commission’s 
previous CSR policies. In particular, the Commission does not propose the 
introduction of any specific Europe-wide CSR regulation. 
In December 2012, the Commission released an action plan on European company 
law and corporate governance in which it announced that it would make a proposal 
in 2013 to strengthen disclosure requirements on board diversity policy and risk 
management.154 In February 2013, the EU Parliament adopted two resolutions in 
which it highlights the importance of company transparency on environmental and 
social matters.155 The EU Parliament asked the Commission to bring forward a 
proposal on non-financial disclosure by companies. In April 2013, the Commission 
proposed a directive regarding disclosure of nonfinancial and diversity information 
by certain large companies and groups.156 The proposed directive, if introduced, 
would require large companies with more than 500 employees157 to disclose 
relevant and material environmental and social information in their annual reports.158 
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This proposed reporting duty is significant for CSR as the issues that companies 
would have to report on overlap with CSR matters. 
2.3.3 Domestic legislation in English law 
There have been attempts by CSR campaigners in the UK to put CSR into formal 
legislation. The Corporate Responsibility (CORE) Coalition has so far developed two 
separate Corporate Responsibility Bills in the UK which were introduced into 
Parliament by Private Members’ Bills: The first one in 2003 and the second one in 
2004.159  
The first Bill was introduced by Linda Perham MP in 2003 and the second by Andy 
King MP in 2004. The aim of the 2003 version was to strengthen the transparency of 
companies about CSR (through, for instance, mandatory reporting provisions), an 
extension of directors’ duties to take account of the environmental and social impact 
of their conduct and a statutory obligation to pay compensation to those injured or 
harmed as a result of group management failure.160 A particular aim of this Bill was, 
in case of a parent company based in the UK with subsidiaries abroad, to impose a 
duty on the parent company to ensure that its foreign subsidiaries comply with the 
Act. This Bill did not succeed, however, partly due to the ongoing process of 
reviewing the Companies Act at that time. The Companies Act review process 
included discussions about an extension of directors’ duties to consider the impact 
of the corporation on their stakeholders as well as debates about an inclusion of 
reporting duties about CSR matters.161 The 2004 Bill, which also failed, proposed a 
stronger reporting system about environmental and social impacts which was mainly 
based on mandatory reporting obligations.162 
Despite the absence of a specific CSR Act in domestic English law one can now find 
sections in the Companies Act (CA) 2006 which have relevance for CSR. The new 
directors’ duty in s172 CA 2006 (‘Duty to promote the success of the company’) 
states that a director must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most 
likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a 
whole. The section enumerates several factors to which directors should have 
regard when making their decisions, such as the likely consequences of any 
decision in the long term, the interests of employees and the impact on the 
environment. The list is non-exhaustive. This provision embodies the ‘enlightened 
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shareholder value theory’ that underlies the Companies Act 2006.163 It has been 
argued that, with its emphasis on various factors that a director must take into 
account when making a decision, s172 CA would be ‘stakeholder sensitive’, 
‘relational’ and ‘more explicitly long term’.164 The exact scope of this duty will be 
analysed below. It is sufficient to note here that, whilst there are criticisms about the 
enforceability of this duty, the list of factors to which a director must have regard 
overlaps with the objects of CSR.  
The second part of the CA 2006 which is relevant for CSR is the reporting duty 
contained in s417 CA. This section requires directors to include a business review 
into their directors' report.165 It is the purpose of the business review is ‘to inform 
members of the company and help them assess how the directors have performed 
their duty to promote the success of the company under section 172 CA’.166 The 
business review is significant for CSR due to the overlap between the list of factors 
in s172 CA and CSR.167 
Another means to hold corporations liable in private law is through torts law. A 
company is vicariously liable in tort for the wrongful acts of an agent or employee 
acting within the scope of his authority or in the course of his employment. Tort law 
and CSR overlap where tort law provides causes of action for corporate conduct that 
constitutes violations of CSR principles. Different causes of action in tort such as 
negligence, private nuisance or battery could therefore provide remedies vis-à-vis 
companies that have violated CSR principles. The use of sophisticated group 
structures by many companies constitutes a challenge for the tort liability of parent 
companies for torts committed by their subsidiaries. The position in English law is 
that companies in a group of companies are separate legal entities.168 However, the 
recent decision in Chandler v Cape plc  established that a parent company may be 
directly liable in negligence to the employees of its subsidiary (to whom it may owe a 
direct duty of care) irrespective of the separate legal personality of its subsidiary.169 
This decision is significant in terms of CSR promotion, as it could establish 
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principles for the future liability of parent companies in tort to the employees of their 
subsidiaries for conduct that violates CSR principles. 
Another example of domestic law playing a role in terms of CSR is the use of 
consumer protection laws and competition laws to hold corporations accountable for 
false advertisement.170 Such claims could be made against a company that violates 
commitments that it has made in a code of conduct, for example where a company 
pledges in a code of conduct to respect human rights in its business practice, but is 
actually involved in the commission of international crimes.171 There is only very 
limited case law available so far.172 The legal bases in this area are the EU Directive 
on unfair commercial practices (Directive 2005/29/EC), implemented through the 
Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 and the EU Directive 
concerning misleading and comparative advertising (Directive 2006/114/EC), 
implemented through the Business Protection from Misleading Marketing 
Regulations 2008. The Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 
prohibit misleading actions, including the failure by a trader to comply with a firm and 
verifiable commitment contained in a code of conduct with which he has undertaken 
to comply. Notably, in March 2012, the Law Commission recommended the 
introduction of consumer redress for misleading and aggressive practices. 
Finally, English contract law could also play a part in the promotion of CSR in 
domestic English law. The rules provided by contract law are already used by 
companies in their supply chain contracts to incorporate CSR standards.173 As 
companies understand their supply chain as an area of reputational risk, they 
increasingly incorporate CSR obligations into the contracts with their suppliers.174 
Contract law is therefore an area of domestic law that could be part of the regulatory 
framework of CSR. 
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Corporations can also be criminally liable for violations of CSR principles, for 
example for the use of physical force against employees.175 Companies can commit 
crimes, although some offences cannot be committed by companies due to their 
nature. If criminal liability is to have a wide reach, it is necessary that the acts of the 
company’s employees, agents or officers are attributed to the company.176 The 
Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 (CMCHA) makes 
corporate manslaughter an offence, provided that the company’s activities are 
managed or organised in a way that causes a person’s death and amounts to a 
gross breach of a relevant duty of care owed by the company to that person.177 The 
offence presupposes that the way in which the company’s activities are managed or 
organised by its senior management is a substantial element in the breach of the 
duty of care.178 English multinational corporations also face liability under the 
recently introduced Bribery Act.179 Common to all cases of bribery outlined in the Act 
is the offer or taking of a ‘financial or other advantage’.180 The Bribery Act creates 
four offences: paying bribes, receiving bribes, the offence of bribing a foreign public 
official and the failure of a commercial organisation to prevent bribery. One of the 
penalties is the disqualification of directors under the Companies Disqualification Act 
1986. The Act has a near-universal jurisdiction, allowing for the prosecution of an 
individual or company with links to the United Kingdom, regardless of where the 
crime occurred. Section 7 makes it an offence for commercial organisations which 
have business in the UK to fail to prevent bribery on their behalf.  This offence does 
not only apply to the organisation itself; individuals and employees may also be 
guilty. Although the Bribery Act is criminal law and hence not private law, it is 
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important for this thesis for two reasons. First, it supports the view taken here that 
CSR is, at least in part, law, given that the prevention of bribery is one of the aims of 
CSR. Secondly, the existence of the Bribery Act raises the issue of whether there is 
also civil liability for bribery.181 
2.3.4 Private regulation 
Private regulation describes normative settings which are not provided for by state 
based decision-making, but by voluntary decisions of non-public actors such as 
corporations or NGOs which create general rules beyond single contracts.182 Private 
CSR regulation inter alia consists of codes of conduct183 and labelling schemes184. 
Private regulation plays an increasingly important role for CSR. The general 
proliferation of private regulation in CSR in recent years is due to the influence of 
non-state actors, such as NGOs or corporations themselves. NGOs, in particular, 
are said to have transformed CSR ‘from a fringe concern to a mainstream policy 
issue’.185 NGOs document cases and monitor adherence to CSR standards.186 For 
example, when producers meet the standards of private regulatory initiatives, they 
receive a certificate or label.187 
The area of private regulation is not homogenous, as CSR standards and codes of 
conduct are not only developed by corporations themselves188, but also at industry 
level or by NGOs. This has led to calls to ‘disentangle’ the private sphere.189 Abbott 
and Snidal have developed a conceptual map to classify the different private 
regulatory regimes. They have created a ‘governance triangle’ by distinguishing 
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between three major actors, the state, companies and non-governmental 
organisations which develop rules and standards, either separately or together.190 
Seven zones are distinguished within this triangle, depending on how many parties 
are involved in defining standards: Three zones consist of initiatives where one actor 
develops the standards (e.g. OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 
industry-driven initiatives and NGO-driven initiatives), a further three zones consist 
of initiatives where two actors develop the standards (cooperation between NGOs 
and the state, initiatives between international authorities and companies such as 
the UN Global Compact) and one zone contains initiatives developed by the three 
parties.191 An example of the latter is the 1977 Declaration of the International 
Labour Organisations, for it involves all three parties. The focus of this conceptual 
map is on who develops the initiatives. 
In conclusion, the overview of the regulatory framework of CSR in this section has 
shown that CSR and law, at least have the potential to overlap in various ways, for 
example, the duty for directors to promote the success of the company for the 
benefit of its members as a whole in s172 (1) CA or the business review in s417 CA. 
The overview therefore supports the view taken in this thesis that CSR is, at least in 
part, law. The outline of the regulatory framework of CSR has particularly shown that 
private law, the focus of this thesis, plays or at least could play a significant role for 
CSR. The following section will therefore review the existing legal literature about 
CSR in light of this regulatory framework. The particular focus of the analysis is the 
question if and, if so, how the existing literature comprehends the role of private law 
in this regulatory framework. 
2.4 Review of the literature on CSR and the law 
Traditionally, the literature on CSR and the law was very much captured in binary 
debates and tended to take place in separate spheres, for example, discussions 
about voluntary or mandatory approaches to CSR. A reason for this situation is, as 
Horrigan has noted, that ‘CSR can be studied, regulated and practised from many 
different angles’.192 These dichotomies in the CSR debate give some justification to 
the claim that ‘CSR has hardly moved beyond the starting point’.193 
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2.4.1 Classic binary debates between a mandatory and a voluntary approach 
Traditionally, discussions on CSR and the law were strongly influenced by the 
debate whether or not CSR should be voluntary or mandatory (also referred to as 
‘hard law’ or ‘soft law’ approaches to CSR). It has been said that this debate 
continues to divide CSR professionals.194 Ward states that the basic dividing line is 
between people who argue that CSR should be limited to voluntary activities beyond 
compliance and those who argue for a broader starting point.195  
On one side of this debate are those who argue for a ‘soft law’ approach to CSR, 
based on self-regulation.196 Proponents of this approach commonly point out that 
state law that forces companies to pursue CSR goals would be overly legalistic and 
complicate the running of business.197 It is often argued that the goal of wealth 
maximisation must always be the most useful touchstone for managers.198 A 
consequence of this approach is to refrain from imposing CSR-related duties on 
directors. According to this view, self-regulation is the best way to meaningfully 
approach CSR as it allows each corporation to adapt CSR to its particular situation 
thereby offering flexibility without being overly restrictive.  This approach is based on 
the idea of the business case for CSR.199 The business case argument means that 
being socially responsible will be economically beneficial for the company in the long 
run.200 State regulation is seen as burdensome and as reducing the competiveness 
of firms. This position is generally based on a neo-liberal attitude to business 
regulation.201 Its effect is to separate law and CSR. Moreover, authors writing from a 
socio-legal perspective share the scepticism about a mandatory approach to CSR 
and look for alternatives to law.202 They often see law as being ineffective to guide 
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human behaviour.203 Many socio-legal scholars are also critical of the ability of 
government departments to set and enforce rules as companies can find ways to 
comply with the letter of the law, but not its spirit.204 From this perspective, a 
mandatory approach to CSR alone does not change social practice. 
On the other side of the debate, there are those who are critical of the mainly 
voluntary status quo and who argue for a ‘hard law’ approach to CSR. Kassahun, for 
instance, contends that voluntary CSR initiatives ‘should supplement, not supplant 
state regulation’.205 This view is based on the argument that host states of 
multinational enterprises and their subsidiaries/suppliers in the developing world 
often have a low level of human rights protection and/or a weak system of law 
enforcement. These states are often too weak in comparison with the power wielded 
by some multinational companies to adequately protect CSR principles. 
Consequently, voluntary CSR standards would not be a sufficiently potent 
instrument of control.206 It would only produce few results. It is argued that the 
control of business is still a matter for the state for reasons of effectiveness, 
legitimacy and accountability.207 Mandatory CSR rules would create rights that are 
enforceable through litigation.208 One of the key arguments in favour of such an 
approach is the poor results of the current voluntary, private initiative-based CSR 
framework.209 Multinational enterprises have not fulfilled the self-imposed, voluntarily 
adopted CSR standards to which they pledged to adhere. It is therefore significant 
that, despite the academic interest in private CSR standards (also referred to as part 
of new forms of governance)210, calls for a legalistic binding CSR framework have 
not disappeared.211 Instead, they are still frequent212 and indeed more diverse now 
with different suggestions as to the binding solutions.213 Pedamon makes such a 
suggestion by arguing for a regulatory framework with a minimum definition of CSR 
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standards to ‘ensure a level playing field’.214 Companies could then define their own 
standards within this framework. She stresses the importance of sanctions to be 
imposed in the event for non-compliance. Such a system would allow companies to 
be more specific.215 Particularly NGOs are sceptical about purely voluntary 
approaches to CSR. For example, the Corporate Responsibility (CORE) Coalition, 
argues that ‘the voluntary approach to Corporate Responsibility has failed’.216 
According to this perspective, CSR is or should, at least in part, be law. 
These two strongly opposed views are representative of classic binary CSR 
debates. However, some recent literature seems to suggest that the classic 
‘either...or’ approach to the question of how to regulate CSR is losing ground. In 
respect of the voluntary vs. mandatory debate, Zerk concludes that too many 
contributions are presented ‘with an agenda in mind’.217 She calls this regulatory 
CSR debate ‘misguided’.218 It would reflect an ‘overly simplistic view of what law is, 
and how it guides human behaviour’.219 She particularly criticises that it would 
separate law from CSR which would overlook the legal developments that have 
been made in CSR.220 And, in fact, the danger of this debate is that it presents 
voluntary CSR commitments and hard law approaches as complete opposites, 
without realising that there are links and that the legal side of CSR is in evolution. 
Such binary debates do not take into account, for instance, that CSR enforcement 
mechanisms have been developed, for example the inclusion of CSR into supply 
contracts or the recourse to consumer law to enforce compliance with a code of 
conduct. These regulatory techniques lead to interaction between self-regulation, 
state law and private law. It is therefore doubtful if the private regulation of CSR can 
indeed still be regarded as entirely voluntary.221 Horrigan notes that new regulatory 
approaches to CSR render the distinction between mandatory and voluntary 
standard-setting increasingly unsound, even within the existing private initiative-
based CSR regime.222 The strict dichotomy between mandatory legal enforcement 
of CSR and voluntary corporate assumptions of responsibility would be an 
                                                          
214
 ibid. 
215
 P Utting, ‘Rethinking Business Regulation: From Self-Regulation to Social Control’, (United Nations 
Research Institute for Social Development, Technology, Business and Society Programme Paper 
Number 15 September 2005) 8. 
216
 See http://corporate-responsibility.org/ (last accessed 09/04/2013). 
217
 J Zerk, Multinationals and Corporate Social Responsibility: Limitations and Opportunities in 
International Law (CUP 2006) 32. 
218
 ibid, 34. 
219
 ibid. 
220
 ibid, 35. 
221
 P Muchlinski, ‘Corporate social responsibility and international law: the case of human rights and 
multinational enterprises’ in D McBarnet, A Voiculescu and T Campbell (eds), The new corporate 
accountability: Corporate social responsibility and the law (CUP 2007) 456. 
222
 B Horrigan, Corporate Social Responsibility in the 21
st
 century Debates, Models and Practices 
Across Government, Law and Business (Edward Elgar 2010) 114. 
41 
 
unsatisfactory one. The reason is that voluntary initiatives now increasingly 
complement mandatory standards.223 There are also moves towards implementing 
accountability measures into voluntary initiatives. For instance, sustainability 
reporting shows a proliferation of external assurance statements, i.e. a third party 
monitors the report of a company.224 
The fact that, contrary to its previous definition of CSR, the EU Commission no 
longer describes CSR as ‘voluntary’ in its 2011 communication on CSR is a further 
indication that there is a growing realisation that CSR is, at least, in part law. The 
classic binary debate between a voluntary or a mandatory approach to CSR has 
been overcome by the ‘reality’ of the emerging CSR-regulation that can be found, for 
example, in the Companies Act (s172: duty to promote the success of the company 
for the benefit of its members as a whole) or the interaction between private 
regulation and private law through supply chain contracts. It can therefore be said 
that the debate about hard law or voluntary approaches to CSR with its ‘thinking in 
bi-polar terms’225 is outdated. It is now time to overcome dichotomies and instead to 
discuss ‘when and where corporate responsibility strategies are effective and 
appropriate’ regardless of the respective mechanism, given that CSR can be 
addressed from many different perspectives such as human rights or company 
law.226 In light of the regulatory framework of CSR outlined in the previous section, it 
is important that the literature on CSR and the law must now move on and focus on 
the overlap between law and CSR as well as the interaction between private 
regulation and law, particularly within ‘hybrid’ regulatory approaches to CSR. The 
term ‘hybrid’ refers to the combination of different forms of regulation such as private 
regulation and state law or public law and private law.227 Pedamon is therefore 
correct to ask:  
One must wonder how public and private ordering can better complement each 
other. Is it possible to imagine a system where the state legislator would define a 
binding framework in which private codification would implement and define rules 
relevant and specific to sector activity and practices? This would thus expand the 
regulatory impact of legislation and bring legitimacy and credibility to private 
governance. Companies would be accountable for the violation of, or non-
compliance with the binding rules. 
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Although Pedamon’s contribution is still speculative, it is nevertheless important as 
she raises the question how the two opposing ends can be brought together to best 
promote CSR.  Horrigan argues in a similar way when he contends that ‘mandatory 
legal regulation is neither the only nor necessarily the best means of ensuring higher 
standards of corporate behaviour and transparency’.228 These arguments indicate 
that it is important to analyse how the combination of private regulation and law 
(including private law) already promotes or could better promote CSR. This thesis 
contributes to that important analysis. 
2.4.2 The focus on socio-legal perspectives 
As early as in the 1990s, Carroll noted that the CSR scholarship is ‘an eclectic field 
with loose boundaries, multiple memberships and different training/perspectives; 
broad rather than focussed, multidisciplinary; wide breath; brings in a wider range of 
literature; and interdisciplinary’.229 In fact, CSR can be studied in a range of subjects 
and with different methodologies. Consequently, the regulatory framework of CSR 
has often been approached from socio-legal perspectives. 
There are two main approaches in the socio-legal literature about how to analyse 
the relationship between law and CSR. These are meta-regulation and reflexive 
governance.230 Parker defines meta-regulation as ‘a descriptive or explanatory term 
within the literature on “new governance” to consider the way in which the state’s 
role in governance and regulation is changing and splitting.’231 Meta-regulation 
denotes the proliferation of different forms of regulation, both state and non-state, 
which regulate each other.232 Parker understands meta-regulation as the state 
regulating its own regulation as well as any form of regulation that regulates any 
other form of regulation, for example legal regulation of self-regulation, non-legal 
methods of ‘regulating’ internal corporate self-regulation or management and the 
regulation of national law-making by transnational bodies.233 Her argument is that 
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legal accountability for CSR must be aimed at making business enterprises put 
themselves through a CSR process aimed at CSR outcomes.234 The process must 
open up management to external values, stakeholder and regulatory influences. 
Meta-regulation is an approach to legal regulation in which the ‘internal corporate 
conscience’ is externally regulated.235 The strength of this perspective is that meta-
regulation seeks a middle-ground between positive law and self-regulation.236 It can 
therefore be a useful tool for the analysis of the regulatory CSR framework and the 
influences that the different forms of regulation have. Horrigan argues that by 
applying the theory of meta-regulation to the CSR regulatory framework one would 
see that an absolute divide between corporate law and non-corporate law would 
deny their regulatory influences on each other and their combined impact for holistic 
corporate compliance and risk management.237 
Another approach to CSR in the socio-legal literature is the use of reflexive 
governance.238 Reflexive governance focuses on ‘creating structures within which 
actors such as corporations can reflect on how they see the world’.239 It looks at the 
’inner logic’ of social systems240 and it studies the communicative processes of legal 
and social systems.241 The emphasis is rather on procedural norms than on 
substantive formalised rules.242 Reflexive governance is about initiating reflexive 
processes in institutions about how to respond to given problems. State law is only 
considered to be one form of normative settings among competing systems.243 Self-
regulation is given an important role in this approach. Reflexive governance 
mobilises the self-referential capacities of institutions to enable them to best shape 
their response to complex problems. The law does not need to directly regulate 
complex social areas but focuses on controlling the structure and processes of self-
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regulation.244 The interesting aspect of this theory from a CSR point of view is the 
recognition of self-regulation as one form of normative orders among others. 
Both meta-regulation and reflexive governance share the recognition of a variety of 
normative settings, including self-regulation. They are therefore useful tools in order 
to understand the complex regulatory framework of CSR with the strong influence of 
private authority and the various effects that this framework has. However, their 
usefulness is not undisputed. For instance, criticisms have been made about the 
effectiveness of reflexive governance with its focus on reflection processes which 
would not direct substantive outcomes.245 The process-oriented understanding that 
these socio-legal frameworks provide is particularly useful to comprehend the 
interaction of different regulatory CSR tools, in particular how the firm reacts to the 
adoption of CSR commitments. Nevertheless, these approaches do not sufficiently 
discuss the legal effects of the existing regulatory framework of CSR, for example, 
what legal duties companies have to be socially responsible or what legal remedies 
parties procure for violations of CSR principles. A doctrinal perspective would 
therefore complement the socio-legal methods in the scholarship on CSR and the 
law. The ways in which law overlaps or at least has the potential to overlap with 
CSR (e.g. in company law) or in which law is used or at least could be used to 
promote CSR (e.g. contract law) raise the question if and, if so, how parties can 
enforce CSR in private law. In particular, the issue is what the contribution of home 
state regulation is to this emerging CSR framework, including English private law. 
To that end, a doctrinal perspective with its systematic analysis of primary sources 
and secondary sources would be a useful addition to the socio-legal literature on 
CSR regulation. 
2.4.3 The dominance of international law in the legal literature on CSR 
The existing literature on CSR and the law is primarily written from an international 
law perspective. The international law literature on CSR clearly outnumbers 
contributions in private law (including the growing literature in company law). This 
confirms Zerk’s observation: ‘So far, international lawyers have proved much more 
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ready to engage with CSR campaigns and debates than their commercial law 
counterparts, especially in relation to human rights.’246 
The international law literature on CSR particularly addresses the issue that, due to 
the state-centeredness of international law, multinational enterprises have been able 
to hide behind the state as they have no legal personality to bear rights or duties 
under treaty or customary law.247 CSR challenges the traditional concept of 
international law as being exclusively inter-state law.248 Discussions about CSR in 
international law overlap with the classic debate whether corporations can directly 
be regulated by international law or only through ‘indirect’ regulation which means 
that obligations are imposed on states to control private actors.249 It has, for 
instance, been suggested that multinational enterprises should become duty-holders 
in relation to human rights due to their power.250 This proposal questions the 
traditional division of participants in international law into ‘subjects’ and ‘objects’ 
(e.g. companies) with international law not being directly applicable to objects.251 
This division means that companies cannot have duties imposed upon them by 
international law. Zerk remains sceptical about the benefits of companies being 
human rights duty-holders as ‘although there may be some blurring at the edges, 
states and companies do perform different roles in society’.252 Here she refers to the 
governmental functions of the state and the profit-creation aim of companies. This 
scepticism is supported by the fact that the ‘Norms on the Responsibility of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with regard to human 
rights obligations’ failed and that the UN Guiding Principles clearly distinguish 
between the duties of states to protect human rights and the responsibility of 
companies to respect human rights. Nevertheless, the literature still proposes 
solutions in international law for the regulation of multinational corporations.253 Alice 
de Jong inter alia suggests broadening the jurisdiction of the International Court of 
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Justice to include transnational corporations.254 Zerk posits that international law has 
much potential in relation to CSR, for the soft law tradition of international law can 
develop into hard law.255 Amao is rather critical of the results of international law in 
relation to CSR which he claims to have failed.256 Instead, he proposes to use 
international law as a supporting mechanism.257 In his view, one way in which this 
could occur would be the introduction of an international company with an 
international corporate personality which should be analogous to corporate 
personality under domestic law.258 This should be part of an international company 
law framework to fill the regulatory gaps that currently exist with respect to 
multinational corporations. Amao suggests that member states should not be 
required, but given the opportunity to incorporate this framework into domestic 
law.259 There should be rules pertaining to the liability of parent companies for their 
subsidiaries. This proposal would establish a uniform standard. It remains to be 
seen though how likely it is that Amao’s proposal is ever going to be implemented. 
An interesting feature of Amao’s concept is that he includes an expanded role for 
home states of multinational companies. There seems to be a growing consensus 
that home states are an important element of the regulatory framework of CSR. 
Discussions about CSR in international law often discuss whether CSR should be 
regulated by the host state, the home state or internationally.260 As regards the host 
state, there is often a low level of protection due to the importance of the investment 
by the multinational corporation.261 The difficulties with regulating host states and the 
transnational activities of multinational companies have led to calls for international 
regulation.262 However, the UN Guiding Principles, too, emphasise the importance of 
regulation in the home states of multinational enterprises. The Guiding Principles 
have clearly turned away from the approach taken by the UN Norms which would 
directly impose duties on companies. If the international law literature on CSR is to 
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follow this approach, than it will need to engage with domestic laws and their 
potential to promote CSR, either directly or in combination with international law 
instruments, such as soft law instruments developed by international organisations. 
This argument supports the view taken in this thesis that English private law plays 
an important role in the development of the legal CSR framework. The fact that the 
UK government has made a political commitment to implement the UN Guiding 
Principles at least potentially further demonstrates their relevance for English law. 
To some extent, the international law literature on CSR therefore needs to turn its 
focus to the use of private law to implement private CSR standards as well as CSR 
standards developed by international organisations. These discussions should 
explore ways in which international legal CSR standards such as the Global 
Compact can reach meaningful results.263 Here, private law could complement 
international law instruments.  
So, whilst it is acknowledged that international law has, at least in theory, ‘much 
potential’ to regulate CSR264, it must now address the interplay between domestic 
law and international law, if it is to fully address current developments in the 
regulatory framework of CSR. This thesis contributes to the analysis of that 
interplay, by focussing on domestic private law and CSR. 
2.4.4. The potential contribution of private law to the promotion of CSR 
The increasing importance of private law for CSR is reflected in some recent 
monographs which analyse CSR from a variety of standpoints, including 
international law, but also company law, contract law and tort law.265 These books 
are significant for two reasons. First, they aim to look at CSR from different legal 
standpoints in order to bring scholarship together. This approach is important, as the 
regulatory framework, discussed in the previous section, has indicated that CSR is a 
matter which requires holistic approaches. Secondly, these pieces also indicate that 
CSR is not purely in the international law domain, but rather an issue that affects all 
branches of the law, including domestic private law. However, in comparison to 
international law, CSR has so far only played a minor role in the private law 
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literature, despite some mentions in company law and corporate governance as well 
as tort law.266 
With regard to company law and corporate governance, the social responsibilities of 
firms already featured in the Berle-Dodd debate in the 1930s about the question in 
whose interest the company is run267 and particularly in Friedman’s criticism of the 
CSR agenda in 1962.268 However, during most of the 1990s and 2000s, CSR was 
very infrequently expressly mentioned and explored in the English company law and 
corporate governance literature.269 The topic somehow disappeared. In particular, 
the concept of CSR did not play an important role in the review process that led to 
the Companies Act 2006. It seems as if CSR was in the shadow of discussions 
about the purpose of the firm during the company law review process. With her 
comment that CSR is ‘now an important topic in its own right’270, Hannigan indicates 
that it was not a priorirty for company lawyers when the company law review 
process was in progress during the late 1990s and early 2000s. And where CSR 
was mentioned, it was understood to be rather interchangeable with ‘stakeholder 
theory’.271 Although there is a link between discussions about corporate theories and 
the question if/how a firm must/may engage with CSR272, it is important to bear in 
mind that stakeholder theory is a theory of the firm, whereas CSR is a concept about 
the responsibilities of the company. This reduction of CSR as being a variant of 
’stakeholder theory’ has therefore hardly helped to advance the CSR debate in 
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company law. The debates about corporate theory in the review process leading to 
the Companies Act 2006 therefore, by and large, did not include CSR.273  
Despite some recent research, CSR is still far from being a mainstream issue in 
company law and corporate governance. This situation becomes obvious when one 
looks at the contents of the leading English company law textbooks. In fact, these 
books do not yet substantially, if at all, address CSR. The question of whether CSR 
is included in company law textbooks is a useful indicator of how far CSR is 
considered to be part of company law. Some books have started to engage with 
CSR in their latest editions, albeit briefly by devoting only one paragraph on CSR.274 
For instance, Mayson, French & Ryan have one subchapter about ‘The company’s 
position in society’ which briefly outlines the hitherto narrow concept of company law 
in English law with its focus on the interest of the shareholders and their relationship 
with directors.275 The authors of this book argue that it was never felt necessary to 
regulate CSR through company law as all firms would have an impact on their 
constituents (no matter if they are a corporation or not) and that there was therefore 
no need to specifically regulate this relationship in company law. It would rather be a 
matter of specific fields that affect all firms such as employment law. Other 
textbooks do not directly address CSR, although there is discussion of how 
corporate governance systems allow or limit the engagement of firms with the 
interests other than those of the shareholders.276 These findings are also reflected in 
the indices of these books, as CSR is not included. These observations indicate that 
the company law and corprorate governance literature has not yet sufficiently 
explored CSR, although links between these do exist.277 
The outline of the regulatory framework of CSR above has, inter alia, shown that the 
duty to promote the success of the company in s172 (1) Companies Act 2006 as 
well as the business review in s417 of the Companies Act 2006 have relevance for 
CSR. The enlightened shareholder value theory, which underlies the Companies Act 
2006, enables, at least in theory, companies to pursue CSR goals. The question to 
what extent companies can promote CSR within this framework has been not 
sufficiently analysed in the literature so far. Comparable to the debates revolving 
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around the reform of English company law in the run-up to the Companies Act 2006, 
analyses of the new s172 CA 2006 duty often do not even mention CSR at all.278 
Instead, the meaning of enlightened shareholder value and its implications for 
stakeholder interests is discussed.279 There is potential for the literature to more 
deeply analyse the ability of the s172 CA duty to promote the interest of the 
company for CSR, particularly as it has been noted that CSR was implicit in s172 
CA.280 It is therefore characteristic that a recent comparison of the economic and 
social responsibilities of directors calls CSR ‘the future’, but does not fully explore 
the extent to which directors have to comply with CSR requirements.281 
Although CSR is not (yet) sufficiently on the company law and corporate governance 
agenda, there are signs in the recent literature that this situation is about to change. 
The interest of company lawyers in CSR seems to have increased in the aftermath 
of the global financial and economic crisis, however.282 In his discussion of corporate 
governance283 and CSR, Adeyeye acknowledges the limited role which corporate 
governance has so far played for CSR issues.284 Mitchell, too, emphasises the 
potential importance of corporate governance by arguing that CSR would need to be 
moved into the scope of corporate governance in order to have any legal impact.285 
He notes that the CSR debate per se has achieved little change whereas corporate 
governance would repay scholarly attention with its impact on company law and in 
particular on corporate fiduciary duties.286 Focussing on the board would be the best 
method of achieving good results.287 Some scholars have made concrete 
suggestions for the way forward for CSR in company law and corporate governance. 
Villiers, for example, discusses legal strategies that would support the socially 
responsible conduct of companies such as legislation to remove the corporate veil in 
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case of involuntary tort creditors of corporate groups.288 Several contributions to the 
recent book ‘The New Corporate Accountability’ specifically focus on what company 
law can do to promote CSR such as making disclosure laws compulsory.289 Such 
ideas provide a good starting point for future work on how to incorporate CSR into 
law. They indicate that company law and corporate governance have potential to 
include CSR into its scope and to regulate CSR concerns. It therefore seems that 
there is a developing literature in company law and corporate governance that 
engages with CSR. Yet, there is scope for more in-depth analysis of the relationship 
between corporate theory, corporate governance and CSR as well as the ability of 
the Companies Act 2006 to promote the socially responsible conduct of companies 
(e.g. through the duty in s172 CA or the business review in s417 CA). 
Tort law, on the other hand, has more readily engaged with CSR, particularly 
concerning tortious liability of companies for human rights violations.290 The focus of 
this literature has, so far, primarily been on the extraterritorial application of tort law 
to torts committed overseas, either directly by English multinational companies or by 
their subsidiaries.291 The problem in countries of the developing world is usually not 
so much the letter of the law (which often provides causes of action in tort, for 
example, in case of human rights violations), but the restricted access to justice and 
the enforcement of the local laws.292 The literature on CSR and tort law has 
therefore looked with interest at the example of the US Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) 
through which parent companies based in the USA can be held accountable for 
human rights violations by their subsidiaries abroad.293 The ATCA confers 
jurisdiction on the US District Courts in respect of ‘any civil action by an alien for a 
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States’.294 The Act has been regarded to fill an accountability vacuum resulting from 
the non-existence of international regulation and the territorial reach of domestic 
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laws.295 Whilst the ACTA is an interesting approach to the extraterritorial liability of 
multinational enterprises in the area of extraterritorial application of tort law, it would 
go beyond the scope of this thesis to substantially engage with the question to what 
extent it could be a model for English law. The extraterritorial application of tort law 
is primarily a matter of private international law. It is rather necessary, first of all, to 
substantially analyse the question to what extent current English tort law provides 
causes of action for corporate conduct that violates CSR principles. Such a doctrinal 
analysis provides a basis for discussions about the ways in which English tort law 
already promotes or could better promote CSR. Moreover, the overlap between 
company law and tort law is relevant in this regard, as many violations of CSR 
principles are committed by the subsidiaries of multinational companies. The 
situation that parent companies often avoid liability in tort for the conduct of their 
subsidiaries due to the use of corporate group structures and the separate legal 
personality doctrine is already addressed in the literature.296 However, this issue has 
become topical again due to the recent decision in Chandler v Cape Industries plc 
where the parent company was held to owe a direct duty of care in negligence to the 
employee of one of its subsidiaries.297 It is therefore necessary in this thesis to 
examine the question to what extent this case sets a precedent for the future liability 
of parent companies in tort to the employees of their subsidiaries. 
Finally, the trend highlighted in the previous section that companies increasingly 
adopt CSR commitments through corporate codes of conduct and that companies 
also increasingly incorporate these CSR commitments into their contracts with their 
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suppliers has so far been extensively discussed in the management literature.298 In 
contrast, given the potential for CSR to be promoted through law, the legal literature 
has not yet sufficiently engaged with these developments apart from some 
introductory overviews.299 There are no substantial analyses of the ways in which 
English contract law promotes the incorporation and the enforcement of CSR 
commitments in supply contracts. Similarly, there is no detailed analysis of the 
question of whether English consumer law protects consumers against statements 
by companies that they would comply with specific CSR obligations that they have 
undertaken where, in fact, they violate these principles.  Both these areas will be 
discussed in the subsequent analysis. 
2.5 Conclusion 
The discussion of the regulatory framework for CSR has revealed that CSR and law 
overlap, or at least have the potential to overlap, in a number of ways. This overview 
supports the view taken here that CSR is, at least in part, law. The implications of 
this view will be discussed in detail in the subsequent substantive chapters. As a 
preliminary conclusion, we see that, on the whole, the regulatory framework of CSR 
indicates that English private law already plays an important role for the promotion 
of CSR. Apart from direct overlaps between CSR and company law and tort law, 
private law also provides tools for the incorporation of CSR commitments into 
contracts and for its enforcement by consumers. 
The literature review has shown that, so far, the academic discussion about CSR 
and the law has not yet fully recognised the contribution that English private law 
makes to the promotion of CSR, as indicated in the regulatory framework. 
Traditionally, academic debates were confined to binary debates (‘either…or’) about 
the question whether or not CSR should be regulated in law. These debates are not 
only a superficial view of the ways in which law functions, but they have also 
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prevented the further understanding of the effects of the legal framework of CSR. 
Whilst this debate now moves on, partly due to a realisation that there are overlaps 
between law and CSR, the existing literature is predominately written from an 
international law perspective. The importance of private law for CSR shown in the 
regulatory framework reveals the need for a detailed analysis of the promotion of 
CSR in English private law. This is the main research agenda of this thesis. The 
thesis will add to existing emergent analyses of the contributions of company law 
and corporate governance as well as tort law to the promotion of CSR. It will 
develop original substantial analysis on the question if and, if so, how English 
contract law and English consumer law promote CSR. To that end, the doctrinal 
perspective taken in this thesis will complement socio-legal approaches to the 
regulatory CSR framework already found in the literature. 
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Chapter 3: English company law, corporate 
governance and CSR 
 
3.1 Introduction 
English company law and corporate governance have in recent years been subject 
to substantial changes through the enactment of the Companies Act (CA)300 2006. 
The global financial and economic crisis caused several reviews of the system of 
corporate governance in English and European Union company law.301 A particular 
feature of the Companies Act 2006 is its endorsement of the enlightened 
shareholder value theory.302 This change was intended to promote a long-term 
approach to doing business, which includes a range of stakeholders, rather than 
purely focusing on shareholders.303 This aim of the enlightened shareholder value 
approach overlaps with the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), as 
CSR implies an obligation on the part of large companies to pursue objectives 
advancing the interests of all groups affected by their activities – not just 
shareholders but also stakeholders such as employees, consumers, suppliers, 
creditors and local communities.304 As already noted in chapter 2, it has therefore 
been argued that the revised Companies Act has several potential CSR 
implications.305 This potential link is important for this thesis as it raises the question 
to what extent English company law and corporate governance promote the socially 
responsible conduct of companies.306  This question will be analysed in this chapter. 
The chapter will also make suggestions about how English company law and 
corporate governance could be further developed to better promote CSR.  
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This chapter will focus on both company law and corporate governance as these are 
related, but different concepts. The scope of corporate governance is wider.307 For 
analytical clarity, the chapter will first establish the relationship between company 
law, corporate governance and CSR. The discussion about the link between the 
three particularly focusses on the adoption of the enlightened shareholder value 
theory as the approach underlying the Companies Act 2006. The theoretical 
framework of the enlightened shareholder value approach characterises the system 
of company law and corporate governance in English law and will therefore be 
looked at first in terms of its implications for CSR.308 This part will be followed by an 
analysis of the promotion of CSR by different aspects of corporate governance. The 
aspects which are discussed in this chapter are the newly codified director’s duty in 
s172 CA to promote the success of the company, the duty for directors to file a 
business review pursuant to s417 (2) CA, the role of shareholders, particularly with 
regard to the new statutory derivative action in s260 CA, and finally the role of non-
executive directors as well as the composition of the board. 
The potential significance of company law and corporate governance for CSR was 
also emphasised in the 2011 final report of the UN Special Representative on the 
issue of human rights and business (SRSG) John Ruggie.309 Principle 3 of the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights recommends that states should, 
inter alia, ensure that company law does not constrain, but enables respect for 
human rights.310 The commentary to this principle makes the criticism that there is ‘a 
lack of clarity in corporate and securities law regarding what companies and their 
officers are permitted, let alone required, to do regarding human rights’.311 Moreover, 
the implications of corporate and securities laws for human rights ‘remain poorly 
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understood’.312 As human rights are an important element of the CSR agenda, this 
principle shows the potential importance of company law and corporate governance 
for the promotion of CSR. The criticisms made in the commentary to principle 3 of 
the UN Guiding Principles correspond to the literature reviewed in the previous 
chapter, which demonstrated that company law and corporate governance, as 
understood in English law, has long considered stakeholder-oriented issues, 
including CSR, to be outside its realm.313 
3.2 Jurisdictional scope of the chapter 
As issues of CSR frequently refer to the conduct of multinational enterprises both in 
England and Wales as well as abroad, it is necessary to establish when English 
courts have jurisdiction to hear a dispute and when English law is applicable in 
matters of company law and corporate governance.314 
In civil and commercial matters English courts must apply the Brussels I Regulation 
in order to determine if they can assume jurisdiction.315 Article 2 of the Regulation 
stipulates that persons should be sued where they are domiciled.316 The definition of 
‘domicile’ for individuals is determined by national private international laws.317 
Pursuant to Article 60 (1) of the Regulation, a company is domiciled at the place 
                                                          
312
 ibid. 
313
 See chapter 2 of this thesis. See also: A Adeyeye, ‘The limitations of corporate governance in the 
CSR agenda’ (2010) Company Lawyer 114. 
314
 As the rules of private international law pertaining to companies differ between states, it is beyond 
the scope of this thesis to address this issue from the perspective of different states. The focus here is 
on the question whether or not English courts have jurisdiction over company law disputes involving 
companies which are incorporated in England or Wales or which were incorporated abroad. Due to the 
focus of the thesis on English private law, the discussion of the jurisdictional scope of the different 
substantive chapters will also focus on England and Wales and not discuss to what extent these areas 
of private law are also applicable to Scotland and/or Northern Ireland. 
315
 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters" (or Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001), 
known as ‘Brussels I’. 
316
 This Regulation is directly applicable to all EU member states. It determines jurisdiction in civil and 
commercial matters where the defendant is domiciled in a member state of the EU. The Regulation is 
concerned with the international jurisdiction of member states. Distinct from this situation is the 
scenario of parent companies domiciled in England or Wales and their subsidiaries domiciled abroad 
which will be addressed in chapter 6. English law treats parent companies as independent from their 
subsidiaries, see Adams v Cape Industries [1990] 1 Ch 433.  
317
 See J Fawcett and J Carruthers, Cheshire, North & Fawcett: Private International Law (14
th
 edn, 
OUP 2008) 211. As the concept of seat is established according to each member states’ own private 
international law, conflicts of jurisdiction can still arise. This is particularly the case as there are two 
different traditions in the treatment of companies in private international law: the incorporation theory, 
followed by most common law jurisdictions including England, and the real seat doctrine, followed by 
many continental European jurisdictions such as Germany and France. According to the real seat 
doctrine, the governing law of a corporation is the law of the place where the real seat of management 
is placed. With regard to the European Union, the ECJ held in its trilogy of cases in Centros (Case 
C212/97, [2000] Ch 446), Überseering (Case C208/00, [2005] 1 WLR 315) and Inspire Art (C167/01, 
[2003] that it is compatible with the freedom of establishment in the EU that a company can be 
incorporated in one Member State and then solely trade in another Member State. See for an overview 
of this topic: D Milman, National Corporate Law in a Globalised Market: The UK Experience in 
Perspective (Edward Elgar 2009) 120 – 129. 
58 
 
where it has its: (a) statutory seat, or (b) central administration, or (c) principal place 
of business. Art 60 (2) further states that ‘For the purposes of the United Kingdom 
and Ireland "statutory seat" means the registered office or, where there is no such 
office anywhere, the place of incorporation or, where there is no such place 
anywhere, the place under the law of which the formation took place.’318 English 
private international law follows the incorporation doctrine which stipulates that the 
place of incorporation determines the domicile.319 The incorporation doctrine is 
therefore important in the situation where an English court determines whether it has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Art 60 (2) of the Regulation.  
Moreover, the incorporation doctrine also determines the law governing the 
corporation.320 The matters addressed in this chapter, such as directors’ duties or 
shareholders’ rights, are thus governed by the place of incorporation as far as 
English courts are concerned.321 The Companies Act 2006 is therefore applicable in 
relation to companies incorporated in England or Wales, even if they have no 
significant premises or activities in England or Wales and conduct their activities 
abroad.322  
3.3 Background: The discussion about the corporate purpose and CSR 
 
3.3.1 Linking the concepts of CSR and corporate governance 
We have already noted that corporate governance and CSR are related. But what is 
their relationship? Corporate governance is commonly understood as ‘the set of 
processes, customs, policies, laws and institutions affecting the way a company is 
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directed, administered or controlled’.323 This is a short version of the definition of 
corporate governance, promulgated by the Cadbury Committee which is regarded 
as the ‘the most authoritative definition of corporate governance in the UK’.324 With 
regard to its scope, corporate governance focuses on the ownership, direction and 
control of companies.325 According to the definition of CSR used for this thesis, CSR 
is about wider relationships with various stakeholders, not just shareholders.326 CSR 
requires companies to advance the interests of the different stakeholders, for 
example the employees and the local community. These interests are not purely 
economic.  
Horrigan makes an important point about how one’s approach to corporate 
governance defines the relation between corporate governance and CSR 
The variety of standpoints from which we might conceive the point of corporate 
governance from the outset inevitably affects the approach we take to define what 
corporate governance means. In turn, this affects how we characterise the relation (if 
any) between corporate governance and CSR.
327
 
This observation is a significant one, as it highlights that there is interdependence 
between corporate theory, corporate governance and CSR. Corporate theory is the 
theoretical framework underlying the system of company law and corporate 
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governance.328 It is important for the relationship between corporate governance and 
CSR as it, in Horrigan’s words, describes ‘the standpoint from which we conceive 
the point of corporate governance’.329 Millon notes that ‘corporate theory can be 
used to legitimate or criticise corporate doctrine’.330 However, he also points out that 
the actual extent to which ‘normative claims…are perceived to follow in a 
determinate way from the underlying positive assertion is controversial’.331 
Corporate theory deals with the question in whose interest corporations are run. It 
thus determines what the purpose of the company is. The purpose of the company 
has an effect on the scope of corporate governance, including directors’ duties.332 
The underlying corporate theory therefore has an impact on the question whether a 
company may pursue social and environmental goals. 
The underlying corporate theory therefore at least influences the ability of the 
system of corporate governance to promote CSR. The theoretical model of the 
company and CSR can positively correlate with each other or be in conflict with 
each other depending on the respective position of shareholders and non-
shareholders in the model. If the corporate theory focusses on the (short-term) 
interests of shareholders, then it does not have a positive impact on CSR.333 
However, if the promotion of stakeholders’ interests is within the scope of the 
theoretical framework (e.g. in a pluralist model of the company), then corporate 
governance can better promote CSR.334  
Against this theoretical background, corporate governance and CSR meet at various 
points that will be addressed in this chapter. The first point is directors’ duties. The 
reason for this link is that directors’ duties are part of corporate governance and the 
ways in which directors (may) discharge their duties are one factor that determines 
to what extent a company pursues CSR objectives. The newly introduced directors’ 
duty in s172 CA, to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its 
members as a whole, raises the question to what extent the discharge of this duty 
requires the directors to promote the interests of its various stakeholders and hence 
CSR goals. CSR and corporate governance are linked where a company 
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internalises its social and environmental impact.335 As outlined in the previous 
paragraph, the extent to which directors are allowed to internalise the company’s 
social and environmental impact through s172 CA is influenced by the theoretical 
framework underlying the system of corporate governance (corporate theory), i.e. 
the enlightened shareholder value approach which is discussed below. 
The second point where corporate governance and CSR meet is the business 
review that directors have to complete pursuant to s417 CA.336 The purpose of the 
business review is to inform members about the ways in which directors have 
discharged their duty under s172 (1) CA.337 Thirdly, corporate governance and CSR 
are also linked through shareholders’ remedies. For example, through the derivative 
action pursuant to s260 CA, under certain circumstances shareholders have the 
right to start proceedings on behalf of the company, if directors are alleged to have 
breached their duties. This action includes remedies for breaches of the duty in s172 
CA, which, as we have just noted, overlaps with CSR. Shareholders could therefore 
bring a derivative action in case of an alleged breach of s172 CA.338 Finally, the 
board can more generally be an important factor for the promotion of CSR, 
particularly through non-executive directors as well as the composition of the 
boardroom. 
Despite these potential overlaps between corporate governance and CSR, the link 
between the two concepts has, so far, not been widely explored in the academic 
literature. Horrigan therefore notes that the connection between the two ‘does not 
meet with universal acclaim’.339 Yet, these two concepts are not ‘mutually 
exclusive’.340 The various points where CSR and corporate governance meet, for 
example the duty to promote the success of the company in s172 CA, demonstrate 
that corporate governance can be an important tool in the promotion of CSR. The 
CSR agenda should therefore include corporate governance within its focus. 
Mitchell even argues that ‘the most likely way for proponents of CSR to achieve their 
goals is to recast their issues as issues of corporate governance’.341 
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The following section will briefly review the three theories about the objective of the 
company that have dominated the discussions in the preparation of the Companies 
Act 2006, namely the shareholder value theory, the stakeholder value theory and 
the enlightened shareholder value theory.342 The enlightened shareholder value 
theory underlies the Companies Act 2006. It is not possible, within the scope of this 
chapter, to comprehensively address all justifications for and arguments about the 
respective theories; rather it is intended to introduce these theories as background 
to the subsequent analysis of the promotion of CSR in English company law and 
corporate governance.343 
3.3.2 The background to the adoption of the enlightened shareholder value 
theory 
3.3.2.1 The shareholder value theory 
There was a considerable debate about corporate theory in the Company Law 
Review Steering Group344 during the discussions about the new Companies Act 
2006, as the hitherto prevailing shareholder value doctrine had come under criticism 
in English law.345 The Company Law Review Steering Group contrasted the 
shareholder value theory (also referred to as the Anglo-American model) with the 
pluralist approach (also referred to as the stakeholder value model, represented, for 
instance, by Germany and Japan)346 and a third model, the so-called ‘inclusive 
approach’ (also referred to as the enlightened shareholder value theory), which it 
finally adopted in its White Paper.347 
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The shareholder value doctrine is based on an agency model which has strongly 
influenced debates about corporate governance in the United States and the United 
Kingdom.348 The basis for this agency model lies in Berle and Means’ observation 
known as ‘separation of ownership and control’.349 They identified the situation that 
the ownership of the company and its control had become divided between the 
shareholders of the company and its management whereas, originally, it was united 
in the person of the entrepreneur.350 As the group of shareholders had increasingly 
become diverse and geographically dispersed, it experienced difficulty in the 
exercise of control over the management. In practice, it was often the managers 
who had gained effective control over the company (the situation is also referred to 
as ‘managerialism’). The identification of this phenomenon initiated the corporate 
governance debate. The agency theory argues that the directors are the agents of 
the shareholders.351 Consequently, the management should be exclusively 
accountable to the shareholders (who are their principals) and primarily strive to 
maximise their profit.352 It has been argued that the preoccupation of this model with 
shareholders’ rights would benefit the company (and society) as it ensures 
accountability and therefore reduces the likelihood that the board could act in a self-
serving way.353 
Under this model the company is treated as a nexus of contracts, which means that 
the corporate entity is regarded as a ‘legal fiction’ created out of explicit and implicit 
private contracts.354 According to this theory, the shareholders are the company’s 
residual claimants as the other corporate constituencies have fixed claims, for 
example employment contracts. The shareholders are the only constituents whose 
interest (i.e. dividend) is not secured, for example by an explicit contract such as a 
loan agreement. For this reason they only receive what is left over (the so-called 
‘residual earnings’) after the company has fulfilled all its other contractual 
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obligations.355 The shareholders therefore bear the risk of the company as their 
claim will be fulfilled last, although they have provided the investment.356 Easterbook 
and Fischel differentiate between the variable claim of the shareholders and the 
fixed claim of other parties linked to the company.357 The size of the shareholders’ 
claim therefore depends on the actions of the management. This situation is used as 
the justification for rewarding the shareholders by way of giving them control over 
the company and why directors must work in their interest, i.e. by the principle of 
maximising shareholder value.358 In this model, shareholders become the owners of 
the company, or at least of the business, through the purchase of shares.359 The 
shareholder value model is said to be clear and certain, as it provides a yardstick to 
measure the performance of directors.360 
It has been argued that the shareholder value theory made claims irrelevant that a 
company should act in a socially responsible manner.361 Drawing upon the idea that 
‘the manager is the agent of the individuals who own the corporation’, Friedman 
argues that a director who acts in a socially responsible way would become a ‘public 
employee’, although, in fact, he is an ‘employee of a private enterprise’.362 Such a 
manager would impose taxes on the shareholders.363 So, with this version of 
corporate theory, corporate governance and CSR do not overlap with each other as 
CSR is beyond the scope of corporate governance. 
3.3.2.2 The stakeholder value theory 
The stakeholder value theory, also known as the pluralist model or the productive 
coalition model364, proposes that a company should be run in the interest of all its 
stakeholders rather than just the shareholders.365 This theory can therefore be 
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characterised by its recognition of all stakeholders’ interests.366 All parties affected 
by the activities of the company should be given a place in corporate decision-
making, albeit differentiated in nature and degree.367 Directors have the obligation to 
balance conflicting interests of all stakeholders and they should not automatically 
give priority to the shareholders.368 The underlying idea of this approach is that the 
company functions as a social institution whose conduct has an important impact on 
people’s lives. The proponents of the stakeholder value theory emphasise that 
individuals owe obligations to each other in a community independently of 
contract.369 Senior managers are seen as the trustees of the corporation’s assets 
which they strive to sustain. According to this model, companies should seek to 
maximise the total creation of wealth instead of purely maximising profit.370 
Supporters of the stakeholder value theory question the theoretical underpinnings of 
the shareholder value theory. In particular, it is disputed that shareholders ‘own’ the 
company.371 The argument is that, by purchasing shares, shareholders would 
acquire a title to the shares but not to the company. They can therefore not ‘own’ the 
company. This argument would follow from the company’s separate personality (as 
evolved in the case Salomon v Salomon372). Moreover, proponents of the 
stakeholder value theory argue that shareholders are not the only constituents who 
invest in the firm and have a stake in it.373 For example, employees invest in training 
which is tailored to the needs of the firm or suppliers invest in machines which 
produce goods needed by a specific company to which they supply goods (called 
‘firm-specific investment’).374 The stakeholder value theory is based on the idea that 
the interests of these stakeholders should not be subordinated to those of the 
shareholders, as the company benefits from the investments of all its 
stakeholders.375 
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Blair and Stout view the public corporation as ‘a team of people who enter into a 
complex agreement to work together for their mutual gain’.376 In their view, all 
members of the team have agreed to give up control rights and, consequently, no 
member of the team is a principal of the other team members.377 The corporation 
operates under a ‘mediating hierarchy‘.378 Blair and Stout focus on the central 
position of the board of directors who are given the control rights over the 
company.379 The directors are ‘trustees for the corporation itself’.380  They are 
‘mediating hierarchs’ who balance the competing interests of the various members 
of the team in a way that ensures the functioning of the productive coalition.381 The 
model is significant on two grounds. First, it treats the various stakeholders as 
members of a productive team. Secondly, it focusses on the power of the board to 
make decisions for the business as a whole, without the need to prioritise the 
interests of the shareholders. Contradicting the claims brought forward by 
proponents of the shareholder value theory, Blair and Stout emphasise that 
shareholders have only limited scope to successfully sue directors for their decisions 
due to an ‘expansive judicial interpretation of the business judgment rule’382 which 
gives much discretion to the directors to make decisions on behalf of the company. 
This argument effectively leads to mangerialism. 
With its emphasis on the team production process, this model of the company 
enables directors to pursue the interests of all groups affected by a company, i.e. to 
act in a socially responsible way. The directors are given discretion to make 
decisions that benefit the team as a whole. Under this version of corporate theory, 
corporate governance and CSR are coterminous.383 Corporate governance allows 
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the promotion of CSR goals, as priority should not automatically be given to 
shareholders. The reason for pursuing CSR can be based both on the argument that 
it ensures the productive functioning of the team, as well as the idea that the 
company is a social institution. 
3.3.2.3 The enlightened shareholder value theory 
Following a discussion of these two theories, the government’s White Paper finally 
settled upon an approach which it calls the ‘inclusive approach’.384 This approach is 
known as the ‘enlightened shareholder value theory’.385 It was seen as a possible 
‘third way’, an alternative to strict shareholder primacy on the one hand and the 
stakeholder value theory on the other hand.386 The enlightened shareholder value 
theory continues to give primacy ultimately to the interests of shareholders, but it 
requires directors also to consider other factors related to the interests of various 
other stakeholders who are affected by the company.387 This theory is premised on 
the belief that long-term profit maximisation can only occur through the fostering of 
co-operative relationships with the various non-shareholder constituents.388 It is 
argued that this theory would better promote wealth generation and competitiveness 
for the benefit of all. The enlightened shareholder value model is embedded in the 
shareholder value theory389 as directors have to act in the collective best interest of 
shareholders.390 However, the directors are also required to recognise the 
company’s need to promote its relationships with employees and suppliers and its 
impact on the environment as well as the community.391 This theory does not 
support purely short-term financial benefits, but rather promotes the pursuing of 
long-term gains.392 The focus on short-term gains used to be a common criticism of 
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British businesses in the 1980s and 1990s.393 A study conducted by the Institute of 
Directors in 1999 found out that many directors thought they were legally required to 
maximise short-term shareholder benefits to the detriment of long-term profit.394 The 
Company Law Review Steering Group therefore identified directors’ duties as well 
as corporate reporting duties to be important for the implementation of the 
enlightened shareholder value doctrine.395 The enlightened shareholder value theory 
is said to be enshrined in the duty of directors to promote the success of the 
company in s172 (1) CA.396 Although the enlightened shareholder value theory does 
not support an understanding of corporate governance and CSR as coterminous, as 
the stakeholder value theory does, Millon states that it ‘resonates with notions of 
CSR’.397 In Yap’s view, the concept of CSR lies behind the enlightened shareholder 
value principle.398 Moreover, Horrigan argues that the reform of UK company law ‘is 
pregnant with potential CSR implications’.399 
With its emphasis on fostering relationships with all stakeholders, the enlightened 
shareholder model at least potentially opens up the scope of corporate governance 
for CSR. This argument can be based on the fact that s172 (1) CA requires directors 
to have regard to the various stakeholders of the company and not just the 
shareholders. Under this model of the corporation, CSR falls, at least potentially, 
within the scope of corporate governance.400 To what extent company law and 
corporate governance, within the enlightened shareholder model, actually promote 
the socially responsible conduct of companies will be analysed in the following part 
of the chapter. The analysis will first address the two areas identified by the 
Company Law Review Steering Group for the implementation of the enlightened 
shareholder value approach, namely directors’ duties (s172 CA) and the business 
review (s417 CA). It will then address two further areas of company law and 
corporate governance that can contribute to the promotion of CSR: Shareholders’ 
                                                          
393
 Commission on Public Policy and British Business, Promoting Prosperity: A Business Agenda for 
Britain (Vintage 1997). 
394
 Institute of Directors, Good Boardroom Practice (IOD 1999). 
395
 Company Law Review, Modern Company Law, Final Report (DTI 2001) para 3.8. As will be outlined 
in the section on the business review, it was originally planned to require companies to compile an 
Operating and Financial Review (OFR). The OFR was finally abandoned and substituted by the 
business reivew. The OFR was intended to compel listed companies to disclose a range of ‘qualitative’ 
and ‘forward-looking’ information, for example about the relationships with employees. See also: A 
Johnston, ‘After the OFR: Can UK Shareholder Value Still be Enlightened?’ (2006) EBOLR 817, 828. 
396
 S Wen, ‘The magnitude of shareholder value as the overriding objective in the UK: the post-crisis 
perspective’ (2011) Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 325, 330. 
397
 D Millon, ‘Enlightened shareholder value, social responsibility and the redefinition of corporate 
purpose without law’ in P M Vasudev and S Watson (eds), Corporate Governance after the Financial 
Crisis (Edward Elgar 2012) 68. 
398
 J L Yap, ‘Considering the enlightened shareholder value principle’ (2010) Company Lawyer 35, 37.  
399
 B Horrigan, Corporate Social Responsibility in the 21st Century: Debates, Models and Practices 
Across Government, Law and Business (Edward Elgar 2010) 229. 
400
 Johnston critically asks if shareholder value will still be enlightened in the absence of a statutory 
OFR, see: ‘After the OFR: Can UK Shareholder Value Still be Enlightened?’ (2006) EBOLR 817. 
69 
 
remedies and the board (the role of non-existing directors as well as the composition 
of the board). 
3.4 The promotion of CSR in English company law and corporate governance 
3.4.1 Directors’ duties: The duty to promote the success of the company (s172 
CA) 
The duty to promote the success of the company in s172 (1) CA401 has been met 
with much interest both in academia and in practice since its implementation into the 
Companies Act 2006.402 Prior to this Act, directors’ duties were not regulated within 
the Companies Act, but based on common law. It has been argued that the duty in 
s172 CA encapsulates in statute the enlightened shareholder value theory.403 
Accepting this interpretation, this section analyses to what extent this duty promotes 
CSR. The analysis of s172 (1) CA will first look at the overlap between the duty and 
CSR. It will then interpret the meaning of the individual components of s172 (1) CA 
which are: ‘good faith’, ‘success of the company for the benefit of its members as a 
whole’ and ‘having regard to’, and their effect on pursuing CSR aims. S172 CA will 
be analysed with regard to its wording, its review in the academic literature and with 
references to the case law. Finally, this section of the chapter will analyse the 
enforceability of s172 (1) CA. 
3.4.1.1 Overlap between s172 CA and CSR 
One important question for this thesis is whether the duty in s172 CA overlaps with 
the concept of CSR. S172 (1) CA enlists a number of factors that a director must 
‘have regard to’ when discharging his duty to promote the success of the company 
for the benefit of its members as a whole. 
The list of factors in s172 (1) CA explicitly refers to various stakeholders, such as 
the employees, the suppliers, customers, as well as the community and the 
environment. This list overlaps with the definition of CSR adopted in this thesis, 
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according to which companies have an obligation to pursue objectives advancing 
the interests of all groups affected by their activities – not just shareholders but also 
employees, consumers, suppliers, creditors and local communities.404 This definition 
of CSR also refers to environmental, human rights and ‘quality of life’ concerns.  So, 
on comparison, several of the factors that are referred to in s172 (1) CA are also 
expressly included in the CSR definition adopted here. These are employees, 
suppliers, customers and others, the impact on the community and environment. 
Hence, there is a considerable overlap between the s172 (1) CA and CSR, although 
the two are not entirely coterminous. 
Although the list in s172 (1) CA does not expressly refer to creditors, they are 
mentioned in s172 (3) CA which stipulates that the duty in s172 (1) CA ‘has effect 
subject to any enactment or rule of law requiring directors, in certain circumstances, 
to consider or act in the interests of creditors of the company’. This provision refers 
to the common law principle that directors of an insolvent company must consider 
the interests of its creditors.405 Whereas the previous Companies Act 1985 expressly 
mentioned employees in a separate section of the Act (s309), they are now part of 
the list of factors in s172 (1) CA. Although several factors are given explicit mention 
in s172 (1) CA the list of factors is non-exhaustive, as indicated by the clause 
‘amongst other matters’. 
The duty of directors to consider some of the factors now contained in s172 (1) CA 
is not entirely new, but a mere repetition of the previous legal situation.406 Apart from 
the employees407 and the creditors408, this point applies to the need to act fairly as 
between members of the company409  and the obligation to have regard to the likely 
consequences of any decision in the long term410. These issues were recognised as 
interests a director needs to consider in the old common law. The factors that are 
indeed new are the need to foster business relationships with suppliers, customers 
and others411, the impact of operations on the community and the environment412 
and the desirability of maintaining a reputation for high standards of business 
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conduct413.  The effect of this expansion of factors in s172 (1) CA is that when 
directors discharge their duty to act in the best interest of the company, they must 
consider a wider spectrum of aspects than under the previous situation. The new 
duty is therefore considered to be more inclusive.414 
Based on these considerations, it can be stated that the list of factors in s172 CA 
overlaps with many concerns of CSR, but that the inclusion of some of these 
considerations into the decision-making process is not entirely new for directors’ 
duties. Nevertheless, due to the overlap between the list of factors in s172 (1) CA 
and CSR, it has been argued that CSR is ‘implicit in s172’.415 Similarly, Ho opines 
that s172 provides the guidance for CSR.416 The Ministerial Statements by Margaret 
Hodge claim that section 172 CA would ‘mark a radical departure in articulating the 
connection between what is good for a company and what is good for society at 
large.’417  She went on to give CSR a mention in this context by stating that 
‘Corporate social responsibility has developed and evolved over time.’418 All of the 
factors considered so far suggest a clear correlation between s172 (1) CA and CSR. 
The question remains, however, to what extent this duty of directors in s172 CA 
actually promotes or has the potential to promote CSR. This issue will be analysed 
in the next part by looking at the different components of the section. 
3.4.1.2 Good faith 
The duty in s172 CA requires a director to act in the way he considers in good faith 
would be in the best interest of the company. The relevant question for the 
promotion of CSR through s172 (1) CA is what standard the courts apply to this test 
when assessing the issue if a director has breached his duty to promote the success 
of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole. 
The wording of s172 (1) CA emphasises the terms ‘he considers’ and ‘in good faith’. 
The inclusion of these two terms gives priority to the director’s judgement. These 
terms put the emphasis on what the director considers, in good faith, to be in the 
best interest of the company, and not on the views of third parties, for instance the 
court. Through this emphasis, the section distinguishes between the considerations 
of the director and the court. This situation is in line with the approach which was 
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taken to the previous common law duty to act bona fide for the company before the 
codification of directors’ duties in the Companies Act 2006.419 As s170 (4) CA 
stipulates a requirement to interpret the general duties in the same way as common 
law rules or equitable principles, it is likely that the courts will refer to the case law 
pertaining to the old common law duty to act bona fide for the company when 
interpreting the ‘good faith’ provision. The reason is that ‘good faith’ can be seen as 
a continuation of the previous ‘bona fide’ requirement. This interpretation was 
indicated in the case Cobden Investments Ltd v RWM Langport Ltd420 which was 
decided after the enactment of the Companies Act 2006 and where the judge said 
The perhaps old-fashioned phrase acting ‘bona fide in the interests of the company’ 
is reflected in the statutory words acting ‘in good faith in a way most likely to promote 
the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole’. They come to 
the same thing with the modern formulation giving a more readily understood 
definition of the scope of the duty.
421
 
The traditional approach to acting ’bona fide’ is embodied in the case Re Smith and 
Fawcett Ltd422 in which it was held that directors of a company must act ‘...bona fide 
in what they consider – not what a court may consider – is in the interest of the 
company, and not for any collateral purpose’. The test was discussed in the case 
Regentcrest plc v Cohen where the court emphasised that it would focus on ‘the 
director’s state of mind’.423 This formulation of the court indicates that the test is a 
subjective one. This situation demonstrates that the courts are unwilling to interfere 
with the judgement of the directors ‘with the benefit of hindsight’.424 The 
interpretation of ‘good faith’ in s172 CA taken in Cobden Investments Ltd v RWM 
Langport Ltd425 was followed in other recent decisions which were made after the 
enactment of the Companies Act 2006. In Iesini v Westrip Holdings Ltd426, the court 
held that it was not in the best position to make judgements about the weight of the 
considerations in s172 CA except in very clear cases as these are commercial 
issues and the director’s subjective judgements would prevail in these 
circumstances.  
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The courts are therefore not likely to second-guess decisions by the directors with 
regard to how to promote the success of the company. This finding has ramifications 
for the importance given to the interests of the various stakeholders, enlisted in s172 
(1) CA. As the good faith test is firmly grounded in subjectivity, the key point for 
assessing how directors have discharged their duty is their subjective opinion as to 
whether a decision was meant to promote the best interest of the company. It will 
therefore be difficult to find directors to be in breach of their s172 (1) CA duty as 
long as they can convince the judge that they acted in good faith in their decision-
making. This situation is a severe limitation of the enforcement of the duty to 
consider the interests of the various stakeholders through s172 (1) CA. In turn, it 
means that although s172 (1) CA overlaps with the concept of CSR, it is doubtful if 
CSR will be promoted through this duty. It rather remains in the discretion of 
directors to consider how to balance the interests of the various stakeholders and 
how much weight to give to these in the decision-making process. 
3.4.1.3 Success of the company for the benefit of the members as a whole 
The next issue is what the term ‘success of the company for the benefit of its 
members as a whole’ means for the pursuing of CSR goals. The directors must 
have regard to the list of factors in s172 (1) CA when working towards promoting the 
success of the company.  It will be analysed here to what extent CSR forms part of 
the goal of promoting the ‘success’ of the company. Keay points out that there is no 
indication in s172 (1) CA as to the meaning of what fulfils the requirement ‘success 
of the company’.427 He suspects that this is because directors can fulfil their duty to 
promote the success of the company under the same preconditions as the ‘good 
faith’ requirement, i.e. when they believe their action to do so, even if it does not 
objectively. 
The Guidance on Key Clauses in the Company Law Reform Bill states that 
the decision as to what will promote success, and what constitutes such success, is 
one for the directors’ good faith judgment. This ensures that business decisions on, 
for example, strategy and tactics are for the directors and not subject to decisions by 
the courts, subject to good faith.
428
 
Guidance as to what constitutes ‘success of the company’ can be found in the case 
law pertaining to the common law prior to the Companies Act 2006. In fact, the ‘new’ 
duty in s172 CA has its origins in the previous common law fiduciary duty for 
directors to act bona fide in what they consider to be in the best interests of the 
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company.429 In this common law duty, the interest of the company was interpreted 
as meaning the shareholders as a general body. The notion of promoting the 
interests of the various stakeholders of the company was not included in this 
concept. This interpretation led to the idea of enhancing shareholder value.430 The 
shareholder-centricity of English company law can be traced back to the origins of 
English company law which evolved out of partnership law in the 19th century.431 At 
that time the shareholders were considered to be ‘the company’ (i.e. the joint stock 
company), as there was not yet any conception of the company as an object 
separate from its shareholders. Despite this long history of shareholder-centricity of 
English company law, the focus of directors on maximising shareholder value has 
been particular dominant in the US and the UK since the 1980s.432 The concept of 
CSR with its focus on the interests of the stakeholders does not form part of this 
concept, unless it promotes the value of the shareholders. 
Under the s172 (1) CA duty, directors must promote the success of the company for 
the benefit of its members as a whole. Membership of a company is normally based 
on shareholding.433 The expression ‘members as a whole’ is understood by the 
courts as present and future shareholders.434 This prioritisation of shareholders 
suggests that directors are only allowed to pursue CSR if it ultimately benefits the 
shareholders. CSR can therefore easily be reduced to a secondary issue in the 
directors’ decision-making process. Parliamentary debates about the new 
Companies Act acknowledged that success is usually measured by the long-term 
increase of shareholder value, but it may also be fulfilled by pursuing other goals, if 
that is the purpose of the firm.435 The Company Law Review Steering Group 
declared that it inserted ‘success of the company for the benefit of its members as a 
whole’ into the provision in order to emphasise that the directors do not work to 
favour the individual interests of members, but for the interests of the members as 
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an association.436 This approach is further supported by the fact that one of the 
factors to which directors must have regard when discharging their s172 CA duty is 
‘to act fairly as between members of the company’.437 
Although there has so far not been much case law about the new duty in s172 CA, it 
seems that the courts, by and large, considered it to be merely the codification of the 
previous duty to act bona fide in the best interest of the company.438 This finding 
suggests that ‘success of the company’ is a continuation of the duty under the old 
common law to work in ‘the best interests of the company’ with the ultimate goal of 
the directors’ decisions being the promotion of the benefit of the shareholders. This 
interpretation further supports the view taken here that the goal to promote the 
success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole in s172 (1) CA 
still prioritises the enhancing of shareholder value. Stakeholders and hence the 
concept of CSR are not given a prominent role in the term ‘success of the company’. 
Although CSR might be implicit in s172 (1) CA439, this duty of directors is limited in 
its ability to promote CSR. The impact of CSR on the directors’ decision-making will 
be limited to those instances where there is a clear business case for pursuing CSR 
objects.  
3.4.1.4 Having regard to list of factors 
Whilst it was outlined above that there is a significant overlap between the list of 
factors in s172 (1) CA and the concept of CSR, the question remains what role 
these factors play in the decision-making process of directors. This issue depends 
on how one interprets the duty of directors to ‘have regard to’ the list of factors.  
The first issue in relation to the phrase ‘having regard to’ is that the list of factors in 
s172 (1) CA does not contain any guidance about how directors should balance 
between the different factors enlisted in s172 (1) CA. There is a lack of clarity about 
the weight given to the various factors. This is particularly a problem in case of 
competing interests, e.g. where a decision favours one factor (e.g. the environment), 
but disadvantages another factor (e.g. the employees).440 It is also not made clear in 
the provision if directors are obliged to choose the factor that is likely to be most 
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beneficial for shareholders in a particular situation.441 However, seeing that ‘success 
of the company’ is interpreted to favour the interests of shareholders it seems that 
every factor may only be taken into account insofar as it ultimately favours the 
interests of the company’s members, i.e. the shareholders. 
The second issue is that s172 (1) CA only requires directors to ‘have regard to’ the 
factors whilst they discharge their duty to promote the success of the company for 
the benefit of the members as a whole. ‘Having regard to’ is a very vague concept 
which does not mandate more than to consider the factors enlisted in s172 (1) CA. It 
seems that the relationship between the ‘success of the company for the benefit of 
its members as a whole’ and ‘having regard’ to the list of factors is one of 
subordination. The analysis of ‘success of the company’ in the previous part has 
shown that directors must ultimately strive to enhance shareholder value when they 
work towards the promotion of the success of the company. The same finding 
applies in relation to the provision ‘having regard to’. Directors must ‘only’ have 
regard to the list of factors in s172 (1) CA whilst they promote the interests of the 
members as a whole, i.e. the shareholders.  
Thirdly, with regard to the role of employees as one key stakeholder group, one 
could even go as far as viewing the provision in s172 (1) CA as a change of the law 
to the worse. The reason is that the previous Companies Act 1985 mentioned 
employees in a separate provision442 without express subordination under 
shareholder value as in s172 CA. S309 Companies Act 1985 stipulated that 
directors must have regard to the interests of the company’s employees in general 
as well as the interests of its members. The reason for the abolishment of this 
previously separate section regarding the position of the company’s employees in 
the new Companies Act 2006 is that the Company Law Review Steering Group did 
not want to see the interests of employees favoured above those of the 
shareholders.443 The duty in s172 (1) CA therefore not only subordinates the 
concept of CSR under the goal of enhancing shareholder value, it also has had a 
detrimental effect on the recognition of employees, as these are now only part of the 
non-exhaustive list of factors in s172 (1) CA. 
Fourthly, the little case law that exists about s172 (1) CA further adds to the cautious 
view taken here about the role of the stakeholders listed in s172 (1) CA in the 
directors’ decision-making process. The recent case R. (on the application of People 
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& Planet) v HM Treasury444 is important for the analysis about how directors must 
‘have regard to’ the list of factors. Here, the High Court had the opportunity to 
consider the scope of the duty in s172 CA and the importance of the interests of the 
stakeholders. The case was brought against the government as it had bought a 
stake of about 84 per cent of the shares of the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS).445 
The government’s ownership of RBS was arranged through a limited company, UK 
Financial Investments Ltd (UKFI).446 RBS is a significant provider of financing to the 
energy industry. This situation led to a challenge by activists of the student network 
People & Planet which works in the areas of poverty, human rights and the 
environment. People & Planet disagreed with HM Treasury Policy regarding UKFI’s 
management of RBS on the basis of the statutory norms regarding the protection of 
the environment in s172 (1) CA.447 Due to the peculiarities with the government 
owning the shares, the litigation in this case was not based on a shareholder 
derivative action, but on judicial review. The government agreed to a policy 
document in which it decided not to intervene in the day-to-day management 
decisions. This approach confirmed a commercial approach as the best way for 
UKFI to achieve its objectives. The court rejected the application for permission to 
bring judicial review proceedings. It argued that to go beyond the commercial 
approach would ‘cut across the fundamental legal duty of boards to manage their 
companies in the interest of all their shareholders’.448 
Notably, the court held that had the government sought to impose its own policy on 
combating climate change and promoting human rights on the board of RBS, this 
would have ‘cut across the duties of the RBS Board as set out in s172 (1)’.449 UKFI 
could properly seek to influence the board of RBS to have regard to environmental 
and human rights considerations in accordance with its duty under s172 CA 2006, 
but this would be a step too far for the Treasury. This decision is significant as the 
court noted that, if shareholders seek to influence the decisions of the management, 
they could only influence directors to act within the constraints of s172 CA (which 
means the shareholder prerogative). The limit of enforcing the consideration of the 
list of factors in s172 (1) CA is therefore the promotion of shareholder value. 
Consequently, CSR considerations may only be pursued to the extent that these 
promote the business case. Secondly, the court pointed out that there is then a risk 
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of litigation by minority shareholders who could complain that the value of their 
shares had been detrimentally affected.450 This argument further supports the 
interpretation of the previous point that the stakeholder-oriented considerations to 
which a director must have regard in s172 (1) CA are subordinated under the 
interests of the shareholders. Following the High Court’s decision, one should be 
cautious as to the effect of s172 (1) CA on the promotion of CSR. 
The analysis of the meaning of ‘having regard to’ has shown that the interests of the 
members are given priority over the various stakeholders referred to in the non-
exhaustive list of factors in the second part of s172 (1) CA.451 Effectively this means 
that the concept of CSR is not considered as an end in itself, but only as an means 
to an end, namely to increase shareholder value. The term ‘having regard to’ 
subordinates CSR under the goal of enhancing shareholder value. The interests of 
shareholders are prioritised through the phrase ‘having regard to’ as these factors 
are only considered as aspects a director must consider when pursuing the ultimate 
goal of promoting the interests of the company’s members. This finding is in line with 
the interpretation of ‘success of the company’ which has shown that the interests of 
shareholders are favoured in the decision-making process. There is thus an 
emerging picture in the analysis here that s172 (1) CA is still firmly embedded in the 
tradition of the shareholder value doctrine. CSR has been left to be a side-aspect of 
the decision-making process. Although CSR is implicit in s172 (1) CA, its practical 
impact is likely to be very limited due to the overriding prioritisation of shareholders. 
The duty in s172 (1) CA therefore effectively continues to prioritise shareholder 
value. CSR is only a secondary consideration for directors. 
3.4.1.5 Enforceability 
Having analysed the different components of s172 (1) CA with regard to their effect 
on the promotion of CSR, the question remains how enforceable claims about an 
alleged breach of this duty are. The principal position is that the proper claimant in 
respect of a wrong allegedly done to the company is the company (‘proper plaintiff 
rule’).452 It is therefore up to the management to decide whether or not to pursue a 
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claim. The only group which could have a right to bring proceedings in case of an 
alleged breach of the s172 CA duty are shareholders. They can bring a derivative 
action pursuant to s260 CA. However, the subsequent analysis will show the limited 
ability of this claim in terms of enforcing s172 (1) in order to pursue CSR goals. 
It is notable that the various groups listed in s172 (1) CA are not given legal standing 
in s172 CA. One can therefore argue that the provision lacks teeth in terms of the 
enforcement of the interests of these groups. This situation is likely to have a limiting 
effect on the promotion of CSR through s172 (1) CA. The reason is that the board of 
directors and the shareholders, as the only groups who have standing to bring a 
claim for an alleged breach of s172 (1) CA, are usually more concerned with the 
protection of their interests, i.e. the promotion of shareholder value. As the various 
stakeholders listed in s172 (1) CA cannot bring a claim for an alleged non-
consideration of their interests, it is less likely that their interests are enforced at all, 
unless socially minded shareholders litigate. The practical effects of s172 (1) CA for 
the promotion of CSR are therefore further limited. It will be difficult to start an action 
or to prove a breach of s172 (1) CA. 
The academic literature has consequently assessed the enforceability of s172 (1) 
CA in a rather cautious manner. Birds calls the effect of s172 CA ‘likely to be 
educational rather than in any sense restrictive’.453 In his opinion, business decisions 
taken in good faith will not be any more easily challengeable than they were prior to 
the CA 2006. This situation has been rightly called ‘a right without a remedy’.454 
Keay therefore concludes that ‘there is certainly an enforcement problem with the 
provision’.455 He points out that there is an absence of significant case law with 
regard to this section even though the Companies Act has been in force for some 
years now.456 There are a number of possible reasons for this situation in Keay’s 
view: Cautious lawyers who are uncertain about the exact meaning and scope of the 
new duty, actions are still in the pipeline, directors are not breaching the provision or 
litigants rely on other provisions as the basis for actions against directors.457  
On the basis of the analysis here, it seems that it is the way in which s172 (1) CA 
has been drafted, with its emphasis on good faith decisions of directors and its 
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prioritisation of shareholder value, that is the principal reason for the lack of 
enforcement of the provision.  
3.4.1.6 Concluding remarks regarding s172 (1) CA 
The analysis of the duty in s172 (1) CA provides a rather limited effect of this 
provision for the promotion of CSR. 
The findings in this chapter contradict the statement made by the then Minister of 
State for Industry and the Regions Margaret Hodge who argued that s172 CA 
marked a ‘radical departure in articulating the connection between what is good for a 
company and what is good for society at large’.458 She also said that ‘The law is now 
based on a new approach. Pursuing the interests of shareholders and embracing 
wider responsibilities are complementary purposes, not contradictory ones’.459 
Whilst the analysis in this chapter severely questions if the first claim of ‘radical 
departure’ is tenable, her reference to the complementary purposes does hint at the 
fact that the directors have a list of factors to consider. However, these factors are 
ultimately subordinated under the goal of increasing shareholder value, so CSR may 
be pursued only if it promotes the business case. The practical effects of the new 
duty for stakeholder concerns, and in particular for CSR, are restricted.  
The priority attributed to shareholder value in s172 (1) CA is a continuation of the 
legal situation prior to the enactment of the Companies Act 2006. In particular, the 
analysis of the requirements ‘good faith’ and ‘success of the company’ in s172 (1) 
CA have revealed considerable conformity between the old common law duty to 
work bona fide in the interest of the company and s172 (1) CA. Where directors 
were previously required to work in the interest of the company, understood as 
meaning the shareholders as a general body, s172 (1) CA now stipulates that 
directors must promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members 
as a whole which are in fact the shareholders. This result demonstrates that CSR is 
only a secondary consideration for directors. 
This outcome is further confirmed by the results of a recent evaluation of the 
Companies Act 2006, commissioned by the Department for Business Innovation & 
Skills (BIS).460 The study showed that there is a need among business and 
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stakeholders to add clarity and guidance for s172 CA in order to boost awareness 
and understanding to increase behavioural change.461 The responses from 
businesses confirm the scepticism about the practical impact of s172 CA. Less than 
a fifth of companies overall which were aware of this duty agreed that it had affected 
the behaviour of directors, and over three-fifths disagreed that the change had 
impacted the behaviour of directors.462 A further important distinction is that amongst 
interviewees significantly more directors disagreed that the change had affected 
their behaviour (91%) as opposed to non-directors (64%). These results show that 
although there is high awareness of the changes made in relation to directors’ duties 
in the CA 2006 (79% were aware of this), only few directors have yet changed their 
decision-making process as a consequence of the new duty in s172 (1) CA. This 
evaluation provides for rather pessimistic reading from a CSR point of view. As the 
vast majority of directors have stated that they have not changed their decision-
making, following the introduction of s172 CA, it is unlikely that they are going to 
pursue CSR goals to a greater extent than they have done before. This point further 
confirms the result of the analysis above: That the practical effects of s172 (1) CA 
for the promotion of CSR are limited. 
It is significant that the study reveals that it is likely that there is no difference in the 
behaviour of directors if the directors are to make subjective judgments and if they 
are the same directors who were in that position prior to the enactment of the CA 
2006.463 This point is a very interesting one, as it indicates that the people who make 
the business decisions are key for the implementation of CSR into the business 
strategy. This issue underlines the importance of the board composition for the 
pursuing of CSR goals in the decision-making process of the company, as, for 
instance, non-executive directors are in a position to challenge business decisions 
and to add different viewpoints to debates, including those that are CSR related. 
The findings of the evaluation of the Companies Act 2006 by BIS make one wonder 
if the drafting of directors’ duties alone is necessarily the most effective means to 
achieve CSR goals. It shows that the composition of the board (with directors 
coming from a more diverse background who represent different stakeholders), in 
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combination with the duty to consider the factors enlisted in s172 CA, might be 
better suited to the effective implementation of CSR through corporate governance. 
The aspect of the board composition will be discussed below. 
In light of the findings of this section, it is doubtful if the enlightened shareholder 
value doctrine that underlies the s172 (1) CA duty really marks a shift away from the 
legal situation prior to the enactment of the Companies Act. At least directors have 
discretion in how they discharge this duty, including considerations above and 
beyond short-term shareholder gains. It is right that directors make ‘good faith’ 
decisions about the promotion of the interests of shareholders and the consideration 
of stakeholder interests which they can balance in different ways.464 Nevertheless, 
this chapter has shown that this was already possible under the common law duties 
prior to the Companies Act 2006. Directors can promote CSR, if they believe that it 
promotes the benefit of the company in the long run, but CSR remains subordinated 
under shareholder value. Because shareholder value and the concerns of CSR are 
not always coincidental and might well be in conflict, this subordination is a severe 
limitation of the s172 (1) CA duty for the promotion of CSR. 
In conclusion, it seems unlikely that the duty to promote the success of the company 
in s172 (1) CA will fundamentally change the way directors run the company under 
the Companies Act 2006. S172 (1) CA can therefore be regarded as a general 
statement with limited practical effects. It is still subject to what is called the 
‘historical magnitude of a corporation as a vehicle for shareholder value 
maximisation’.465  
3.4.2 The business review (s417 CA) 
3.4.2.1 Legislative requirements for the business review 
The duty to promote the success of the company pursuant to s172 (1) CA is linked 
with the business review in s417 CA. The enlightened shareholder value model was 
implemented through s172 CA as well as the business review.466 
Companies are required to file a directors’ report for each financial year of the 
company, s415 (1) CA. Pursuant to s417 (1) CA the directors’ report must contain a 
business review, unless the company is entitled to the small companies exemption, 
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s415A CA. The purpose of the directors’ report is to inform members of the 
company and help them assess how the directors have performed their duty under 
s172 CA.467 The business review is relevant for this chapter insofar as the list of 
factors in 172 (1) CA to which a director must have regard when making decisions 
overlap with CSR. The reporting duty therefore requires directors to inform members 
about how they have discharged their duty to promote the success of the company, 
including the pursuing of CSR goals. With this transparency, the business review 
can contribute to the promotion of CSR. The current legislative reform of narrative 
reporting in the UK will be addressed later on this section, following the analysis of 
the business review in its present form.468 
The business review must contain a fair review of the company’s business and a 
description of the principal risks and uncertainties facing the company.469 The review 
is (a) a balanced and comprehensive analysis of the development and performance 
of the company’s business during the financial year and (b) the position of the 
company’s business at the end of that year.470 In case of a quoted company, s417 
(5) CA further stipulates that the business review must, to the extent necessary for 
an understanding of the development, performance or position of the company’s 
business (a) include the main trends and factors likely to affect the future 
development, performance and position of the company’s business and (b) (i) 
include information about environmental matters (including the impact of the 
company’s business on the environment), (ii) the company’s employees and (iii) 
social and community issues, including information about any policies of the 
company in relation to those matters and the effectiveness of those policies and (c) 
information about persons with whom the company has contractual or other 
arrangements which are essential to the business of the company. 
It is important from a CSR point of view that, if the review does not contain 
information regarding the issues mentioned in s417 (5) (b) and (c) CA, it must only 
state which of these categories it does not contain. A business review must also 
include analysis using financial key performance indicators and, where appropriate, 
other key performance indicators, including information relating to environmental 
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matters and employee matters.471 This provision in s417 (6) CA emphasises the 
significance of financial information as these ‘must’ be included, whereas other key 
performance indicators relating to environmental matters and employee matters only 
need to be included ‘where appropriate’. This situation is significant for CSR as it 
prioritises financial issues and makes the reporting about environmental matters 
(which are part of the CSR agenda) optional. In addition to this effective 
subordination of CSR matters in s417 (6) CA, one must consider the situation in 
s417 (5) CA which was referred to above. The fact that this section allows quoted 
companies to leave out information about environmental matters, employees as well 
as social and community issues, as long as the company declares that its business 
review does not contain this information, degrades reporting about CSR to a 
voluntary exercise for directors. It is a clear weakness of the provision that it remains 
very vague about what is to be included into the business review.472 Directors can 
make quite neutral statements due to the discretion that they have in the writing of 
the reports.473 
Research about the question how the relationship between company boards and 
their investors has been affected by the business review requirements further 
questions the effectiveness of the new reporting requirement.474 A study by Villiers 
and Aiyegbayo based on semi-structured interviews with key corporate governance 
actors, such as investor relations managers and corporate governance directors 
from institutional investment firms, shows that the business review makes little 
difference to the quality of reports.475 According to Villiers and Aiyegbayo’s study, 
companies are struggling to report effectively their non-financial key performance 
indicators.476 As these are CSR issues such as environmental matters, this study 
supports the view taken in this section that the practical effect of s417 CA for the 
promotion of CSR is limited. 
This outcome is further exacerbated by the fact that it is difficult to hold directors 
accountable for breaches of their reporting duty. Pursuant to s463 CA, directors are 
only liable for false and misleading statements or the omission of anything required 
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to be in the report under the condition that the director knew that the statement was 
untrue or misleading or if he was reckless as to whether it was untrue or misleading 
and he knew the omission to be dishonest concealment of a material fact.477 This 
section effectively restricts liability to cases of deceit. It cannot arise in negligence 
which is the reason why it has been called a ‘safe harbour provision’.478 Moreover, 
the claimant is the company which can only sue in case of a loss suffered as a 
consequence of the false or misleading statement, something which is difficult to 
prove. This means that the stakeholders of the company who should benefit both 
from the considerations enlisted in s172 (1) CA and the reporting about the 
discharge of this duty are left without a remedy in cases where the directors do not 
report about matters of CSR at all. 
3.4.2.2 The limitations of the business review 
The business review is considered to be what accountants call ‘narrative 
reporting’.479 Narrative reporting enables managers to explain the company’s 
performance without numbers and to indicate the future direction of the company’s 
business.480 The duty to write a business review is part of the government’s intention 
that companies acknowledge their social responsibilities.481 However, what 
appeared to be a rather novel idea during the work of the Company Law Steering 
Group in the late 1990s and early 2000s has since then to some extent been 
overtaken by disclosure developments outside the Companies Act. In the meantime, 
the pressure on companies to publicly commit themselves to CSR has led to the 
widespread voluntary disclosure of CSR-related activities by companies which were 
not foreseen at the time of the Company Law Review.482 It must be added, however, 
that this voluntary disclosure is not necessarily very effective.483 The development of 
voluntary disclosure outside the Companies Act further questions if the business 
review does contribute to the promotion of CSR. 
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In this regard it is important to note that the system of narrative reporting is currently 
under review in the UK and likely to be subject to legislative reforms due to come 
into force later this year.484 In 2010 the government issued a consultation paper, The 
Future of Narrative Reporting, to consult on the business review in order to enable 
more effective shareholder engagement.485 A summary of responses document was 
published in December 2010.486 Upon analysing the contributions, the government 
chose to publish a further consultation on the future of narrative reporting in 
September 2011. In October 2012, the government proposed changes to the system 
of narrative reporting in the UK and published a further document that contained 
draft regulations.487 These will be discussed later on in this section. The background 
to this consultation process is that the government had committed itself to this 
review during the passage of the Companies Act through Parliament as the 
business review replaced the originally proposed Operating and Financial Review 
(OFR).488 The main objective of the OFR was to provide ‘more qualitative and 
forward looking reporting, in addition to information that is quantitative, historical or 
concerns internal company affairs’.489 This abolition of the OFR was received with 
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criticisms.490 Johnston makes the criticism that the business review is less 
prescriptive than the OFR would have been and that the business review offers less 
guidance about its content.491 Whilst he admits that ‘the success of the OFR was by 
no means certain’492, it would have enabled investors to gain a better understanding 
of the way in which individual businesses generate wealth which, in turn, would have 
enabled directors to exercise more discretion in their decision-making.493 Moreover, 
the abandoned OFR would have given directors an opportunity to consider the 
various interests that they must have to have regard to under s172 (1) CA to an 
extent that is not required by the business review.494 
The responses to the first consultation were mixed with positive feedback from 
companies and business representatives and criticisms from NGOs and Trade 
Unions.495 The latter respondents said that company reports often failed to explain 
how companies were managing issues such as human rights, environmental 
impacts or employee matters where these had material implications for their strategy 
and risk management. This feedback is in line with the result above that the 
reporting of companies about the promotion of CSR goals is more or less left to the 
directors’ discretion. With regard to the question if elements of the OFR with its more 
prescriptive provisions should be reinstated in order to improve the quality of 
reporting, views were particularly divergent.496 Whilst the majority of companies and 
business representatives negatively responded to this question, several NGOs and 
Trade Unions made clear that there was a need for a more precise regulatory 
framework which set out exactly what information was needed on social and 
environmental matters to help companies and users. They argued that human rights 
issues should be explicitly included. The critical views of the NGOs and Trade 
Unions reflect the conclusion of the analysis in this section that the effects of the 
business review on the promotion of CSR are likely to be rather limited. 
Reviews from corporate reporting agencies, accounting firms and governmental 
regulators are critical of the quality of narrative reporting in the UK, too.497 PWC, for 
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example, reviews annually the narrative reporting practice of the FTSE350.498 In a 
recent review they conclude that ‘companies still fail to present a clear, credible and 
coherent picture of the direction of travel and short-term performance’.499 They 
argue that many companies would only pay lip service to their sustainability goals. 
This argument is evidenced by their finding that around 40% of FTSE 100 
companies and around 60% to 70% of FTSE 250 companies have significant 
progress to make in terms of their narrative reporting regarding external drivers, 
risks and sustainability reporting.500 In its response to the consultation on the future 
of narrative reporting, PWC points out that its research would show that regulation 
appears to have an indirect positive impact on reporting by establishing the key 
principles for good quality reporting.501 The Accounting Standards Board, an 
operating body of the Financial Reporting Council (FRC), reviewed the reports of a 
sample of 50 listed companies.502 Notably, they found out that only 20% of the 
companies in their sample revealed best practice in terms of their disclosure of the 
CSR issues concerning environmental matters, employees as well as social and 
community issues.503 34% were compliant in spirit whereas 40% were either not 
compliant with the law or were compliant but the discussion was either generic or 
related to matters that were unimportant to the business.504 This situation reveals a 
lack of transparency in respect of CSR issues and further questions whether the 
business review in s417 CA promotes CSR at all. 
It appears from the studies about narrative reporting that the business review in its 
current form does not meet its aims. From a CSR perspective it is a particular 
limitation that the information about the environment, employees, as well as social 
and community issues, must only be included in the business review of quoted 
companies ‘to the extent necessary for an understanding of the development, 
performance or position of the company’s business’.505 This restriction is further 
exacerbated by the fact that quoted companies only need to state which of the 
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information about, for instance, the environment or employees, their report does not 
contain. The consequence is a situation where the reporting about these aspects is 
rather limited, as evidenced by several studies about the quality of the reports of 
FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 companies. These results confirm the critical assessment 
of Johnston about the move away from the originally planned OFR to the business 
review. Johnston argued that the business review was ‘incapable’ of playing the role 
that was envisaged for the OFR (i.e. informing the company’s investors about the 
ways in which the company creates wealth, including information about social and 
environmental issues as well as the company’s relationship with its employees, 
customers, suppliers and others).506 The analysis of both s172 CA and the business 
review in this chapter support his conclusion that the UK system of corporate 
governance would ‘remain unchanged by the company law reforms’.507 Given that 
the quality of voluntary CSR reports of companies is also seen critically by their 
readers in the survey on the future of narrative reporting by BIS, it seems as if the 
state of reporting on CSR issues is generally poor. Keay therefore is correct in his 
criticims that the decision not to require an OFR, but rather to implement the 
business review ‘causes one to ask to what extent is the government committed to 
any consideration of stakeholder interests’.508   
The business review is too vague and leaves too much discretion for any effective 
reporting on stakeholder-issues. The approach of the government to encourage 
business to (voluntarily) disclose their CSR policies and activities rather than to 
legally require them to do so has so far only produced poor results. The business 
review in s417 CA in its current form has therefore not greatly helped to promote 
CSR. It is primarily aimed at shareholders, as s417 (2) CA states that ‘the purpose 
of the business report is to inform members of the company’. It should help 
shareholders understand how the directors ‘have performed their duty under section 
172’. This focus on shareholders is further emphasised by the prioritisation of the 
review of the company’s business, its risk and uncertainties as well as, in the case 
of a quoted company, the use of financial key performance factors to describe the 
factors likely to affect the future development, performance and position of the 
business.  The focus of the review is on assessing the business from an investor’s 
perspective.509 The reporting about stakeholder issues, such as the environment, is 
left to the discretion of the company. Whereas the review must contain financial key 
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performance indicators, other key performance indicators pertaining, for example, to 
the environment or employee matters are only necessary ‘where appropriate’. 
Stakeholder-issues are therefore effectively subordinated under financial 
considerations.  Like the s172 (1) CA duty, the business review is firmly embedded 
in the goal of prioritising the interests of shareholders.510 Both the duty to promote 
the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole and the 
business review are strongly limited in their ability to promote CSR.  
3.4.2.3 The promotion of CSR under the proposed strategic report 
As a result of the consultation process on the state of narrative reporting in the UK 
the government has proposed to replace the business review by a strategic report. 
511 The proposals are, at the time of writing, considered by Parliament and are 
expected to come into force later in 2013. At the same time, the EU Commission 
has proposed amendments to existing legislation in order to improve the 
transparency of large companies on social and environmental matters.512 The 
following part will focus on the proposed changes to English company law first and 
then review if the proposed changes by the EU Commission will necessitate 
changes to the system of narrative reporting in English law. 
The draft Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report) Regulations 
2013 that the government has proposed includes the requirement for companies to 
produce a strategic report.513 The strategic report (which will be required by s414A 
of the Companies Act) will replace the business review, but will be similar to it.514 
Under the proposed regime, the strategic report will come first in the directors’ 
report. It will require quoted companies to report on their strategy and their business 
model.515 Whilst the new s414C CA will ‘replicate section 417 of the Companies Act 
2006’516, the strategic report will also explicitly require quoted companies to report 
on human rights issues. This inclusion of human rights can be seen as a response 
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to the recommendation in the UN Guiding Principle on Business and Human Rights 
that states should ‘encourage, and where appropriate require, business enterprises 
to communicate how they address their human rights impacts’.517 Human rights 
issues will be added to the social and community issues in s414C (4) (d) (iii) which 
will otherwise replicate s417 (5) (b) (iii) CA. Whilst the addition of human rights into 
the list of factors for the strategic report sounds promising from a CSR point of view 
at first sight, it needs to be taken into account that the same restrictions to the 
reporting about these issues will apply as for the existing provision: First, the quoted 
companies must only include information about these issues ‘to the extent 
necessary for an understanding of the development, performance or position of the 
company’s business’; secondly, if the report does not contain information about 
these issues (as well as environmental matters and the company’s employees) the 
report must only state which of those kinds of information it does not contain. A 
notable change under the new regime is that quoted companies will be required to 
disclose the number of women on the board, in senior executive positions and in the 
whole organisation.518 
It can be concluded that the proposed strategic report is unlikely to change much in 
terms of CSR reporting despite of the addition of human rights into the list of factors. 
Directors will still not be forced to report about CSR issues. The reform of narrative 
reporting with the introduction of the new strategic report is therefore a missed 
opportunity from a CSR point of view. The duty to report about gender diversity both 
within the management and the company as a whole is a step into the right 
direction. It is hoped that this requirement will increase pressure on boards to 
become more diverse (which is a point that is addressed below in the section about 
the board). 
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3.4.2.4 The proposed EU Directive on the disclosure of nonfinancial and 
diversity information 
However, the reporting about CSR matters could be improved if the Directive 
regarding disclosure of nonfinancial and diversity information by certain large 
companies and groups that was proposed in April 2013 is to be introduced.519 The 
background to the proposed Directive is that, in its 2011 communication on CSR, 
the Commission had stated its commitment to implement the UN Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights.520 In its action plan on company law and corporate 
governance in December 2012, the Commission announced that it would make a 
proposal in 2013 to strengthen disclosure requirements on board diversity policy and 
risk management.521 
Moreover, in February 2013, the EU Parliament adopted two resolutions in which it 
highlights the importance of company transparency on environmental and social 
matters.522 The EU Parliament asked the Commission to bring forward a proposal on 
non-financial disclosure by companies. The impact assessment of the Commission 
on corporate reporting on nonfinancial information showed significant weaknesses 
both in terms of the quantity of information and the quality of information.523 The 
                                                          
519
 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC as regards disclosure of nonfinancial and 
diversity information by certain large companies and groups’ COM (2013) 207 final, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/accounting/docs/non-financial-reporting/com_2013_207_en.pdf 
(last accessed: 19/05/2013).  
520
 As indicated above, principle 3 (b) of the UN Guiding Principles contains the recommendation that 
states should encourage, and where appropriate require, business enterprises to communicate how 
they address their human rights impacts‘. 
521
 European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the regions, Action Plan: 
European company law and corporate governance – a modern legal framework for more engaged 
shareholders and sustainable companies’ COM (2012) 740 final, para 2.1, available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0740:FIN:EN:PDF (last accessed: 
21/05/2013).  
522
 The resolutions passed on 6
th
 February are: First, Report on corporate social responsibility: 
accountable, transparent and responsible business behaviour and sustainable growth 
(2012/2098(INI)); Committee on Legal Affairs, available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A7-2013-
0017+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN (last accessed: 19/05/2013); Secondly, Report on 
Corporate Social Responsibility: promoting society’s interests and a route to sustainable and inclusive 
recovery (2012/2097(INI)); Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A7-2013-
0023+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN (last accessed: 19/05/2013). 
523
 The Commission states that it is estimated that only 2500 out of the total 42000 EU large 
companies formally disclose non-financial information on a yearly basis. Moreover, the quality of 
information disclosed by companies does not adequately meet the needs of users. See: European 
Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Council Directives amending Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC as regards disclosure of 
nonfinancial and diversity information by certain large companies and groups’ COM (2013) 207 final, 4, 
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/accounting/docs/non-financial-
reporting/com_2013_207_en.pdf (last accessed: 20/05/2013). 
93 
 
proposed Directive is intended to be an amendment to the Accounting Directives 
rather than a new Directive.524 
The proposed Directive, if introduced, would require large companies with more than 
500 employees525 to disclose relevant and material environmental and social 
information in their annual reports. The proposed Directive stipulates that the annual 
report of these companies must include a non-financial statement containing 
information relating to at least environmental, social and employee matters, respect 
for human rights, anti-corruption and bribery matters. This statement must include a 
description of the policy pursued by the company in relation to these matters, the 
results of these policies and the risks related to these matters and how the company 
manages those risks. Companies that do not pursue policies in relation to one or 
more of these matters shall provide an explanation for not doing so.526 Moreover, the 
proposed Directive also requires companies to describe their diversity policy for its 
administrative, management and  supervisory bodies with regard to aspects such as 
age, gender, geographical diversity, educational and professional background, the 
objectives of this diversity policy, how it has been implemented and the results in the 
reporting period.527 The ‘comply or explain’ approach also applies to this reporting 
duty. 
The proposed Directive overlaps with the planned reform of narrative reporting in 
English law. However, the changes to English law are expected to be effective in 
October 2013 whereas the Commission envisages that companies would be 
required to publish their first reports in compliance with the Directive in 2017.528 
Whilst there are similarities between the two proposed regimes, it is important to 
note that the requirements of the Directive go further than the business review and 
the strategic report. First, contrary to the proposed strategic report the Directive also 
explicitly requires reporting on anti-corruption and bribery matters. However, whilst 
this issue is not explicitly required in the proposed strategic report, it could be 
argued that this addition will not make a real difference to the way in which English 
companies address bribery as they already face liability under s7 of the Bribery Act 
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2010.529 They can therefore be expected to take bribery seriously.530 Secondly, 
rather than just requiring companies to report on CSR issues ‘to the extent 
necessary for an understanding of the development, performance of position of the 
company’s business (the position under the strategic report), the proposed Directive 
prescribes reporting of the policies, their results and risks whenever a company has 
a policy on these issues. Where a company does not have such a policy, it would 
need to give reasons for this situation, which applies the ‘comply or explain’ 
approach (that underlies the UK Corporate Governance Code) to CSR reporting. In 
contrast, the strategic report would allow companies purely to state that they did not 
report on these issues. Therefore, the requirements of the proposed Directive go 
beyond the current and proposed reporting system under the Companies Act. If 
introduced, the Directive would therefore improve the reporting on CSR by large 
companies.531 Thirdly, the diversity reporting under the directive, too, goes beyond 
the planned changes in the reporting duty under the Companies Act. Therefore, the 
proposed directive has potential to improve the status quo of corporate CSR 
reporting in English law. Besides, as CSR is by its nature an international concern, it 
is a positive development if there is a level playing field for companies throughout 
the EU. The Directive is unlikely to make CSR reporting a primary concern for 
companies, but it will nevertheless improve the kinds of information that companies 
need to provide on their socially responsible conduct. Whilst the reporting duty will 
not force companies to adopt CSR policies, it will nevertheless put the reporting on 
these matters on a comparable ground throughout the EU. Moreover, it will enable 
the public to identify those companies that do not have a CSR policy. The important 
issue that remains to be seen, however, will be the quality of reporting under the 
new reporting scheme with its continuance of the ‘comply or explain’ approach. The 
key issue for the success of the proposed reporting regime will be if companies use 
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it as a genuine opportunity to reflect on their CSR policies and as an instrument to 
inform their investors as well as other stakeholders or if companies only provide 
boilerplate statements. In the end, the reporting duty will only be one (albeit 
important) tool for the promotion of CSR. The following section will analyse to what 
extent the investors, who are one of the key addressees of the reporting duty, can 
contribute to the socially responsible conduct of companies.532 
3.4.3 Shareholders’ engagement and the derivative action 
It is said that good corporate governance depends on both effective shareholder 
control and an effective board (to be discussed below).533 This section will analyse 
to what extent shareholders can contribute to the promotion of CSR within 
companies. The focus will be on two aspects: First, the role of institutional investors 
as they are a powerful group of shareholders who have potential to influence the 
decision-making of companies. Secondly, the focus will be on the use of the 
derivative action pursuant to s260 (1) CA as a means to enforce CSR. 
3.4.3.1 Institutional investors 
Several reviews of corporate governance have emphasised the importance of 
institutional investors for the monitoring of the directors.534 The reason for this focus 
on institutional investors is that they hold approximately 40 per cent of the shares of 
quoted companies in the UK.535 Due to this power, discussions about corporate 
governance commonly focus on the ability of institutional investors to monitor and 
engage with decisions of the board. Shareholder activism is an aspect that deserves 
consideration in a chapter on the promotion of CSR in company law and corporate 
governance as shareholders can influence the adherence of a company to social 
issues.536   
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However, the different reviews of institutional investors concur in their critical 
assessment of the status quo, i.e. the inadequate level of engagement of 
institutional investors with their investee companies.537 And, notably, the criticisms 
repeat themselves. In 2001, the White Paper on the company law reform 
emphasised that a change in the ‘traditional’ attitude of institutional investors 
towards the companies in their portfolios was necessary.538 The ‘traditional’ attitude 
was understood as a lack of engagement with their portfolio companies, a focus on 
short-term financial gains and the widespread use of an exit strategy (i.e. selling of 
the shares) in case the investors were unhappy about the direction of the 
company.539 At the same time the White Paper positively commented on the 
Statement of Principles on the Responsibilities of Institutional Investors, published 
by the Institutional Shareholders Committee as a means to improve the role of 
institutional investors.540 This document contains statements of best practice for 
institutional investors about their monitoring duties.541 It also declares that the 
primary role of institutional investors is that of investors. In the wake of the financial 
and economic crisis, the role of institutional investors continued to be a matter of 
concern, however. The 2009 Walker Review of corporate governance in UK banks 
devotes a whole chapter to the issue of the effective engagement of institutional 
investors with their portfolio companies.542 
The discussions about the role of institutional investors eventually led to the 
development of the UK Stewardship Code in 2010.543 The UK Stewardship Code 
was revised in September 2012.544 It is a set of principles which ‘aims to enhance 
the quality of engagement between institutional investors and companies’.545 It is 
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addressed ‘in the first instance to institutional investors, by which is meant asset 
owners and asset managers with equity holdings in UK listed companies’.546 Asset 
owners include pension funds, insurance companies, investment trusts and other 
collective investment vehicles.547 Stewardship includes monitoring and engaging 
with companies on matters such as strategy, performance, risk and corporate 
governance, including culture and remuneration.548 The UK Stewardship Code 
follows the ‘comply or explain’ approach of the UK Corporate Governance Code 
which means that investors who do not comply with provisions of the UK 
Stewardship Code shall explain that they have not done so and give reasons for 
this.549 The UK Stewardship Code provides inter alia that institutional investors 
should monitor their investee companies, report about how they discharge this duty 
and that they should seek to exercise their voting rights. Principle 2 clarifies that it is 
the duty of institutional investors to act in the interests of their clients.550 As part of 
their duty to monitor their investee companies (Principle 3), institutional investors 
should ‘satisfy themselves that the company’s board and committees adhere to the 
spirit of the UK Corporate Governance Code, including through meetings with the 
chairman and other board members’. Principle 4 has undergone a slight change in 
the revision of the Stewardship Code. Whereas the 2010 version stipulated that the 
institutional investors should have ‘clear guidelines on when and how they will 
escalate their activities as a method of protecting and enhancing shareholder value’, 
the revised version omits the reference to the protection and enhancement of 
‘shareholder value’.551 Moreover, the guidance to this principle also outlines that 
companies may want to intervene when they have concerns about the company’s 
approach to risks that may arise from social and environmental matters.552 
The effects of the UK Stewardship Code in terms of promoting CSR in investee 
companies are likely to be limited, however. Although the term ‘stewardship’ in the 
title appears to emphasise the responsibility of institutional investors, there is not 
much in the Code that is new at all. The duty to monitor investee companies is 
nothing new, in light of the guidelines previously published by the Institutional 
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Shareholders Committee.553 In fact, there is a considerable continuity between the 
UK Stewardship Code and the previous documents by the Institutional Shareholders 
Committee.554 The fact that the 2010 version of the UK Stewardship Code even 
explicitly referred to ‘enhancing shareholder value’ is not a problem for CSR in itself, 
given that investors expect a financial return on their investment. However, the 
explicit absence of references to the pursuit of CSR goals shows that the UK 
Stewardship Code does not mark a step towards the promotion of CSR. The 
comment in the guidance to principle 4, that the instances in which investors ‘may 
want to intervene’ include those ‘that may arise from social and environmental 
matters’, is rather vague. The absence of a principle with an express outline of CSR 
issues in the Stewardship Code is particularly disappointing, given that the new duty 
in s172 (1) CA refers to the interests of various stakeholders. This duty has not had 
any impact on these best practice guidelines for institutional investors. It is therefore 
not to be expected that the majority of institutional investors are promoting these 
interests as part of their shareholder engagement which means that the impact of 
the UK Stewardship Code for CSR is likely to be minimal. 
On a practical note, it is important to consider that the overall share ownership of 
traditional institutional investors, such as insurance companies and pension funds 
(with a potentially higher interest in long-term success), is declining whereas that of 
hedge funds and overseas investors is increasing (there is a danger that these 
groups are less interested in the long-term success of their investee companies or 
CSR issues).555 The scepticism about the restricted ability of institutional investors to 
enhance greater CSR is also based on the fact that the division of power generally 
vests the power of management in the board of directors with only limited rights 
retained by the shareholders such as the statutory right to amend the articles556, to 
reduce the share capital557 and to remove the directors558. At the moment, 
shareholders do not have much power to promote greater CSR in their investee 
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companies.559 This sceptical assessment is further supported by the fact that the so-
called ‘shareholder spring’ in 2012 focussed on directors’ remuneration.560 Whilst 
there was an intensive coverage in the press about the refusal of some institutional 
investors to accept the remuneration reports of some companies (shareholders have 
an advisory vote on the directors’ remuneration report561), the engagement of the 
investors did not expand to CSR matters such as the quality of corporate reports on 
CSR or their CSR record generally.562 One also needs to consider that institutional 
shareholders such as pension funds are under pressure to pursue short-term 
investment strategies in order to meet their own ongoing contractual obligations.563 
Moreover, the fact that investment funds are required to ensure sufficient profitability 
in order to remain competitive on the market further encourages short-term 
investment strategies.564 In turn, such short-term investment strategies influence the 
way how directors run their companies, often leading to the prioritisation of ‘short-
term earnings at the expense of potentially greater long-run firm value’.565 
In summary, the contribution which institutional investors, within the framework of 
the UK Stewardship Code, can make to the promotion of CSR in their investee 
companies is limited. Whilst the UK Stewardship Code further encourages 
                                                          
559
 The Regulatory Reform Act 2013 (the “Act”) changes the system of directors’ remuneration. Under 
the new regime, quoted company’s remuneration policy must be approved by an ordinary resolution of 
its shareholders every three years. See: http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2012-
13/enterpriseandregulatoryreform.html (last accessed: 21/05/2013). The European Commission has 
also announced in its 2012 action plan on company law and corporate governance to propose a 
modification of the shareholders’ rights Directive in 2013 in order to improve transparency on 
remuneration policies and individual remuneration of directors as well as grant shareholders the right to 
vote on remuneration policy and the remuneration report, see: European Commission, ‘Communication 
from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the regions, Action Plan: European company law and corporate 
governance – a modern legal framework for more engaged shareholders and sustainable companies’ 
COM (2012) 740 final, para 3.1, available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0740:FIN:EN:PDF (last accessed: 
21/05/2013).  
560
 See for example: Financial Times, ‘Boards wake up to a shareholder spring‘ (4th May 2012), 
available at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a284e414-95ee-11e1-a163-00144feab49a.html#axzz2Ts5cY15i 
(last accessed: 20/05/2013). The article refers to the examples of Aviva whose investors refused to 
approve of its remuneration report as well as Barclays which experienced almost a 33% disapproval of 
its remuneration report. The remuneration report is subject to shareholder approval, but the 
shareholders are only entitled to an advisory vote. They cannot reject the remuneration itself. 
561
 S439 CA. 
562
 Moreover, the existence of a ‘shareholder spring‘ has been questioned on the basis of statistic 
evidence which revealed that despite some public disapprovals of directors‘ remuneration reports the 
overall level of dissent in all votes on remuneration was though higher than in 2011 lower than in 2002 
and 2003, see: BBC News, ‘The myth of a shareholder spring‘ (12th June 2012), available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-18407587 (last accessed: 20/05/2013). 
563
 Millon highlights that pension funds which are commonly perceived of as being long-term investors 
need to make sufficient returns on investment in order to meet their ongoing contractual obligations on 
a monthly basis. This need for cash is a driving force behind the reality of pursuing short-term 
investment strategies. Historically, public pension funds have assumed an annual return on investment 
rate of about 8%. See for a discussion of the issue: D Millon, ‘Shareholder Social Responsibility’ (2013) 
36 Seattle University Law Review 911, 930-934. 
564
 ibid, 934–937. 
565
 ibid, 939. 
100 
 
institutional investors to fulfil their role to monitor their investee companies, it is 
unlikely to enhance greater social responsibility of companies.  
3.4.3.2 The derivative action 
Within the context of shareholder engagement, it is important to consider the 
derivative action pursuant to s260 CA as a possible means to promote CSR.566 
3.4.3.2.1 Analysis of the statutory derivative action 
The derivative action is a claim brought by a member of the company in respect of a 
cause of action vested in the company and seeking relief on behalf of the 
company.567 Pursuant to s260 (3) CA, a derivative claim may be brought only in 
respect of a cause of action arising from an actual or proposed act or omission 
involving negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust by a director of the 
company. This section further stipulates that a derivative claim may be against the 
director or another person (or both). The fact that a derivative action can be brought 
for breach of duty by a director is important for this chapter as it brings breaches of 
s172 (1) CA into the ambit of the derivative claim. 
Still, shareholders cannot initiate an action on behalf of the company that easily. 
They must apply to the court for permission to continue their claim568 and they must 
pass a two-stage test. First, they must make a prima facie case; otherwise the court 
must dismiss the claim.569 The second stage contains a non-exhaustive list of 
factors a judge must consider. S263 (2) CA contains a list of situations in which a 
court must refuse permission to continue with the derivative claim. According to this 
list, a court must refuse permission if it is satisfied that a person acting in 
accordance with s172 CA would not seek to continue the claim. Moreover, actual 
authorisation or ratification provides a complete defence to a derivative claim.570 
This authorisation may be done by the shareholders or by the directors. Pursuant to 
s239 (7) CA, the ratification of acts of directors does not affect any rule of law as to 
acts which are incapable of being ratified by a company. However, in fact, many 
breaches of duty by directors are ratifiable.  
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If none of the factors in s262 (2) CA apply, then the court has discretion to allow a 
claim to proceed.571 S263 (3) CA provides guidance for the court’s decision whether 
or not to grant permission to continue with the claim. According to s263 (3) (a) CA, 
the court must take into account whether the member is acting in good faith in 
seeking to continue the claim and pursuant to s 263 (3) (b) CA, the court must 
consider the importance a person acting in accordance with s172 CA (duty to 
promote the success of the company) would attach to continuing it. S172 (1) CA 
also plays a role in the list of reasons for refusing permission to continue with the 
claim, as s263 (2) (a) CA stipulates that a court must refuse permission if it is 
satisfied that a director acting in accordance with s172 (1) CA would not seek to 
continue the claim. This condition attaches importance to the views of a hypothetical 
director with regard to s172 (1) CA.572 In considering whether to give permission, the 
court shall have particular regard to any evidence before it as to the views of 
members of the company who have no personal interest, direct or indirect, in the 
matter.573 
In terms of the ability of the derivative action to enforce CSR, two of the conditions 
outlined deserve particular attention: First, breaches of directors’ duties are a cause 
of action for a derivative action. This means that shareholders can bring a derivative 
action on grounds of alleged violations of CSR principles as these overlap with the 
list of factors in s172 CA, as shown above. Secondly, when the courts decide 
whether or not to grant permission to continue with the claim they must consider the 
importance a person acting in accordance with s172 CA would attach to it. This 
means that issues of CSR which are inherent in s172 CA can play a role in the way 
in which the courts assess the question whether or not to allow the shareholder to 
continue with their action. 
The important question is if this new derivative action has a positive impact on 
pursuing CSR goals. One might assume that it does, considering the fact that, when 
the new statutory action was introduced, concerns were raised by business 
representatives that shareholder activists might overly use this new claim to 
challenge business actions on grounds of an alleged breach of the s172 CA duty.574 
It was argued then that a shareholder might, for example, challenge business 
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decisions through a derivative action based on the claim that the directors did not 
have regard to the impact of the business decision on the community and the 
environment.575 Adeyeye opines that corporate governance, as the part of company 
law which addresses the governance of companies, would be able to address CSR 
issues concerning both internal and external stakeholders through the use of 
derivative suits.576 Internal stakeholders refer to those stakeholders inside the 
company (such as employees) and external stakeholders to those outside the 
company (e.g. human rights considerations, the environment and the community).577 
In Adeyeye’s view such claims can be used to enforce ethical behaviour of 
companies.578 There is a significant overlap between the goals of CSR and the 
issues which Adeyeye considers to be potentially enforceable through derivative 
actions. In order to find out if Adeyeye’s optimistic outlook on the derivative action to 
promote CSR is justified, the case law will be considered. However, there is only 
very limited case law in this area so far which gives rise to doubts if this new cause 
of action does make a difference from a CSR point of view, given that the 
Companies Act came fully into force on 1 October 2007.  
3.4.3.2.2 Case law about the derivative action 
The key question is how the courts will exercise their discretion whether or not to 
give permission to continue with the claim. Effectively, the courts need to decide if 
they should interfere with the decision of the board not to pursue the claim in the first 
place. This possibility potentially conflicts with the traditional reluctance of courts not 
to second-guess business decisions.579 In Franbar Holdings Ltd v Patel the judge 
identified some reasons which a hypothetical director acting in accordance with 
s172 (1) CA would take into account when assessing the importance of continuing 
the claim.580 These include: the prospect of the success of the claim, the ability of 
the company to make a recovery on any award of damages, the disruption which 
would be caused on the development of the company’s business by having to 
concentrate on the proceedings, the costs of the proceedings and any damage to 
the company’s reputation and business if the proceedings were to fail.581 Notably, 
none of these factors refers to the interests of the stakeholders contained in the list 
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of factors in s172 (1) CA. Instead, the factors mentioned by the court in Franbar 
about the assessment of the claim in light of s172 (1) CA are about financial 
considerations. Further factors were established in the subsequent decision in Iesini 
v Westrip Holdings Ldt which again focused on financial aspects.582 The judge 
pointed out that the weighing of the considerations was ‘essentially a commercial 
decision’.583 However, he also stated that s172 CA would only be used as a bar to 
derivative claims pursuant to s263 (2) (a) CA where the court is satisfied that no 
director acting in accordance with s172 CA would seek to continue the claim.584 If 
some directors would, and others would not, seek to continue the claim, the case is 
one for the application of s263 (3) (b) CA.585 Despite this slightly optimistic comment, 
the existing case law suggests that the decision about whether or not to permit 
continuation of the derivative claim is primarily based on financial concerns despite 
the fact that the yardstick for this decision, s172 (1) CA, requires directors to include 
the interests of various stakeholders into their decisions. The use of s172 (1) CA by 
the courts in this assessment of derivative claims is therefore firmly embedded in the 
goal of maximising shareholder value. 
This pessimistic outcome from a CSR point of view is further exacerbated by the 
case Stimpson v Southern Landlords Association.586 Here the court refused the 
application as it held that a hypothetical director acting in accordance with s172 CA 
would not continue the action. The significant aspect of the decision for this chapter 
is that the court held that it had to take into account the effect of the proposed 
actions on the former employees of the first defendant and that this was possible as 
the list in s263 (3) CA is non-exhaustive.587 It therefore saw the effect on employees 
to be a consideration which is not part of the factors enlisted in s263 (3) CA, despite 
the explicit inclusion of s172 (1) CA with its referral to the interests of employees into 
s263 (3) (b) CA. This approach therefore separates the interests of employees and 
s263 (3) (b) CA although this section explicitly refers to s172 CA which, in turn, 
contains a list of factors including employees, the environment and the community. 
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Gibbs therefore argues that the separation between s263 (3) CA, with its reference 
to s172 CA and employees, could put CSR merely at the discretion of the court 
when considering whether or not to allow a derivative claim to be further pursued.588 
When considering s172 CA through s263 (3) CA, the courts might then only assess 
it in terms of benefiting members as a whole, i.e. the majority.589 This assessment 
would then leave out the list of factors contained in s172 (1) CA with its overlap with 
CSR issues from necessary considerations in s263 (3) CA. This situation means 
that insofar as the decision whether or not to permit a claim to be continued 
according to s263 CA is concerned, the courts seem to interpret s172 (1) CA as only 
focusing on shareholder value. The interests of the stakeholders contained in the list 
of the factors of the provision are left out of this approach. Courts can still include 
these considerations as in Stimpson with reference to the non-exhaustive nature of 
the s263 (3) CA, but this severely limits the importance of these interests. 
It might be that the rationale behind this approach is that allowing shareholders to 
decide via derivative actions which stakeholders to consider in the decision-making 
process would conflict with the rule that it is up to the majority of board members to 
make a decision.590 The fact that employees as stakeholders which are internal to 
the company were taken into account by the court (though as a non-exhaustive 
aspect) might indicate that stakeholder interests internal to the company can form 
part of the test pursuant to s263 (3) CA. Gibbs therefore considers it more likely that 
stakeholder interests external to the company such as human rights, environment 
and the community are dismissed.591 This situation contradicts Adeyeye’s opinion 
who anticipated successful actions on the basis of these issues. Stimpson therefore 
further demonstrates that CSR does not play an important role insofar as the 
decision of the courts whether or not to permit derivative claims to be continued is 
concerned. This decision will effectively be a commercial decision. In line with this 
approach, the judge based his decision to refuse the application to continue the 
claim in Stimpson also on financial considerations, as the court held that a 
hypothetical director acting in accordance with the s172 CA duty would not seek to 
continue the claim because the value of the claim was modest in reality.592 The 
distinction between s172 (1) CA and the interests of employees in this case, as well 
as the emphasis on financial considerations, severely reduces the potential of the 
derivative claim for CSR goals. 
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3.4.3.2.3 The effect of the derivative action for CSR 
This situation questions the ability of shareholders to use the derivative action to 
pursue CSR aims. This negative outcome for CSR is further exacerbated by the 
difficulty with successfully basing claims that directors have not sufficiently paid 
regard to CSR on s172 (1) CA. One can therefore conclude that the scope for the 
derivative action to be used to enforce CSR through alleged breaches of s172 (1) 
CA is very limited. The analysis here supports Keay’s sceptical outlook on the 
impact of the new derivative action as he had expected such claims to be used in 
few situations only, for example in case of a member who had invested in a 
company to pursue long-term gains, but where the directors are purely acting in the 
interest of short-term gains.593 Even this idea seems questionable, given that s172 
(1) CA gives much power to the directors to decide in a manner that they consider, 
in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company. Further 
possible scenarios for Keay were derivative actions brought by employees who are 
also shareholders and who feel that the position of the employees has not been 
sufficiently included in the decision-making process or members who live in the local 
community and who fear that the community could be negatively affected by the 
impact of the corporation’s work.594 However, following the court’s assessment of 
the derivative action in the Stimpson case, with its optional reference to employees, 
it is doubtful if such claims would be successful. First, even though these issues 
were not ruled out by Stimpson to be part of the court’s considerations according to 
s263 (3) CA, it remains to be seen if they would actually be included. Secondly, 
even if such CSR considerations are included, the challenge remains to prove a 
breach of the duty in s172 (1) CA in the first place. 
The discussion in this section shows that the concerns raised by business 
representatives at the time the Companies Act 2006 was drafted that the 
combination of the new duty in s172 (1) CA and the statutory derivative action could 
lead to litigation about business decisions (referred to as ‘judicial review of a 
commercial decision’)595 seem to be unfounded so far. Quite the reverse, from a 
CSR perspective, the outcome is disappointing. The analysis in this section 
therefore confirms doubts which have been raised about the practical impact of the 
new derivative action in terms of promoting CSR goals.596 In fact, the government 
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had not anticipated a significant increase of derivative actions through the new 
statutory remedy.597 The derivative action in its current form with the limitations (the 
two-stage test of the court to decide whether or not to give permission to continue 
the derivative claim) was intended to strike a balance between protecting the rights 
of shareholders on the one hand and leaving directors free to take business 
decisions in good faith on the other hand.598 The traditional approach to 
shareholders’ remedies that it is the company that is the proper person to sue (also 
known as the rule in Foss v Harbottle599) underlay the Parliamentary debates about 
the derivative action.600 This rule is also based on the idea of majority rule.601 Courts 
traditionally do not want to second-guess business decisions.602 Although the rule in 
Foss v Harbottle was replaced with the statutory derivative action in the Companies 
Act 2006, its underlying principles are still relevant for the court’s reluctance towards 
getting involved in business disputes as the position remains that the proper plaintiff 
in respect of a wrong done to a company is prima facie the company.603 As this 
approach seems to continue to prevail in relation to shareholders’ actions, there is 
not much to be expected from the derivative claim in terms of promoting CSR. 
This analysis therefore agrees with Gibbs’ argument that the new statutory 
derivative action does not appear ‘to have altered tremendously for now’.604 It is 
rather unlikely that the number of cases based on derivative actions is going to 
increase in the future.605 The potential of shareholders’ remedies to promote CSR is 
therefore limited. 
3.4.4 The role of non-executive directors and the composition of the board  
So far, the analysis of s172 (1) CA, the business review and the derivative action 
has shown that these instruments only have a limited effect on the promotion of 
                                                          
597
 See 679 HL Official Report (5th series), cols GC4-5, 27 February 2006; 681 HL Official Report (5
th
 
series), col 883, 9 May 2006; HC Official Report, SC D (Company Law Reform Bill), 13 July 2006, cols 
664-6. 
598
 681 HL Official Report (5th series), col883, 9 May 2006. 
599
 Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461. 
600
 B Hannigan, Company Law (3
rd
 edn, OUP 2012) para 18-11. 
601
 ibid, para 18-14. 
602
 D French, S Mayson and C Ryan, Mayson, French & Ryan on Company Law (28
th
 edn, OUP 2011-
2012) para 18.3.3. 
603
 B Hannigan, Company Law (3
rd
 edn, OUP 2012) paras 18-12 to 18-15. 
604
 D Gibbs, ‘Has the statutory derivative claim fulfilled its objectives? The hypothetical director and 
CSR: Part 2’ (2011) Company Lawyer 76, 82. See also the analysis of shareholder litigation by 
Tomasic and Akinbami who conclude that ‘the prospects of successful litigation against directors of 
large public companies, such as directors of failed UK banks and financial institutions, are somewhat 
remote’, see: R Tomasic and F Akinbami, ‘Shareholder activism and litigation against UK banks – the 
limits of company law and the desperate resort to human rights claims?’ in J Loughrey, Directors’ 
Duties and Shareholder Litigation in the Wake of the Financial Crisis (Edward Elgar 2013) 172. 
605
 E C Mujih, ‘The new statutory derivative claim: a paradox of minority shareholder protection‘ (2012) 
Company Lawyer 99, 100, 106. 
107 
 
CSR. This situation is exacerbated by the finding of a study by BIS that most 
directors continue to make decisions in the same way as they had done prior to the 
enactment of the Companies Act 2006 despite the new duty in s172 (1) CA.606 Given 
the discretionary power that is vested into directors in their decision-making process, 
it is argued here that the board is likely to be the most effective means to promote 
greater CSR in companies. The following part of the chapter will therefore address 
two issues that are particularly relevant for the promotion of CSR in the boardroom: 
First, the role of non-executive directors and secondly the composition of the board.  
3.4.4.1 The role of non-executive directors 
Boards commonly consist of both executive directors and non-executive directors.607 
The difference between the two is that executive directors tend to devote their whole 
working time to the company whereas non-executive directors usually only spend 
part of their working time on the company and receive a smaller director’s fee than 
their counterparts.608 Non-executive directors are often considered to be an effective 
means to ensure that the executive directors work in the interest of the company.609 
The UK Corporate Governance Code addresses the composition and the role of the 
board by stipulating that ‘every company should be headed by an effective board 
which is collectively responsible for the long-term success of the company’.610 The 
Code further requires the company to have ‘an appropriate combination’ of 
executive and non-executive directors, in particular independent non-executive 
directors.611 The function of non-executive directors is specified by principle A 4 of 
the Code. It is their function to challenge the management and to contribute to the 
development of strategic proposals. One of the independent non-executive directors 
should be appointed as senior independent director to act as intermediary for the 
other directors.612 The role of this director is ‘to provide a sounding board for the 
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chairman and to serve as an intermediary for the other directors when necessary’.613 
Except for smaller companies (defined as those below the FTSE 350), at least half 
the board, excluding the chairman, should comprise non-executive directors 
determined by the board to be independent.614 The board should determine whether 
the director is independent in character and judgment and whether there are 
relationships or circumstances which are likely to affect, or could appear to affect, 
the director’s judgment.615 Appointments to the board should be subject to ‘a formal, 
rigorous and transparent procedure’.616  
As it is their role to challenge the executive directors and to contribute to the 
strategy of the company, non-executive directors potentially hold an important 
position for the promotion of CSR.  As they are in the boardroom, they can critically 
engage with the decisions of the executive directors and add CSR considerations 
into the decision-making process. However, the fact that non-executive directors 
continue to be the subject of critical reviews617, demonstrates that they are obviously 
not always sufficiently exercising their function to monitor and to challenge the work 
of the executive directors. The economic and financial crisis has revealed several 
examples of non-executive directors who have not sufficiently monitored the 
board.618 When looking into the failure of Northern Rock, the Treasury Committee 
criticised the company’s non-executive directors for their failure to restrain the 
CEO.619 The non-executive directors failed to ensure that the company remained 
liquid and solvent and to prevent the inacceptable risks the company took.620 And in 
his review of corporate governance in UK banks and other financial industry entities, 
Sir David Walker questioned whether ‘the long established conventional wisdom and 
practice that non-executive directors make an essential contribution to governance 
continues to be as realistic as previously envisaged.’621 These examples underline 
that there are many instances where non-executive directors have not properly 
discharged their duties to monitor and critically challenge the decision-making 
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process.622 This issue is important here as non-executive directors have potential to 
put CSR on the agenda in the boardroom. However, whether they do this depends 
on the question of whether they fully engage with the running of the company. 
The important function of non-executive directors in the monitoring of the board has 
been acknowledged in several company law reviews. Prior to the enactment of the 
Companies Act 2006, the White Paper Modernising Company Law already 
emphasised the central role of non-executive directors in corporate governance in 
terms of accountability.623 The 2009 Walker Review of corporate governance in UK 
banks and other financial industry entities provides several suggestions with regard 
to the role of non-executive directors which are of interest for corporate governance 
generally.624 The final recommendations suggest that non-executive directors ought 
to be given a sufficient introduction into their role.625 The report further emphasises 
that non-executive directors in a major bank would be expected to commit a 
minimum amount of time in the area of 30 to 36 days which should be clearly 
indicated in letters of appointment.626 Although this report is directed at major banks, 
it does hint at an important issue, namely the time non-executive directors devote to 
the respective board(s) on which they sit. The recommendations also emphasise the 
function of non-executive directors to challenge decisions of the board. This aspect 
of the role of non-executive directors is particularly important for CSR as non-
executive directors can contribute a consideration of stakeholder interests to the 
decision-making process (this point is discussed in the next section ‘The 
composition of the boardroom’). Despite all these discussions, the Walker Review 
rejects the idea of more statutory regulation of corporate governance. It is argued in 
the Review that such regulation would increase the risk of litigation and would not 
have prevented the corporate governance failures in the financial services 
industry.627  
Whilst it is beyond the scope of this chapter to fully discuss whether the duties of 
non-executive directors ought to be included in the Companies Act or remain in the 
UK Corporate Governance Code, it is submitted here that it needs to be considered 
that the system based on ‘comply or explain’ has not prevented the failures of non-
executive directors in the run-up to the current economic and financial crisis. It 
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seems that the recent corporate governance failures, including the lack of sufficient 
monitoring by non-executive directors, mirror the situation in the early 1990s which 
occurred prior to the beginning of the whole corporate governance debate in the UK. 
The several reviews of corporate governance and the creation of codes of conduct 
since then do not appear to have achieved much in light of the scale of corporate 
governance failures. It is therefore doubtful if some amendments of the codes, as 
suggested in the Walker Review, do really suffice to improve the quality of the work 
of non-executive directors in the UK boardrooms in a sustained manner. 
These discussions reveal a rather critical view of the way in which many non-
executive directors exercise their function at present. This situation has direct 
ramifications for the promotion of CSR in the boardroom. If non-executive directors 
do not devote enough time to their jobs or do not sufficiently challenge business 
decisions or contribute their positions to debates, then it is unlikely that they will 
achieve much for the promotion of CSR. The discussions about the role of non-
executive directors form the background to the issue of board composition in the 
next section. 
3.4.4.2 The composition of the board 
The composition of the board is closely connected with the question what 
contribution non-executive directors can make to the promotion of CSR.628 A more 
diverse board could potentially lead to a better inclusion of stakeholder interests in 
the decision-making process. This idea has been taken up at the European Union 
level. The 2011 Green Paper on the EU Corporate Governance Framework focuses 
on three key areas which form part of this chapter due to their relevance for the 
implementation of CSR: The effective functioning of the board, enhancing 
shareholders’ engagement and improving the monitoring and enforcement of the 
existing national corporate governance codes.629 These issues have now been 
taken forward in the European Commission’s action plan on company law and 
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corporate governance, published in December 2012.630 In terms of the board 
composition, the focus of the action plan was on improving transparency on board 
diversity, a suggestion that has been taken up with the proposed Directive on 
narrative reporting. The issue of gender balance at board level, most notably 
whether there should be a binding female quorum is currently debated at EU and 
member state level.631  
The Green Paper discusses boardroom diversity, in particular the inclusion of 
women and non-nationals in terms of their positive impact on the effective 
functioning of the board. The Commission emphasised that it considered ‘group 
think’ to be a realistic danger in the current composition of many boards. This aspect 
is significant for CSR in light of the finding of the BIS study on the new Companies 
Act referred to above that most directors continue to make decisions in the same 
way as they used to do before the enactment of s172 (1) CA although this duty was 
intended to widen considerations in the boardroom beyond only those of 
shareholders.632 Whilst part of the problem with s172 (1) CA for the promotion of 
CSR is the firm embedding of the duty in the shareholder value doctrine, the other 
issue is that the directors do not sufficiently make use of their discretion in the 
decision-making process. Boards of directors that are more diverse could lead to a 
greater consideration of CSR issues at board level. To that end, a more diverse 
group of non-executive directors could better contribute the perspective of 
stakeholders to the decision-making process of the board in order to give full 
recognition to the list of factors in s172 (1) CA. Non-executive directors from a 
variety of backgrounds are less likely ‘to wear the same lenses’. Patterns of thought 
are more likely to differ. And in particular non-executive directorships could be given 
to individuals with a view of promoting CSR goals and bringing stakeholder 
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perspectives into the decision. As long as non-executive directors continue to only 
commit little time and as long as board members tend to have a similar personal and 
professional background, discussions about the direction of the company will not 
arise to the same extent as if these people had a more diverse professional and 
personal background. This idea is taken up by the Green Paper which warns that a 
board consisting of executive directors with a similar personal and professional 
background is less likely to challenge traditional patterns of thought. And, as an 
example relating to the diversity in the boardroom, research shows that gender 
balance in UK boardrooms is far from being achieved. The Female FTSE Index 
Report for 2010 shows that merely 7.8% of FTSE 250 board directors are women.633 
The number was at 7.6% in the previous year.634  
These deliberations further support the argument made in this chapter that, apart 
from the question of the underlying corporate doctrine, the key to effectively promote 
CSR through corporate governance is the boardroom. In light of the flaws of s172 
(1) CA, the shortcomings of the reporting duty in s417 CA (albeit the improvements 
that the proposed Directive on nonfinancial reporting will bring, if it is adopted) and 
the rare use of the derivative action, the people who make the business decisions 
appear to be central for the enhancement of greater CSR. The studies referred to 
above are right with their warning of ‘group think’, as a more uniform background of 
the directors is likely to lead to more agreement among them. Considerations of the 
interests of the various stakeholders and CSR are less likely to occur in such 
circumstances. Having executive and non-executive directors who come from a 
more diverse background might widen the discussions in the boardroom to consider 
a broader range of interests including CSR.635 It is therefore argued here that the 
behavioural changes which were intended with s172 (1) CA depend on the people 
who sit on the board. Or put it another way: The discretion that s172 (1) allows, 
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despite its weaknesses, are more likely to be used if there is a broader range of 
directors at the board. 
Although non-executive directors have not yet contributed much to the promotion of 
CSR, they have potential to do so. The planned reporting duties about gender 
diversity and the currently debated issue of female representation at board level 
highlight that there is an increasing realisation that the board is, at least potentially 
an effective tool of corporate governance to achieve behavioural changes. So, whilst 
this argument is more about the way forward for corporate governance than about 
the status quo, it does provide a starting point for a better promotion of CSR through 
corporate governance. A more diverse board would still only be able to work within 
the framework of s172 (1) CA and its emphasis on shareholder value, however. 
Directors are still restricted in their decision-making by the duty to strive to maximise 
the benefit of the members, i.e. the shareholders. Nevertheless, despite its 
limitations to enhance CSR, s172 (1) CA at least provides directors with some 
discretion about how they consider (‘having regard to’) stakeholder interests. They 
are allowed to promote CSR as long as they can justify that they considered their 
decision to ultimately promote the interests of the members as a whole. Whether 
they do choose to promote CSR within the scope of s172 (1) CA, depends on the 
directors themselves, which supports the argument made here that the board is the 
key to effectively promote CSR. 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that the system of corporate governance within the 
framework of the enlightened shareholder value doctrine has at least in theory the 
potential to promote CSR. Corporate governance and CSR overlap in different areas 
which are addressed here: the duty to promote the success of the company for the 
benefit of the members as a whole (s172 CA), the reporting duty (s417 CA), the 
derivative action (s260 CA) and the board. There is a strong correlation between the 
list of factors in s172 (1) CA and the concept of CSR. Nevertheless, the conclusions 
drawn from the different aspects of company law and corporate governance 
analysed in this chapter in terms of promoting CSR are rather disappointing. In 
particular the duty in s172 (1) CA has so far not achieved much for the promotion of 
CSR. The present state of English company law contrasts with the announcements 
of the government about the long-term view that English company law would take, 
following the enactment of the Companies Act 2006 with the enlightened 
shareholder value model. In reality, not much has been achieved from a CSR point 
of view so far. 
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The various aspects analysed in this chapter all have severe shortcomings in the 
promotion of the socially responsible conduct of companies. CSR is too much left to 
the discretion of directors. One can critically ask what the real meaning of 
enlightened shareholder value is in English law, in light of the results of the legal 
analysis here. The interests of stakeholders and the concept of CSR continue to be 
subordinated under the shareholder value prerogative. The ultimate beneficiaries of 
the company remain the shareholders with only discretionary consideration of other 
aspects. The analysis of the s172 (1) CA duty, the business review636 and the 
derivative action has demonstrated that English company law and corporate 
governance are still too embedded in the shareholder value model to effectively 
promote CSR. Moreover, it is doubtful if the recent focus on institutional investors is 
going to significantly change things for the better. The UK Stewardship Code 
contains only little recognition of social and environmental matters. And, more 
generally, it is doubtful whether investors will go beyond scrutinising their investee 
companies and push for a stronger CSR policy. The conclusion of this chapter 
therefore is that, despite their overlap with CSR, English company law and corporate 
governance contribute only little to the promotion of CSR in practice. This situation is 
unlikely to change without a redirection of the corporate objective in English law to a 
more pluralistic understanding of the firm. 
Nevertheless, the chapter has also shown that English company law could better 
promote CSR. Leaving aside the fundamental question of the underlying model of 
the company, it has been shown here that the boardroom could be an effective area 
for the promotion of CSR. There are two starting points for using the board as a 
means to better promote CSR. The first one is to improve the way many non-
executive directors exercise their function to monitor and to challenge decisions in 
the boardroom. The second way is to achieve more diversity in the boardroom. It is 
argued here that the inclusion of CSR in the decision-making process not only 
depends on the formulation of directors’ duties in the Companies Act, but that it also 
depends on the kind of people who sit on boards. If the directors come from a more 
diverse background, there are higher chances that traditional patterns of thought are 
challenged and that moves towards a stronger inclusion of CSR into business 
decisions are made. Despite its prioritisation of maximising shareholder value, s172 
(1) CA at least provides discretion for directors to consider CSR as long as they 
believe in good faith that their decision ultimately promotes the interest of the 
members. It is within this narrow framework that company law and corporate 
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governance can make a contribution to the promotion of CSR, if directors choose to 
do so. 
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Chapter 4: English contract Law and Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
 
4.1 Supply chains and CSR 
In the course of globalisation, companies no longer produce their goods completely 
themselves within the national boundaries of the country where the company’s 
headquarters are, but rather distribute their production to suppliers in different 
countries around the world through supply chains.637 Companies in the global North 
and West have increasingly outsourced parts of their production to suppliers in 
developing and transitional countries in order to reduce cost.638 To that end they 
have developed sophisticated supply chains as a business tool.639 The supply chain 
is defined as the series of companies, including suppliers, customers, and logistics 
providers which work together to deliver a value package of goods and services to 
the end customer.640 Global supply chains function across different countries and 
different cultures.641 This process of outsourcing to suppliers is particularly prevalent 
in labour-intensive production industries such as the garment industry and also in 
the food industry.642 The buyers in these supply chains are often multinational 
companies.643  
However, reports about human rights violations of employees of some suppliers in 
the developing world, for instance through the use of child labour, unsafe working 
conditions or excessive working hours, have negatively affected the reputation of 
some Western companies which trade with these suppliers.644 Similarly, the pollution 
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of the environment through poor production standards at the suppliers’ factories645 
has become public causing a negative impact on the reputation of some of the 
Western companies which use supply chains.646 The suppliers are often based in 
developing countries with weak legal standards in terms of human rights and/or a 
weak system of law enforcement.647 The supply chain has therefore become 
increasingly scrutinised by NGOs, trade unions and consumers.648 The UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights refer to the responsibility of companies to 
‘seek to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts’ linked to their supply 
chain.649 At the EU level level, a document on responsible supply chain 
management was published in 2010, commissioned under the European Union's 
Programme for Employment and Social Solidarity - PROGRESS (2007-2013).650 As 
a consequence of this increasing interest in the supply chain, Western multinational 
companies, particularly those with well-known brands,651 have come under 
increasing public and political pressure to expand their CSR engagement to their 
supply chain and to show that they are socially responsible in their supply chain.652 
Many multinational companies therefore began to implement CSR policies into their 
supply chain.653 To that end companies usually develop their own code of conduct or 
adopt a code developed by a third party which contains the company’s policy on 
CSR and the principles it expects everyone within the company to uphold.654 Many 
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companies incorporate a CSR code of conduct into their supply chain contracts with 
their suppliers, although they do so differently and with different contractual effect.655 
The corporate codes of conduct are defined as documents which state a number of 
social and environmental standards and principles that a firm’s suppliers are 
expected to fulfil.656 This incorporation of the buyer’s CSR policies into the supply 
contract is an interesting development, given that the codes of conduct of 
companies are often criticised for being non-binding.657 Studies have analysed the 
proliferation of such CSR codes of conduct amongst the FTSE 100 companies.658 A 
study published in 2010 shows that 77 out of the 100 constituent FTSE 100 firms 
had adopted such codes and many companies have policies about ethical sourcing 
which they integrate into the supply chain relations with their suppliers.659 In terms of 
content, most of these ethical sourcing policies stipulate requirements to uphold 
employee working conditions and health and safety at work, freedom of association, 
decent remuneration for employees, respect for human rights and a commitment to 
environmental policies.660 The principles are often based on well-known CSR 
standards such as the UN Global Compact, the ETI Base Code, the ILO Declaration 
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on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work or the UN Declaration of Human 
Rights.661 
The incorporation of CSR into supply chain contracts has been extensively analysed 
in the management literature.662 This literature looks, inter alia, at the motives for 
including CSR policies into the supply chain such as brand reputation, the content of 
the codes663, the specifics of different industries such as the food industry664, the 
monitoring process665 and the effects of the codes of conduct666.  In contrast, there 
has only been little writing from a legal perspective so far.667 In fact, there has so far 
only been a general overview about the use of supply chain contracts to promote 
CSR through English contract law.668  
This chapter seeks to contribute to this legal literature by providing a detailed 
contract law analysis of the incorporation of CSR policies into supply chains.669 The 
purpose of this chapter is to answer the question to what extent English contract law 
promotes socially responsible behaviour in corporations. On the basis of this legal 
analysis, which determines the circumstances in which contract law is more likely 
and less likely to have this capacity, the chapter also seeks to make forward-looking 
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Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law (CUP 2007) 59 – 92. This 
chapter is an introductory piece about the topic. It gives an overview about some of the issues such as 
monitoring and enforcement. 
669
 The chapter also contributes to the literature by analysing the CSR supply chain policies of fifteen 
FTSE 100 companies. Some of these companies have provided their contractual documents such as 
standard terms and conditions which they use for purchase orders online. These documents enabled 
me to analyse the promotion of CSR through supply chain contracts in more detail. 
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suggestions about what English law could do to encourage greater corporate social 
responsibility through contract law. 
CSR policies can only be enforced in contract law if the following is the case: First, 
CSR policies must become ‘part’ of the supply contracts and hence become 
enforceable (either by the Western company at the head of the supply chain or, for 
example, by an employee of the supplier, although the privity of contract doctrine 
makes the enforcement in supply chain contracts a complex issue). Secondly, the 
Western companies must be able to procure an appropriate remedy in contract law 
for these breaches. Thirdly, the Western companies (the buyers) must be sufficiently 
aware of breaches of these contractual terms pertaining to the CSR policies in order 
to at least consider using contract law to promote socially responsible behaviour 
among those companies in transitional economies where concerns about violation of 
CSR issues such as human rights are focused. The subsequent analysis will be 
structured in the order of these three preconditions. 
4.2 Jurisdictional scope of the chapter 
Due to the international nature of the supply contracts analysed in this chapter, it is 
necessary to establish if English courts have jurisdiction and if English law is 
applicable.670 The question of whether English contract law is applicable is 
particularly important here as the thesis focuses on English private law in terms of 
its jurisdictional scope.671 
The first issue is whether English courts have jurisdiction to hear a dispute. It is 
likely that English companies (the buyers) will bring an action for breach of contract 
at English courts. English courts must apply the Brussels I Regulation in order to 
determine whether they can assume jurisdiction.672 Pursuant to Article 4 (1) of the 
Regulation, if the defendant is not domiciled in an EU member state, the general 
rule is that the court may apply its traditional rules of jurisdiction subject to Articles 
22 and 23.673 In most cases the defendant will be a supplier from a developing 
country and he will therefore not be domiciled in an EU member state. The parties 
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 These are separate issues, as it might be that English courts have jurisdiction, but that they have to 
decide a dispute on the basis of foreign law or vice versa foreign courts might have jurisdiction, but 
must decide a case according to English law. 
671
 The chapter therefore gains relevance for the thesis overall if the majority of the supply contracts 
between the UK-based multinational company and the foreign suppliers are indeed governed by 
English law. 
672
 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters" (or Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001). 
673
 Article 4 (1): ‘If the defendant is not domiciled in a Member State, the jurisdiction of the courts of 
each Member State shall, subject to Articles 22 and 23, be determined by the law of that Member 
State.’ 
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can, pursuant to Article 23 (1) of the Regulation, decide that the courts of a member 
state have exclusive jurisdiction as long as one party to the contract is domiciled in a 
member state.674 This is indeed the case in the terms and conditions reviewed for 
this chapter. They all contain a clause which stipulates that English courts have 
exclusive jurisdiction.675 This prorogation of justice must satisfy formal requirements 
which is, for instance, the case if the agreement is ‘in writing’, Art 23 (1) (a). If the 
clause conferring jurisdiction is included in general conditions then the requirement 
‘in writing’ is met if the contract signed by both parties contains an express reference 
to the general condition.676 The companies reviewed for this chapter commonly use 
terms and conditions which contain such a prorogation of justice for English courts. 
For it to be effective, the contract must be signed by both parties and contain an 
express reference to the general conditions of the buyer.677 In these situations 
English courts would have jurisdiction over claims based on the supply contract with 
a supplier from a non-EU country. 
When English courts are asked to hear an international contractual dispute, they 
have to apply the Rome I Regulation to determine the law governing the contract.678 
This Regulation governs choice of law in the European Union and is hence 
applicable to English courts in their decision which law governs a contract. For the 
Regulation to be applicable it is not necessary that the parties have a connection to 
the EU. What is required is that an action is brought at a court of an EU member 
state and that the case raises the question which law is applicable. The Regulation 
applies to situations involving a conflict of laws situation in contractual obligations in 
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 Section 7, Prorogation of jurisdiction, Article 23 (1): ‘If the parties, one or more of whom is domiciled 
in a Member State, have agreed that a court or the courts of a Member State are to have jurisdiction to 
settle any disputes which have arisen or which may arise in connection with a particular legal 
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 For example, Rio Tinto’s terms and conditions for purchase orders contain the following clause in its 
section 23 (a) Law: ‘…and the Supplier irrevocably and unconditionally submits to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the English courts for all purposes in connection herewith.’ 
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 Case 24/76 Estasis Salotti di Colzani Aimo e Gianmario Colzani v RÜWA Polstereimaschinen 
GmbH [1976] ECR 1831. 
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 In case of a defendant domiciled outside the EU where no such prorogation of jurisdiction has been 
agreed the position in English common law is that English courts have jurisdiction if the defendant is 
amenable to the court’s jurisdiction. If the defendant is not present in England (as will be the case in 
the situation underlying this chapter), the English courts have jurisdiction if he has submitted to their 
jurisdiction. In cases where the defendant is not present in England or Wales and has not submitted to 
the jurisdiction (likely to happen in the buyer-supplier scenario here) then the court may have the power 
under CPR rules 6.36 and 6.37 and its Practice Direction to assume jurisdiction by giving permission 
for process to be served on the defendant out of the jurisdiction. The power to give permission arises 
when the events or the subject-matter of the dispute are connected with England (see the Practice 
Directive for the list of special connecting factors). In the case of the supplier producing goods in a 
developing country for a buyer in the England or Wales it is highly unlikely that either the events or the 
subject-matter of the dispute are connected with England other than that the goods are to be delivered 
to the buyer who is based in England or Wales. See: C Clarkson and J Hill, The Conflict of Laws (4
th
 
edn, OUP 2011) 67. 
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 (Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on 
the law applicable to contractual obligations). Article 2 of the Regulation provides that the law specified 
by the Regulation shall be applied whether or not it is the law of a Member State. 
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civil and commercial matters. ‘Contractual obligations’ are not defined in the 
Regulation, but a broader approach to this term is suggested.679 A distinction is 
made between the situation where parties have chosen a law in their contract and 
where no governing law was chosen by the parties. Pursuant to Article 3 (1) of the 
Rome I Regulation the parties have freedom of choice to determine the law 
applicable to their contract.680 The supply contracts analysed for this chapter all 
contained a choice of law clause in the buyer’s general terms and conditions which 
determined English law as the applicable law for the contract.681 Such a choice of 
law clause is likely to be included in most supply chain contracts due to the strong 
bargaining position of the buyer. Article 3 is satisfied where a contract has been 
concluded by reference to one of the parties’ general terms and conditions which 
include a choice of law clause as long as there is consensus that the contract is 
concluded on those contractual terms.682 Insofar the supply chains contracts of the 
companies reviewed here are governed by English law. It is to be expected that this 
choice of English law through the buyer’s terms and conditions is the norm for other 
buyers based in the England or Wales, as choosing English law makes the legal 
situation more predictable for them due to their familiarity with their own legal 
system.683 This argument is further supported by the situation that English law is 
generally the law of choice in international commercial contracts.684 And one can 
expect that the larger buyers based in England or Wales will not take the risk of not 
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 C Clarkson and J Hill, The Conflict of Laws (4
th
 edn, OUP 2011) 206. 
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 This provision means that parties have autonomy to decide amongst themselves which law should 
govern them. Article 3 (1), Freedom of choice: ‘A contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the 
parties. The choice shall be made expressly or clearly demonstrated by the terms of the contract or the 
circumstances of the case. By their choice the parties can select the law applicable to the whole or to 
part only of the contract.’ It is important to note that this provision requires that the choice of the parties 
must be ‘made expressly or clearly demonstrated by the terms of the contract or the circumstances of 
the case’. 
681
 The effectiveness of the buyer’s terms and conditions for the supply contract is a separate legal 
issue which is addressed below. It is assumed here. In fact, the analysis below will show that in most 
cases the buyer’s terms and conditions are effective. An example of such a choice of law clause in the 
buyer’s standard terms and conditions for supply contracts is Unilever’s General Terms & Conditions of 
Purchase of Goods of Unilever Supply Chain, section 15.9: ‘The parties agree that the Contract is an 
international contract and each party (a) agrees that the Contract (and each part including the Call-Off) 
and any UPCs and Call-Offs shall be governed by and construed in accordance with English law….’ 
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 Iran Continental Shelf Oil Co v IRI International Corp [2002] CLC 372. The situation is more difficult 
where the parties have indirectly identified the applicable law or where an implied choice is made, see 
for further information: C Clarkson and J Hill, The Conflict of Laws, (4
th
 ed., OUP 2011) 210 – 217. 
683
 The model agreement for the purchase and supply of goods recommends a choice of law clause 
which determines English law to be the applicable law: Article 21.11, Law and jurisdiction: “The validity, 
construction and performance of this Agreement shall be governed by English law and shall be subject 
to the [non-]exclusive jurisdiction of the English courts to which the Parties submit. 
684
 R Bradgate, Commercial Law (3
rd
 edn, OUP 2005) para 1.4. The Law Society of England and 
Wales has even prepared a booklet for foreign businesses emphasizing the benefits of choosing 
English law for their commercial contracts. English law has therefore become an “export product” in 
international trade. See: The Law Society of England and Wales, England and Wales: The jurisdiction 
of choice, available at: 
http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/documents/downloads/jurisdiction_of_choice_brochure.pdf (last accessed 
17/06/12). 
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including a choice of law clause and potentially having their supply contracts 
governed by the law of the residence of their supplier.685 
The choice of English law means, for example, that the Sale of Goods Act 1979 
applies to international supply contracts.686 Notably, English law does not draw a 
formal distinction between domestic and international sales contracts687 which 
means that the law which will be analysed in this chapter is domestic English sales 
contract law despite the international nature of the supply chain contracts. 
4.3 Under what circumstances can CSR policies become enforceable 
contractual terms? 
This section asks if and, if so, how the buyer’s CSR policies become enforceable 
contractual terms. 
4.3.1 Introduction: Research method 
The information about CSR in supply chain relationships retrieved from academic 
literature is complemented by small-scale research conducted for the purpose of this 
chapter. The websites of fifteen FTSE 100 companies688 (the ten largest FTSE 100 
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 In fact, if the parties have not agreed on the applicable law in the contract, the Regulation 
determines in Article 4 (1) (a) that in case of a contract for the sale of goods the contract shall be 
governed by the law of the country where the seller has his habitual residence. The habitual residence 
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choice of law clause into the supply contract would therefore mean that the supply contracts are 
governed by the law of the country where the supplier has its general administration. In case of a 
supplier base across different countries this situation would significantly increase their transaction 
costs. 
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 C Murray, D Holloway and D Timson-Hunt, Schmitthoff’s Export Trade: The Law and Practice of 
International Trade (11
th
 edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2007) para 21-001. The legal regime pertaining to the 
contracts governed by English law could be modified if the Uniform Laws on International Sales Act 
1967 and the 1980 Vienne Convention on the International Sale of Goods were applicable. The 
Uniform Laws on International Sales Act 1967 only applies if it has been chosen by the parties to the 
contract, s1 (3). This rule means that in English law, the Uniform Laws only apply if the parties opt into 
them. Still, the terms and conditions of Rio Tinto, for example, expressly exclude the applicability of the 
Uniform Laws. Contrarily, the general terms and conditions of Unilever are silent on this point which 
reflects the legal situation. The 1980 Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods is only not 
applicable if the parties to the contract exclude its applicability. This situation is important as the 
Convention differs from English law in some respects, e.g. the availability of specific performance. 
However, the general terms and conditions reviewed for this chapter all exclude the applicability of the 
Vienna Convention. 
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 R Bradgate, Commercial Law (3rd edn, OUP 2005) para 7.4. There are only few distinctions 
between domestic sales and international sales, for instance, s26 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 
1977 excludes ‘international supply contracts’ from the Act. 
688
 The fifteen companies researched are: BHP Billiton, Royal Dutch Shell, HSBC, Vodafone Group, 
BP, Rio Tinto Group, GlaxoSmithKline, Unilever, British American Tobacco, BG Group, Marks & 
Spencer, BT Group, Burberry Group, Diageo and Tesco. 
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companies measured by market capitalisation689 plus five further companies from 
industries across the board which are known to have a supplier-base in developing 
countries690) were researched by this author in order to find out what CSR 
requirements they stipulate for their suppliers. This research had two aims: The first 
aim was to find out if and, if so, how CSR issues are incorporated into supply chain 
contracts between the UK-based multinational companies (the buyers) and their 
suppliers, for instance through inclusion into the buyer’s terms and conditions. The 
second purpose was to obtain contractual clauses which refer to CSR and which are 
used in the buyer-supplier contractual relations. This small-scale research of the 
way in which fifteen FTSE100 companies incorporate CSR into their supply chain 
was necessary as the management literature seems to view the incorporation of 
CSR into supply chain contracts as given without describing the actual detail of how 
this is effected. The existing literature rather analyses the content of the CSR 
policies imposed on suppliers691, without examining if these duties have any effect in 
contract law. 
The documents were retrieved from the companies’ websites which were searched 
for information about the companies’ CSR policies in general and the incorporation 
of these into the supply chain relations in particular. Previous studies of CSR among 
companies which were more comprehensive than the research conducted for this 
chapter also only used the material available online.692 The analysis of information 
available on corporate websites is perceived as being a reliable research method to 
obtain CSR documents.693 The reason for this view is that previous research has 
discovered that the vast majority of corporate CSR documents are on the 
companies’ websites.694 Notably, in one study where CSR managers were 
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 See L Preuss, ‘Codes of Conduct in Organisational Context: From Cascade to Lattice-Work of 
Codes’ (2010) 94 Journal of Business Ethics 471; A Tencati, A Russo and V Quaglia, ‘Unintended 
consequences of CSR: protectionism and collateral damage in global supply chains: the case of 
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 L Preuss and B Brown, ‘Business Policies on Human Rights: An Analysis of Their Content and 
Prevalence Among FTSE 100 Firms’, accepted for publication in Journal of Business Ethics, so far the 
piece is only published online by the journal as ‘OnlineFirst’, 4. 
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 K Bondy, D Matten and J Moon, ‘The adoption of voluntary codes of conduct in MNCs: A three-
country comparative study’ (2004) 109 (4) Business and Society Review 449. 
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 L Preuss and B Brown, ‘Business Policies on Human Rights: An Analysis of Their Content and 
Prevalence Among FTSE 100 Firms’, accepted for publication in Journal of Business Ethics, so far only 
published online by the journal as “OnlineFirst” 4. 
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approached to provide further documents about their CSR policies than just the 
material which was available on the companies’ websites, the additional information 
received following this request was a mere 3% of the total sample.695 All fifteen 
companies selected for the research here have made information available on their 
website pertaining to their CSR policies. Most of the companies also explain the way 
they include CSR into their supply chain relationships with their suppliers, e.g. 
through a reference to the buyer’s CSR code of conduct in the standard purchase 
order forms. Several firms also provide their general terms and conditions which 
contain the CSR clauses and which they incorporate into their contracts with their 
suppliers. Finally, the research was further complemented by using model supply 
contract forms available on the encyclopaedia of forms and precedents on 
LexisNexis. 
With the practical insights it offers into the practice of supply chain contracts, this 
material informs the legal analysis that follows. 
4.3.2 Contractual terms or mere expressions of expectation between the 
buyer and supplier 
The question is if and, if so, how the corporate codes of conduct become part of the 
contracts (i.e. contractual terms) between the Western buyer and the supplier based 
in a transitional economy. This section therefore analyses the ways in which buyers 
incorporate CSR into their supply contracts. As indicated above, the exact 
mechanisms of this incorporation are so far somewhat overlooked in the literature 
about CSR and supply chain management.696 
The difficulty with the information available on the websites is that some companies 
only mention that they incorporate the CSR code of conduct that they have adopted 
into their supply chain contracts without going into further detail and without 
providing any of the purchase documents themselves. An example of this situation 
is Burberry which declares in its annual corporate responsibility review that ‘all 
Burberry suppliers are governed by its Ethical Trading Policy…’697 The word ‘govern’ 
could be interpreted in a way that the company’s CSR policies are contractual 
terms. This example can be contrasted with BP, which only states that it ‘expects’ its 
suppliers to comply with legal requirements and to operate consistently with the 
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 L Preuss, ‘Codes of Conduct in Organisational Context: From Cascade to Lattice-Work of Codes’ 
(2010) 94 Journal of Business Ethics 471, 472-473. 
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 The chapter will also closely analyse the contract law questions which are raised by this inclusion 
such as the use of standard business terms. A further difference is the exact analysis of the legal effect 
of the clauses pertaining to CSR which were found in the documents referred to in this chapter. 
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 http://annualreview2009-10.burberry.com/corp_responsibility/index.html (last accessed 18/6/2012). 
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principles of its code of conduct.698 However, a mere ‘expectation’ such as indicated 
by BP does not constitute a binding legal obligation upon the supplier. Notably, BP 
declares that ‘work is under way to incorporate these [key performance indicators] 
into contracts’ with its suppliers which implies that the code is not yet contractual, at 
least in the view of BP. 
Other companies, on the contrary, provide their contractual documents that contain 
CSR terms, e.g. terms and conditions incorporated into purchase order forms. 
Overall the research of the fifteen companies shows four different ways of 
incorporating the buyer’s CSR policies into the supply chain relationship.  
 
The first and most common mechanism of incorporation seems to be through the 
terms and conditions of the buyer which are incorporated into the buyer’s purchase 
order forms. These terms and conditions either contain a reference to the buyer’s 
code of conduct (e.g. Unilever and Rio Tinto)699 or an express term which stipulates 
the buyer’s CSR principles (e.g. GlaxoSmithKline)700. An example of a reference to 
the buyer’s code of conduct is the following term in Unilever’s terms and conditions: 
 
each supplier…acknowledges that it has reviewed Unilever’s Business Partner Code 
(the “Code”) and agrees that all of their activities shall be conducted in accordance 
with the Code…The Code can be accessed at the internet address…”.
701
  
 
The clause in Unilever’s terms and conditions that refers to the company’s CSR 
code of conduct is the contractual clause. The code of conduct is not a term of the 
contract, it is a reference document. It will help determining if the contractual term 
which refers to it is a condition, warranty or an innominate term (which is discussed 
later on and is important for the remedy the buyer can procure in case of a breach of 
the term) and whether or not the supplier is in breach of the term.  
 
The alternative mechanism for incorporating CSR into the buyer’s terms and 
conditions is through an express stipulation in the terms exemplified by 
GlaxoSmithKline: 
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 http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle800.do?categoryId=9048984&contentId=7082805 (last 
accessed: 03/05/2013). 
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 Rio Tinto London Limited, Purchase Order for the Supply of Goods, Terms and Conditions, section 
10 Compliance with law and policies: “In supplying the Goods and associated services (if any), the 
Supplier will: (a) …; (b) comply with Rio Tinto’s policy titled ‘The Way We Work’ that can be found at 
http://...”  
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 GlaxoSmithKline, Terms and Conditions of Purchase (Goods & Services), section 21: “Ethical 
Standards and Human Rights: 21.1. Unless otherwise required or prohibited by law, Supplier warrants 
to the best of its knowledge, that in relation to the supply of Goods or Services under the terms of the 
Agreement: 21.1.1. it does not employ engage or otherwise use any form of child labour…” 
701
 Unilever, General Terms and Conditions of Purchase of Goods of Unilever Supply Chain Company 
AG (“Conditions”) section 13. 
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21. Unless otherwise required or prohibited by law, Supplier warrants, to the best of 
its knowledge, that in relation to the supply of Goods or Services under the terms of 
the Agreement: 
21.1.1. it does not employ, engage or otherwise use any child labour in 
circumstances such that the tasks performed by any such child labour could 
reasonably be foreseen to cause either physical or emotional impairment to the 
development of such child…
702
 
 
The difference to the previous example is that the CSR policy is in the contractual 
term without a reference to a further document. In both these cases the CSR policy 
of the buyer is contained in the buyer’s terms and conditions. The reason for the use 
of general terms and conditions in purchase orders is that this incorporation saves 
the buyer a significant amount of time as he does not have to negotiate these 
contractual terms each time he orders goods.703 Moreover, by using his terms and 
conditions, the buyer can include terms which are favourable for him.704 In this 
situation, the buyer’s CSR policies only become ‘part’ of the contract if his terms and 
conditions form part of the contract between the buyer and supplier. This issue will 
be addressed below. 
Secondly, the CSR code of conduct can be incorporated into a contract which is not 
based on standard terms and conditions, but whose terms were expressly 
negotiated.705 In this situation there are two ways of incorporating the buyer’s CSR 
policies which are similar to the previous scenario: Either through reference to the 
buyer’s code of conduct or through express stipulations in the contract. In this 
situation, the buyer’s CSR policy becomes ‘part’ of the contract when the contract 
between the two parties is formed (see below). 
Thirdly, some companies declare that they incorporate their CSR policies into their 
invitations to tender.706 For the CSR policies to have contractual effects in this 
situation it is necessary that they are incorporated into the subsequent contract 
between buyer and supplier, either through the first or the second mechanism 
described above. 
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 GlaxoSmithKline Terms and Conditions of Purchase (Goods & Services), section 21. 
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 R Bradgate, Commercial Law (3rd edn, OUP 2005) para 2.5.3. 
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 ibid. 
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 One company – BT – stated that it would not use the terms and conditions for non-UK suppliers. 
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 BT states that this is one of its ways of how it incorporates its CSR policy into its supply chain: 
‘Working with BT Generic Standards’, 1. Introduction: Generic Standards will form part of the tenderer 
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contract. The inclusion of Generic Standards into Invitation to Tenders or contracts will be either 
through the Quality of Suppliers and Generic Standards clause, specifically drafted contract clauses or 
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Finally, some companies state that they ask their suppliers to sign up to their code 
of conduct.707 This mechanism creates contractual effects only if this signing of the 
code of conduct makes it a term of the contract. However, the privity of contract rule 
means that it is generally the parties to that contract who can enforce that 
contractual effect. 
The following section analyses if and, if so, how the buyer’s CSR policies become 
‘part’ of the contract through these four mechanisms. It will follow the order used in 
this section with the incorporation of CSR through the buyer’s terms and conditions 
taking priority due to their frequency. 
4.3.2.1 Incorporation through the buyer’s terms and conditions 
The buyer’s terms and conditions, which are usually referred to on the buyer’s 
purchase order form, must form part of the contract, i.e. they must be properly 
incorporated into the contract. To do this, the buyer and supplier must first of all 
enter into a contract which presupposes that they reach an agreement, i.e. offer and 
acceptance.708 The basic rules as to the formation of contract are the same, 
irrespective of the type of commercial supply contract.709 There are different kinds of 
commercial supply contracts such as the contract for the sale of goods, governed by 
the Sale of Goods Act 1979, or the contract for the supply of services, governed by 
the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982.710 However, neither of these statutes 
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Code of Ethical Purchasing and to…”, see: Vodafone, Corporate Responsibility – 
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 R Bradgate, Commercial Law (3
rd
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of sale or for work and materials. For further information see R Bradgate and F White, Commercial Law 
– Legal Practice Course Guides (OUP 2009) paras 9.4.6., 17. 
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contains all the rules applicable to these types of contracts, as many rules governing 
these contracts can be found in the common law or in other statutes.711 
Offers must contain all integral parts of the contract so that the offeree can just say 
‘yes’. For example, for contracts of sale of goods the following elements were held 
to be ‘essential elements’ of the contract although some terms can be implied into 
contracts, e.g. default provisions under the Sale of Goods Act 1979: a) the goods 
ordered should be described without ambiguity, b) the purchase price and the terms 
of payment should be stated and c) the terms of delivery should be set out, including 
instructions for packing and invoicing, transportation and insurance.712 The purchase 
order form is a commercial document issued by a buyer to a seller which indicates 
types, quantities, and agreed prices for products or services the seller will provide to 
the buyer.713 The sending of a purchase order to a supplier is therefore considered 
to constitute a legal offer to buy products or services as the buyer makes an 
order.714 The purchase order forms used by the buyers (the companies based in the 
UK) must contain all these essential elements of the contract in order to constitute a 
binding offer. The incorporation of the buyer’s terms and conditions which contain 
the CSR obligations into the offer will be discussed below.715 
This offer must be accepted by the supplier (the seller). An acceptance is defined as 
any statement, by words or conduct, which clearly and unequivocally indicates that 
the person making it agrees to be bound by the terms of the offer.716 When 
accepting, the offeree must not vary or add to the terms of the offer as this would 
constitute a counter-offer which rejects and terminates the original offer. It is not 
likely to happen in the supply situation here that the supplier would take the risk of 
changing the terms. The acceptance must usually be communicated to the offeror. 
Silence is generally held not to be able to amount to an acceptance although there 
are some exceptions to this rule.717 However, the offeror can waive this requirement 
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which means that acceptance can be by conduct.718 In the example of a sale of 
goods contract, the seller may in this case accept an offer by dispatching the goods 
that the offeror ordered in the purchase order form. Acceptance of a purchase order 
by a seller usually forms a one-off contract between the buyer and the seller, so no 
contract exists until the purchase order is accepted. This system is used to control 
the purchasing of products and services from external suppliers.719 
To form part of the supply contract, the general terms and conditions of the buyer 
must be incorporated into his offer (which is commonly the purchase order).720 This 
incorporation can be done by printing the terms and conditions on offers. The text of 
the offer should at least contain a clear reference to the fact that terms and 
conditions of purchase are printed on the reverse of the offer or on an attached 
sheet or on a website.721 The buyer must obtain the seller’s agreement to the terms 
and conditions. To that end the seller should ideally agree in writing to the offer 
(countersign), for instance through returning a countersigned acceptance form.722 
Agreement is also possible by conduct, if the other party despatches the goods 
which happens often in practice. A signed agreement is binding even if the party 
signing it has not understood or read it.723 If the parties have not signed an 
agreement, no terms are incorporated unless the party which wants to incorporate 
them has drawn the terms to the attention of the party prior to, or at the same time 
of, the agreement.724 These rules mean that for the terms and conditions of the 
buyer to take effect it is important that the offeror (the buyer) clearly refers to them 
and that the seller (the supplier) agrees to them, ideally by countersignature. 
Otherwise, the buyer’s terms and conditions which contain his CSR policy will not be 
included into the contract. 
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It may be, however, that the buyer’s terms and conditions do not become part of the 
contract due to a practice known as ‘battle of the forms’.725 A ‘battle of forms’ 
denotes the situation where one party notifies the other that their general terms 
apply to the contract, but the other party responds by saying that their general terms 
will apply.726 Although such a ‘battle of forms’ usually occurs in relation to conflicting 
provisions about the retention of title and exclusion clauses, it is to be expected that 
the same would apply to conflicting CSR policies. It is the buyer who wants to 
incorporate his company’s CSR code of conduct into his supply contracts whereas 
the seller might either have less burdensome CSR principles or not have a CSR 
policy in his terms and conditions at all. In the scenario here, a ‘battle of forms’ 
occurs when the buyer orders goods on his terms and conditions of purchase 
whereas the seller acknowledges the order on his own standard terms of sale.727 
The traditional approach of the English courts is that this situation is analysed in 
terms of offer and counter-offer.728 That means where the buyer orders goods on a 
form which incorporate his standard terms and the seller acknowledges the order on 
a form that incorporate his terms, the response by the seller will be a counter-offer 
rather than an acceptance.729 The ‘battle of forms’ is usually won by the party who 
sends the last terms and conditions (commonly described as ‘firing the last shot’).730 
In that case the seller (supplier) would be in a favourable position to make their 
terms and conditions win the ‘battle’ by delivering the goods ordered with a delivery 
note which contains the seller’s standard terms which the buyer may be deemed to 
accept by keeping the goods. This situation means that the seller’s terms and 
conditions would prevail as they are the last general terms to reach the opposite 
party. It is possible that the counter-offer is accepted by conduct. In a ‘battle of 
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forms’ the difficulty is to determine which standard terms apply. The buyers will often 
try to ensure acceptance of their standard terms by obtaining the signature of their 
suppliers that they consent to their terms.731 
In this scenario the incorporation of the buyer’s CSR policy into the contract 
depends on whether or not the suppliers use any conflicting terms and conditions. 
Moreover, the clause commonly found in the buyers’ terms and conditions that their 
terms would override any conflicting sellers’ terms does not prevent the supplier’s 
terms from becoming part of the contract, if they are incorporated later on.732 
However, the buyers can stamp any delivery note they receive from the suppliers 
with the following statement: ‘received under our terms and conditions’.733 This 
stamp is regarded as a counter-offer in relation to the terms and conditions and has 
the effect that the terms of the party using that stamp prevail. In fact, in commercial 
practice many buyers have adopted the practice of stamping delivery notes with the 
statement ‘accepted subject to our terms’ in order to avoid the result that the sellers’ 
terms and conditions override theirs.734 This option at the time of delivery provides a 
solution for buyers who want to ensure that their terms and conditions including the 
CSR policy form part of the contract. Yet, if the stamp is made after the offer was 
accepted, then it is ex post facto (i.e. after the contract came into existence) and has 
therefore no effect. Hence, the ‘battle of forms’ depends on the question when the 
contract came into existence. If a party gets in the ‘last shot’ after the contract was 
formed, then it does not make a difference. The crucial question is therefore which 
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party got in the ‘last shot’ (incorporating its terms and conditions) before the contract 
was formed. 
Although in theory, the law on ‘battle of forms’ appears relevant, it may not be in 
practice. In commercial practice, due to the strong economic bargaining power of 
the buyer in international supply contracts, one can expect that buyers can often 
impose their CSR policies on their suppliers as a prerequisite to trading and that no 
‘battle of forms’ occurs at all. Multinational buyers from Western companies are 
usually in a position where they can choose between numerous potential suppliers. 
Their suppliers are therefore unlikely to enter into a ‘battle of forms’ with their 
buyers. 
Occasionally, it is also possible that the parties start performing (i.e. supplying and 
paying) before a contract has, in fact, been concluded or that no contract has been 
concluded at all due to discrepancies in the declarations of the parties.735 In that 
case, a court could or could not conclude that a contract came into being and 
depending on when it came into being a CSR policy may or may not be 
incorporated. 
Finally, the rules on unfair contract terms cannot make invalid the CSR policies 
which are included in the buyer’s terms and conditions. The reason is that the 
supply chain contracts analysed here consist of a business-to-business situation 
whereas the unfair contract terms framework, by and large, focusses on business-
to-consumer relationships.736 S3 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 which 
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applies to both business-to-consumer737 and business-to-business contracts entered 
into on standard terms only encompasses the exclusion and restriction of liability or 
contractual performance.738 The rules on Unfair Contract Terms would therefore not 
usually invalidate contractual CSR obligations. In any event, it is important to note 
that international sales contracts are normally excluded from the scope of the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act 1977.739 
4.3.2.2 Incorporation of CSR policy through expressly negotiated contract 
In case the buyer does not use terms and conditions, but incorporates his CSR 
policies into a negotiated contract, it is again necessary that the parties are in 
agreement, i.e. that there is an offer and an acceptance, as in the previous scenario. 
In this case the CSR policies of the buyer are only incorporated into the supply 
contract if the buyer has included this policy into his offer and if the supplier has 
agreed to it and if the contractual clauses referring to the buyer’s CSR policy are 
then included into the written agreement signed by the parties. 
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4.3.2.3 Incorporation of CSR policy through an invitation to tender 
In the situation in which the buyer incorporates his CSR policy into an invitation to 
tender, it is again necessary for the CSR policy to be part of the agreement between 
buyer and supplier. The practice of some companies to issue invitations to submit a 
tender to supply or buy goods generally constitutes an invitation to treat.740 
Consequently, every person who submits a tender makes an offer and the party 
which invited tenders (here: the buyer) is in the position to make a choice between 
the offers.741 In this case, the incorporation of CSR into the supply contract would 
depend on the terms of the supplier’s offer. If this offer does not contain any CSR 
clause, then there is no contractual obligation on the supplier to comply with CSR 
duties. As the supplier makes the offer in this scenario, one would usually expect 
that the supplier does not include a CSR clause into the offer as it burdens him. 
However, if the invitee (the buyer) insists on the inclusion of his CSR policy into the 
subsequent contract by making it a condition of offers, then the CSR policy becomes 
part of the subsequent contract through the tender process. The potential supplier 
will then have to include the buyer’s CSR policy into the terms of their offer in order 
to be recognised by the buyer. The declaration from BT that it includes its Generic 
Standards (which contain the company’s CSR policy) into the tenderer selection 
process and into Invitations to Tender and that these standards form part of any 
subsequent contract reflects this legal situation. In that situation, the buyer’s use of 
invitations to tender does not preclude the incorporation of the buyer’s own CSR 
policy into the supply contract. 
4.3.2.4 Incorporation of CSR policy through signing up to the buyer’s code of 
conduct 
Where the buyer makes his supplier sign up to his CSR code of conduct, the CSR 
policy can only be enforced in contract law if it is part of the supply contract. The 
problem with this method of signing up to the code of conduct is that it does not per 
se incorporate the buyer’s code of conduct into the terms of the supply contract. If 
the seller signs up to the buyer’s code of conduct, then the situation is legally 
comparable to the situation when the buyer himself signs up to codes of conduct. 
The general view is that codes of conduct are not binding for the companies that 
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adhere to them.742 This view means for the supply chain relationship that if the 
supplier signs up to the buyer’s code of conduct this signing up does not create any 
contractual effects. It is not part of the agreement and hence not part of the contract.  
4.3.3 The continuing incorporation of the buyer’s CSR policy into long-term 
contractual relationships and informal agreements 
The analysis in the previous section when the buyer’s CSR policies become part of 
the supply contract raises the related question if the buyer’s CSR policy remains 
part of subsequent informal contracts between the parties. 
So far, the focus has been on the situation that buyer and supplier enter into a 
contract for every single order in written form. This situation might be different, 
however, when the two parties have traded with each other for some time. In 
commercial practice, contractual relationships between parties are often long-
term.743 Many businesses pursue long-term relationships for the supply of 
products.744 Trading partners regularly use informal agreements amongst 
themselves such as oral agreements or e-mail exchanges.745 Most commercial 
contracts tend to be rather informal as they are not clearly defined and are not 
formally written down.746 The way contracts are formed also depends on 
particularities of the respective industries. Industries trading with perishable goods 
are more likely to use informal agreements. By contrast, industries trading with 
medical goods tend to employ comprehensively drafted contracts as the production 
and sale of medical goods is subject to much regulation.747 It should also be 
remembered that long-term contracts are commonly considered through the prism of 
relational contract theory, although that is not necessarily the case.748 Relational 
contract theory can apply to both short-term and long-term contract, but in many 
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different ways.749 One of the key issues affecting long-term contracts is the need to 
allow for sufficient flexibility to adjust to changes in the environment.750 However, 
these issues are not relevant here, as the important question for this chapter rather 
is to what extent the long-term nature of many supply chain contracts affects the 
incorporation of CSR policies. The issue within long-term business partnerships is if 
the buyer’s CSR policy, which was included in the initial supply contracts, either 
through incorporation of the buyer’s terms or conditions or expressly outlined in a 
closely-defined written contract, continues to be part of subsequent informal 
contracts such as oral agreements. 
The English courts have been willing to incorporate terms into a contract by a prior 
course of dealing which was both regular and consistent.751 This incorporation is 
also possible in verbal contracts when the parties previously had regular contractual 
relationships.752 For a specific clause to be implied into the verbal agreement there 
is a need for it to have been included in several previous contracts.753 The 
requirement ‘regular’ will not be met in the case of only some previous contracts.754 
It is difficult to guess a minimum period of time and number of previous orders which 
would be sufficient for a court to constitute a ‘prior course of dealing’, but one can 
assume that, on the basis of the case law, there ought to be a consistent previous 
dealing of at least a year with some orders per month.755 It is therefore likely that in 
such circumstances courts would be prepared to imply the CSR policy into 
                                                          
749
 See: I Macneil, Reflections on Relational Contract theory after a Neo-classical Seminar’, in D 
Campbell, H Collins and J Wightman (eds), Implicit Dimensions of Contract (Hart Publishing 2003) 207 
– 217; A Schwartz, ‘Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and 
Judicial Strategies’ (1992) 21 Journal of Legal Studies 271, 271. 
750
 Important issues which are often discussed in the literature on long-term and relational contracts are 
the need to allow for flexibility and adjustments of the contracts to changing circumstances. See for an 
introduction into this topic: M Hviid, ‘Long-term contracts and relational contracts’, in B Bouckaert and 
G De Geest (eds), The Encyclopaedia of Law and Economics vol III (Edward Elgar 2000) 46.  
751
 McCutcheon v David MacBrayne Ltd [1964] 1 All ER 430, [1964] 1 WLR 125, HL. 
752
 R Austen-Baker, Implied Terms in English Contract Law (Edward Elgar 2011) para 5.34. 
753
 The party which asks the courts to imply this specific clause would need to provide documentation 
that the clause had been incorporated into previous contracts. 
754
 This situation might be different in commercial contracts where the parties are of equal bargaining 
power: In British Crane Hire Corporation Ltd v Ipswich Plant Hire Ltd [1975] QB 303, a clause was 
implied in the contract on the basis of two previous transactions and the customs of trade. However, 
even though one could construe equality of bargaining power due to the commercial nature of both 
buyer and supplier, it would be too construed to assume an incorporation of CSR policies into such 
contracts as customs of trade – especially as every company tends to develop its own CSR code of 
conduct. This case is therefore unlikely to provide any precedent for the scenario discussed here. 
755
 It depends on the facts of the particular case what constitutes a ‘regular’ course of dealing. The 
Court of Appeal held in Hollier v Rambler Motors (A.M.C.) Ltd [1972] 2 Q.B. 71; [1972] 1 All ER 399 
that past dealings on three or four occasions over a period of five years is not sufficient to imply a term 
into a contract by course of dealing between the parties. This case is to be contrasted with the 
interpretation of ‘regular’ in Henry Kendall Ltd v William Lillico Ltd [1962] 2 AC 31 in which the House of 
Lords considered three or four dealing per month over a period of about three years as sufficient, which 
amounts to about a hundred contracts over this period. The threshold of what is ‘regular’ will be 
somewhere between these two cases. 
139 
 
subsequent informal agreements (e.g. verbal contracts) which are not as detailed as 
to provide for the CSR policy of the buyer. 
4.3.4 Enforcement against suppliers ‘down the chain’ 
As the concerns about lack of corporate social responsibility among firms in 
transnational economies apply in particular to those contractors at the end of the 
supply chain, the chapter needs to consider the question of whether the Western 
company at the ‘head’ of the supply chain could enforce a contract against firms 
further down the supply chain. In fact, a particular challenge which the supply chain 
poses for the promotion of CSR through contracts between the buyer and the 
supplier is that many suppliers use sub-contractors further down the supply chain to 
provide material or to complete a significant element of the contract.756 A distinction 
is therefore often made in the literature on supply chains between different tiers of 
suppliers to describe this situation: First-tier suppliers, second-tier suppliers and so 
on.757 The sub-suppliers are not party to the contract between the buyer and the 
supplier. 
Due to the privity of contract doctrine, it is a general rule that third parties cannot be 
subjected to a burden by a contract to which they are not a party.758 Hence, no 
obligation can be placed upon them.759 It is considered to be unreasonable to 
subject a third party to a burden in a contract to which he is not a party.760 This issue 
is not regulated by the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 which instead 
focusses on the rights of third parties. The Act does not allow enforcement of 
burdens imposed on third parties.761 The supply chain contracts between the buyer 
and their seller can therefore not directly impose a duty on sub-suppliers to adhere 
to the code of conduct of the multinational company based in the UK. The buyer is 
therefore unable to sue sub-suppliers further down the supply chain as they are not 
parties to the contract. As a consequence of this legal situation there is a danger 
that the suppliers can evade their CSR obligations by employing a number of sub-
contractors who do most of the work on their behalf.  
However, if the buyer’s general terms and conditions impose a duty on the first-tier 
supplier to implement the buyer’s CSR policy further down its own supply chain 
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(perpetual clause) then this term constitutes a contractual duty on the supplier to do 
so. If the first-tier supplier consequently incorporates the buyer’s CSR policy into its 
contracts with its own sub-contractors, then it is able to sue its own contractors for 
breaches of this policy. If the first-tier supplier fails to incorporate the buyer’s CSR 
policy into its contracts with its own contractors, then this failure constitutes a breach 
of the first-tier supplier’s contractual duties to the buyer. In that case the buyer could 
sue its first-tier supplier for breach of contract. However, as indicated, the buyer 
could not directly sue the second-tier supplier to comply with its CSR policies as the 
second-tier supplier is not party to the contract between the buyer and the first-tier 
supplier. 
The challenge of ensuring the incorporation of CSR obligations by suppliers into 
their sub-supplier contracts is also addressed in the CSR reports of multinational 
companies. Statements about the responsibility for the conduct of sub-suppliers are 
rather cautious as the multinational companies tend to emphasise the duty of their 
direct (first-tier) suppliers to implement similar CSR policies within their own supply 
chains. Vodafone, for instance, states that it requires its first level (direct) suppliers 
to confirm that they will comply with the company’s code of ethical purchasing and 
that it would also ‘encourage all suppliers to implement the standards across their 
whole business and within their own supply chain’.762 Similarly, Unilever’s supplier 
code states that its direct suppliers are responsible for requiring their direct suppliers 
[sub-suppliers] to adhere to the principles of the code.763 However, Unilever does 
not contain any clause in its terms and conditions or its supplier code which imposes 
a duty on its suppliers to establish a similar contractual CSR regime with their sub-
contractors. In the guidelines to its supplier code, Unilever declares that it is aware 
of the fact that many of the CSR issues arise further down the supply chain and that 
first tier suppliers therefore have a responsibility to ensure that the principles are 
followed there, too.764 Rio Tinto takes a different approach and expressly prohibits 
their suppliers to subcontract without its prior written authorisation.765 More 
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cautiously, GlaxoSmithKline uses the following term in its terms and conditions of 
purchase: 
Supplier agrees that it is responsible for controlling its own supply chain and that it 
shall encourage compliance with ethical standards, and human rights by any 
subsequent supplier of goods and services that are used by Supplier when 
performing its obligations under the Agreement.
766
 
The different examples reflect the legal situation that contractual duties cannot be 
imposed against third parties who are not party to the contract. The carefully worded 
clause by GlaxoSmithKline that its suppliers ‘shall encourage compliance’ within 
their own supply chain as well as the statement by Vodafone that they ask their 
suppliers to ‘encourage all suppliers to implement the standards…within their own 
supply chain’ are in line with the fact that contractual parties (e.g. the multinational 
company based in the UK and its direct/first-tier supplier in the developing world) 
cannot enforce a burden imposed on a third party such as sub-contractors/second-
tier suppliers. 
Sub-contracting therefore poses a significant challenge for the promotion of CSR 
policies in the supply chain through contract law, especially if there are diversified 
suppliers and sub-suppliers. The more parties are involved in the production 
process, the easier it is that CSR obligations are circumvented, as the Western 
buyer cannot bind companies further down the supply chain that are not its 
contractual partners. The ability of contract law to promote corporate social 
responsibility throughout the supply chain is therefore limited in practice. This 
situation is a major drawback of using contract law to promote socially responsible 
behaviour among corporations. However, this drawback can be mitigated if Western 
companies use their bargaining power to force their suppliers to ensure compliance 
with CSR standards further down the supply chain. Such a practice might arise due 
to growing public pressure and the reputational damage that reports about human 
rights abuses within the supply chain entails.767 
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4.3.5 Enforcement of the CSR terms in supply chain contracts by third 
parties  
The incorporation of CSR policies into the supply contract also raises the question of 
whether third parties such as the supplier’s employees are able to enforce the 
contract between the buyer and its supplier on the basis of the Contracts (Rights of 
Third Parties) Act 1999. This issue is particularly relevant in relation to the CSR 
terms in the contract which are potentially beneficial for third parties such as the 
supplier’s employees or the local community.  
At common law, the privity of contract doctrine stipulates that parties who are not 
party to the contract cannot enforce it, even if the contract was specifically entered 
into for their benefit.768 However, this situation changed in English law with the 
Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999. The Act was intended to overcome the 
common law’s privity rules which were considered to be unjust and needlessly 
complex.769 Section 1 of the Act provides that a person who is not actually a party to 
the contract may still enforce a term of the contract if he meets the test of 
enforceability in s1 (1) – (3) of the Act. This test requires that a term of the contract 
expressly provides that the third party may enforce a right in its own right or that a 
term purports to confer a benefit on that party.770 The third party must be expressly 
identified in the contract by name, as a member of a class or as answering a 
particular description but need not be in existence when the contract is entered 
into.771 If the third party meets this test, all remedies are available to him that would 
be available to the parties of the contract.772 The third party can enforce his rights 
against the promisor of the term. In a supply contract, the CSR duties are imposed 
on the supplier. For instance, the promisor of the right of employees to join a trade 
union is the supplier as their employer. 
An express provision pursuant to s1 (1) (a) of the Act is provided if the contracting 
parties state that the third party ‘shall have the right to enforce the contract’.773 
Alternatively, pursuant to s1 (1) (b) of the Act, the third party might derive a right 
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from the supply contract if a contract term purports to confer a benefit on him. This 
option is applicable if ‘on a true construction of the term in question its sense has the 
effect of conferring a benefit on the third party in question’.774 In this case, the court 
did not consider it to be necessary that the predominant purpose or intent behind the 
term is that the subsection confers a benefit to the third party. On this basis it has 
been argued that the requirement that the term in question ‘purports to confer a 
benefit’ on the third party will not be difficult to meet.775 Benefits conferred upon third 
parties in the CSR context could be duties on the supplier not to use child labour, 
not to make their employees work excessive working hours and to allow employees 
to join a Union. 
In the documents from the companies reviewed for this chapter, there is no term that 
meets the requirements of s1 (1) (a) of the Act by expressly conferring upon a third 
party the right to enforce the contract. However, the second way for third parties to 
acquire an enforceable right in s1 (1) (b), i.e. if a term ‘purports to confer a benefit’, 
is more likely to apply and to entitle third parties to enforce CSR clauses. The 
following provisions of GlaxoSmithKline’s terms and conditions are an example of 
this situation: 
 …Supplier warrants….: 
21.1.2. it does not use forced labour in any form (prison, indentured, bonded or 
otherwise) and its employees are not required to lodge papers or deposits on 
starting work; 
21.2.5. it does not discriminate against any employees on any ground (including 
race, religion, disability or gender) 
21.1.7. it complies with the laws on working hours and employment rights in the 
countries in which it operates. 
21.1.8 it is respectful of the employees right to join and form independent trade 
unions and freedom of association…
776
 
 
Upon a true construction of these terms one can argue that the supplier’s 
declaration that it does not use forced labour in any form, that it does not 
discriminate against any employees on any ground, that it complies with the laws on 
working hours and employment rights and that it allows its employees the right to 
join a trade union are intended to confer a benefit on the employees. These 
exemplary terms provide clear benefits for the employees of the supplier who are 
also expressly identified as a class, hence meeting the test in s1 (3) Contracts 
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(Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999.777 Given the court’s rather broad interpretation of 
‘purports to confer a benefit’ on the third party, one can conclude that in this 
example the employees of the supplier acquire an enforceable right due to s1 (1) (b) 
of the Act. The contractual obligations to comply with the laws on working hours, to 
grant its employees the right to join a trade union, not to discriminate on any ground 
and not to use forced labour in any form are imposed on the supplier as the 
promisor of these duties. Hence, in the example here, the third parties, the 
employees, are provided with a right of action against the supplier, their employer, 
due to the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties Act) 1999. 
 
However, the parties to the contract can expressly make clear that they do not 
intend to confer a right of action on a third party.778 The contracting parties are 
allowed to exclude the conferment of a right of action upon third parties.779 Section 1 
(1) (b) is then disapplied by s1 (2) of the Act.780 Where the parties indicate in the 
contract that they do not intend to confer an enforceable benefit upon a third party 
with the contract, the right that third parties might acquire from s1 (1) (b) Contracts 
(Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 will not apply. The contractual parties are able to 
exclude the application of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 by third 
parties without the danger that this exclusion is considered to be an unfair term. The 
reason is that the supply contracts discussed here are exempt from the usual test 
for exclusion clauses pursuant to the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. S7 (4) of the 
Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act stipulates that s1 would not allow a third party 
to be treated as a contracting party for the purposes of any other Act. This includes 
the Unfair Contract Terms Act whose s3 test for exclusion or restriction of liability 
therefore does not apply if the buyer and supplier exclude the rights of third parties 
to enforce a term of the Act. Moreover, as indicated above, the Unfair Contract 
Terms Act 1977 does not apply to international sale of goods contracts.781 
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And, in fact, the terms and conditions of GlaxoSmithKline which have just been 
analysed in terms of providing rights to third parties also contain a term excluding 
the rights of third parties: 
 
25.8. Except for any rights granted to GSK Affiliates, which the parties hereby 
designate as intended third party beneficiaries to the Agreement, no person who is 
not a party to the Agreement shall have any rights under the Contracts (Rights of 
Third Parties) Act 1999 to enforce any term.
782
 
 
The terms and conditions of the other companies reviewed for this chapter all 
contain similar provisions such as the following clause in Rio Tinto’s terms and 
conditions:  
 
No person who is not a party to the relevant contract or the Purchase Order shall 
have any right under the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 to enforce any 
term of the Purchase Order.
783
 
 
In actual fact, this exclusion of the rights of third parties is standard practice in 
commercial contracts784 and it is therefore included in the model purchase 
agreements: 
 
Third parties: For the purposes of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 
this Agreement is not intended to, and does not, give any person who is not a party 
to it any right to enforce any of its provisions.
785
  
 
During the consultation process that led to the introduction of the Act, the Law 
Commission did not consider the easy exclusion of the rights of third parties to 
enforce terms that purport to confer a benefit on them to be problematic.786 The 
discussions rather focused on the question whether or not the introduction of s1 (1) 
(b) would result in ‘uncertainty’.787 It was argued that the rebuttable presumption of 
enforceability for third parties would achieve a ‘satisfactory compromise’.788 
However, the fact that the parties can relatively easily exclude the applicability of s1 
(1) (b) of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 severely limits the power 
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of the supply contracts to promote corporate social responsibility among firms. The 
third parties, as the beneficiaries of the contractual CSR clauses, can acquire rights 
through s1 (1) (b) Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act that they then lose due to 
the standard exclusion of this Act. Viewed from their perspective, the compromise 
found in the Act is contradictory. It can be argued that contractual parties who 
promise to benefit third parties in a contract (through contractual CSR clauses) 
should expect to have these promises enforced by these third parties such as the 
employees of GlaxoSmithKline’s suppliers in the example used above. This 
argument can be supported by the fact that the legislator expressly enabled third 
parties such as the supplier’s employees to acquire a right if a contractual term 
purports to confer a benefit upon them and where they are identified as a member of 
a class (e.g. the employees of GlaxoSmithKline’s suppliers). Otherwise, contractual 
terms that pretend to enhance the position of third parties would only be general 
statements whose enforcement purely depends on the buyer and not on the 
intended beneficiaries themselves. At the moment, contract law can therefore be 
used as a tool to make public CSR commitments by entering into contractual CSR 
obligations that the intended beneficiaries, the third parties, are unable to enforce. 
The current legal position means that the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 
1999 has not significantly improved the situation of third parties as the intended 
beneficiaries of a greater socially responsible commitment of corporations. Quite the 
contrary, the possibility for the contractual parties to exclude the applicability of s1 
(1) (b) of the Act contradicts the aim of the Act, namely to provide third parties with a 
right of enforcement. Third parties, such as the suppliers’ employees that are 
expressly identified in a contractual clause, should have a right to enforce clauses 
that are beneficial for them, for example the right to join a trade union or not be 
forced to work excessive hours. Whilst this contradiction in the Act is criticised, it is 
important to point out that it is still the contractual parties who choose to exclude the 
applicability of s1 (1) (b) Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 (and hence the 
enforcement of their CSR policies by the intended beneficiaries of these policies) in 
the first place.    
4.4 What remedies are or could be available for breach of CSR terms? 
Once the buyer’s CSR policy has become part of the supply contracts, the next 
issue in terms of promoting the socially responsible conduct of corporations is if the 
buyer (the Western company) is able to procure an appropriate remedy in contract 
law for the breach, i.e. repudiation rather than damages. Repudiation of the contract 
is a particularly strong remedy as it provides the non-breaching party with the right 
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to terminate further performance of the contract whereas the right to damages gives 
the innocent party a right to recover damages in respect of the loss suffered from 
the breach. The consequence of a right to terminate the contract is severe for 
suppliers as they can lose the contract with the buyer. This situation means that, if 
the buyers procure the right to terminate the contract rather than the right to claim 
damages for a breach of the CSR terms, then the socially responsible behaviour of 
the suppliers is given a particularly strong position through contract law. 
The following section will analyse what remedies the buyers could procure for 
breaches of some of the contractual CSR clauses from the documents that were 
researched for this chapter. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to analyse all 
material found on the websites. The analysis will therefore rather focus on a small 
sample of companies which have provided their contractual documents such as their 
general terms and conditions for purchase order forms. The three companies 
selected are Rio Tinto, Unilever and GlaxoSmithKline.789 The contractual terms 
pertaining to CSR in the terms and conditions of these three companies are the 
object of the following analysis. There is, so far, no case law available that deals 
with the breach of CSR principles in supply contracts. 
The kind of remedy which is available to the Western buyer here depends on the 
type of term which is broken.790 The three types of terms are conditions, warranties 
and innominate terms.791 A condition is an essential term of the contract which goes 
to the root or the heart of the contract (e.g. in case of the purchase of a new car 
these are the terms as to the make of the car).792 Conditions contain the main 
obligations and are central to the contract.793 If a condition is broken, the breach is 
generally considered as repudiatory and the non-breaching party has the option of 
either terminating the contract for the future and to obtain damages for any loss 
suffered or affirming it and to recover damages for the breach.794 A warranty is a 
lesser, subsidiary term of the contract (e.g. the colour of the car).795 A breach of a 
warranty is not a repudiatory breach and the non-breaching party can only obtain 
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damages, but not terminate or affirm.796 Between these two types are innominate 
terms (also called ‘intermediate terms’). They were introduced in Hong Kong Fir 
Shipping Co Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd797 as it was considered to be inflexible 
that breaches of contractual terms give only either rise to a termination or to 
damages depending on the classification of the terms.798 Innominate terms are 
terms which cannot be categorised as being conditions or warranties, as they can 
be broken in a way that is so fundamental that it undermines the whole purpose of 
the contract (i.e. giving rise to repudiation) or in a way that is rather trivial and 
where, consequently, damages are an adequate remedy.799 The assessment of the 
question if a breach of an innominate term gives rise to repudiation depends on the 
issue whether or not the nature of the breach deprives the non-breaching party of 
substantially the whole benefit of the contract.800 The breach is repudiatory if the 
legal benefit of the contract has been removed from the non-breaching party. If it is 
repudiatory, then the non-breaching party has the right to terminate the contract, as 
in case of a breach of a condition. Innominate terms therefore give the courts 
greater remedial flexibility to focus on the consequences of the breach.801 In 
essence, when assessing the type of a term, one must consider its ‘commercial 
significance’ for the contract as a whole.802 It is therefore necessary to decide if the 
breach deprives the non-breaching party of substantially the whole benefit of the 
contract. It can be difficult to ascertain how serious the consequences of the breach 
must be before an innocent party is entitled to terminate.803 The factors that courts 
include in their decision about the seriousness of a breach are, inter alia, the losses 
caused by the breach, the cost of making performance comply with the terms of the 
contract and the adequacy of damages as a remedy to the innocent party.804 The 
decision depends on the facts of the individual case and on the effects of the 
breach.805 It can, however, be difficult for courts to make this decision when a term 
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has not previously been classified.806 Innominate terms have therefore enjoyed a 
mixed reception in the case law.807  
Another remedy which would promote CSR is specific performance. An order of 
specific performance is a remedy for breach of contract which compels the obligor to 
actually perform the agreed obligation rather than being exposed to a termination of 
the contract or having to pay damages as compensation for the breach.808 However, 
whereas damages are available as a right upon breach of contract, the remedy of 
specific performance is only rarely awarded in English law.809 It is an equitable 
remedy which is only available in the discretion of the courts.810 Specific 
performance is traditionally regarded by the courts as a supplementary remedy 
which is only granted when damages are inadequate.811 The scope of the specific 
performance remedy has been broadened in Beswick v Beswick812 which held that 
specific performance could be awarded upon the basis of appropriateness rather 
than as a supplementary remedy. However, it is the duty of the non-breaching party 
to demonstrate that damages would be an inadequate remedy.813  
Applying these principles to the companies chosen here, the first example is Rio 
Tinto: 
 10. Compliance with law and policies 
In supplying the Goods and associated services (if any), the Supplier will:… (b) 
comply with Rio Tinto’s policy titled “The Way We Work” that can be found at 
http://.... 
The contractual term in section 10 (b) of the terms and conditions stipulates 
compliance with the company’s code of conduct. The code of conduct ‘The Way We 
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Work’814 is a reference document. It is not part of the term itself. However, it is a 
point of reference to determine whether or not the supplier is in breach of his binding 
contractual commitment pursuant to section 10 (b) which is to be in compliance with 
the code. The code contains a variety of principles, for example, about the 
environment, human rights and bribery. The main purpose of the contract is supply 
and purchase. The issues addressed in the code do not address the main 
obligations of the contract of sale of goods such as payment and delivery, but they 
establish a duty on the supplier to adhere to a range of CSR principles. Therefore 
the term in section 10 (b) cannot be classified as a condition. However, given the 
significance of some of the principles in the code for the reputation of the buyer or, 
in case of bribery, potentially also for its liabilities, it would not be appropriate to 
classify the term as a warranty either as this would only entitle the buyer to 
damages, but not to termination in case of a breach of the term. The breach of this 
term can therefore be so severe that it undermines the purpose of the contract or it 
can occur in a way that is comparatively trivial. It therefore appears suitable here to 
classify the term as an innominate term. The reason for this classification is that 
otherwise, once classified, all breaches of the term would either only entitle Rio 
Tinto (the buyer) to damages (in case of a warranty) or would always entitle the 
company to termination (in case of a condition), even in case of trivial breaches. 
Given the diversity of the principles which are covered by the contractual term in 
question, it is preferable to have the flexibility which is offered by innominate terms. 
For example, Rio Tinto’s principles on bribery in its code are strict: ‘Rio Tinto 
prohibits bribery and corruption in all forms, whether direct or indirect.’815 Pursuant to 
s7 of the Bribery Act 2010, Rio Tinto as a commercial organisation could be guilty of 
the offence of failing to prevent bribery by a person associated with it.816 The 
associated person can be an employee, agent, subsidiary or supplier.817 Pursuant to 
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s11 (3) of the Act, commercial organisations, if convicted, are liable to pay a fine. 
One could therefore argue that the potential consequence of a breach of this 
principle (inter alia liability under the Bribery Act 2010) can be of such commercial 
significance that it undermines the purpose of the contract. In serious cases (where 
the buyer might face a higher fine, if convicted) the breach of the principle not to 
commit bribery could, consequently, deprive Rio Tinto of the benefit of the contract. 
Although the breach does not affect the primary object of the contract, i.e. supply 
and purchase, it can be argued that the potential liability that Rio Tinto could incur 
under the Bribery Act 2010 would justify classifying the breach as repudiatory in 
serious cases of bribery. Damages would then not be an appropriate remedy. In that 
case, the breach of the innominate term in Rio Tinto’s terms and conditions could 
provide the buyer with the right to repudiation. However, it is likely that not every 
case of bribery by a supplier would provide the buyer with a right to repudiation, as 
the courts consider each breach of an innominate term in terms of its seriousness. 
Due to this flexibility of the courts it is difficult to predict under what circumstances 
breaches will be classified as repudiatory. Among the factors that the courts take 
into account when making that decision is the losses caused by the breach. The 
higher the potential fine due to the seriousness of the bribery, the more likely it will 
be that the breach will be considered as being repudiatory. In contrast, less severe 
cases of bribery will probably only give rise to damages. 
The situation differs in terms of the other principles, for example the principle not to 
use forced or child labour.818 If the supplier is found to be in breach of this principle, 
then this human rights violation is likely to have a significant negative impact on the 
reputation of Rio Tinto. However, despite the reputational damage that the use of 
forced or child labour entails for the Western buyer, Rio Tinto would not be deprived 
of the economic benefit of the supply contract. As will be shown in the chapter on 
tort law, where Rio Tinto’s suppliers or subsidiaries commit torts (e.g. by abusing 
human rights), they will usually be liable themselves rather than Rio Tinto. Rio Tinto 
would therefore rather face reputational damage than legal liability. Consequently, 
despite the significant reputational damage that human rights abuses can entail, it is 
likely that the breach of the innominate term here would result in the remedy of 
damages. In commercial practice, it is probable that Rio Tinto would not enter into 
new supply contracts with that supplier, following such a breach. 
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A clearer example of a breach that is likely to give rise to damages only is the 
following principle: ‘forbid using inappropriate language in the workplace, including 
profanity, swearing, vulgarity or verbal abuse’.819 Notably, this principle falls under 
the same heading as the prohibition of child labour and forced labour, namely 
‘employment’ and it is only two bullet points away from these aspects. However, 
where the supplier is found to be in breach of this principle, it would not deprive the 
buyer of the economic benefit of the contract. In particular, the reputational risk vis-
à-vis the customer is likely to be limited. It would therefore not seem to be 
proportional to treat such a breach as repudiatory.  
These different examples – bribery, child/forced labour and the use of inappropriate 
language at the workplace – illustrate well the different situations which can lead to 
a breach of the term referring to CSR in Rio Tinto’s terms and conditions. It depends 
on the facts if a breach of the term ought to be treated as repudiatory or not. The 
assessment of that issue depends on the question of whether the breach deprives 
the non-breaching (i.e. here the Western buyer) of the legal benefit of the contract. 
The classification of the term as an innominate term provides sufficient flexibility for 
the assessment of breaches of that contractual term. The remedies that Rio Tinto 
would obtain in case of breaches of the above examples are appropriate. However, 
the fact that serious cases of bribery by the supplier are likely to be considered to be 
repudiatory whereas the breaches of the other CSR duties are more likely to result 
in damages only suggests that legal liability (here through the Bribery Act 2010) in 
the home states of Western buyers enhances the position of CSR in supply 
contracts. The duty pertaining to bribery is, consequently, worded in a firm and 
verifiable manner. 
Unilever, too, refers to its code of conduct in its terms and conditions: 
 13. Business Partner Code 
Each Supplier and the Lead Supplier acknowledges that it has reviewed Unilever’s 
Business Partner Code (the “Code”) and agrees that all of their activities shall be 
conducted in accordance with the code…The Code can be accessed at the internet 
address: www….
820
 
As with Rio Tinto, the code is not incorporated, it is a reference document. It is 
therefore a point of reference to determine whether or not the supplier is in breach of 
its contractual commitment, i.e. the term in section 13 of Unilever’s terms and 
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conditions. Failure to comply with the principles of Unilever’s Business Partner Code 
(‘shall be conducted in accordance with the code’) may therefore give right to a 
repudiatory breach depending on the classification of the term. The breach of the 
code is again a point of reference when determining what remedy the buyer 
procures. Unilver’s code of conduct is to be read in conjunction with its supporting 
guidelines.821 With its reference to the code of conduct the term is again difficult to 
classify as either a condition or warranty, as the code contains a diverse list of 
principles ranging from the prohibition of bribery to environmental issues. It is 
therefore preferable to classify the term here as an innominate term. The principle 
pertaining to bribery is again strict (‘There will be no payments,…’) as is the principle 
that prohibits the use of child labour (‘There shall be no use of child labour,…’). 
Based on the assessment of Rio Tinto’s terms and conditions, it can be argued that 
the situation is similar for the prohibition of bribery and the use of child labour. Whilst 
a breach of the principle not to use child labour would entail a significant reputational 
damage, Unilever would not be deprived of the economic benefit of the contract with 
their suppliers per se. In contrast, it can be argued that the situation is different in 
serious cases of bribery due to the possible fines under the Bribery Act 2010. A 
breach of this principle could therefore be seen as undermining the purpose of the 
contract and hence give right to repudiation. However, the court will assess every 
case of bribery on its facts in order to determine whether or not it is repudiatory. It is 
therefore probably that less severe cases of bribery will give rise to damages only. 
The situation is again different in terms of the environment as the relevant principle 
is rather openly phrased (‘Operations will be carried out with care for the 
environment and will include compliance with all relevant legislation in the country 
concerned’). As environmental standards in the developing world are often rather 
weak the reference to the local law does not necessarily entail any duties for the 
supplier that he must adhere to. The phrase ‘care for the environment’ is rather 
indefinite which means that the principle is relatively easy to fulfil. This principle is 
therefore weaker than the mentioned principles on bribery and the use of child 
labour. Moreover, even if the supplier is found to be in breach with the relevant 
legislation of the country concerned, it is unlikely that this breach would deprive 
Unilever of the economic benefit of the contract. Therefore, in terms of breaches of 
the principle relating to the environment, Unilever would, if at all, only procure a right 
to damages. 
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The third company whose terms and conditions are analysed is GlaxoSmithKline. 
This company has taken a different approach. Instead of referring to its code of 
conduct, GlaxoSmithKline has expressly stipulated several CSR obligations upon 
the supplier in its terms and conditions:822 
 21. Ethical Standards and Human Rights 
21.1. Unless otherwise required or prohibited by law, Supplier warrants, to the best 
of its knowledge, that in relation to the supply of Goods or Services under the terms 
of the Agreement: 
21.1.1. it does not employ, engage or otherwise use any child labour… 
21.1.2. it does not use forced labour in any form… 
21.1.3. it provides a safe and healthy workplace, presenting no immediate hazards 
to its employees… 
21.1.8. it is respectful of its employees right to join and form independent trade 
unions and freedom of association; and 
21.1.9. it complies with the GSK Anti-Bribery and Corruption Requirements set out in 
Annex A. 
21.2. Supplier agrees that it is responsible for controlling its own supply chain and 
that it shall encourage compliance with ethical standards and human rights by any 
subsequent supplier of goods and services… 
21.3. Supplier shall ensure that it has ethical and human rights policies and an 
appropriate complaints procedure to deal with any breaches of such policies. 
 
These extracts show that GlaxoSmithKline has incorporated into its terms and 
conditions those aspects of socially responsible corporate behaviour that it requires 
from its supplier. The differentiation into several sub-points of section 21 allows 
classifying all the terms individually. The fact that the supplier ‘warrants’ does not 
anticipate any classification of all the subsequent terms as warranties as it does not 
denote the terms as ‘warranties’ and as courts are not bound by the way parties 
have classified terms.823 Several terms are strictly worded and breaches of them 
might be easy to prove. This assessment applies, for example, to the use of child 
labour and forced labour as well as the right to join or form a trade union and the 
compliance with GlaxoSmithKline’s anti-bribery requirements. Although these 
principles are firm and verifiable, they do not contain the main obligations of the 
contract which are supply and purchase. Due to the range of possible breaches of 
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these terms, it would again be preferable to treat them as innominate terms rather 
than conditions or warranties. As with Rio Tinto and Unilever, it can be argued that 
serious breaches of the principle referring to bribery would deprive GlaxoSmithKline 
of the commercial benefit of the contract due to the potential liability under the 
Bribery Act. Such breaches could therefore be seen as repudiatory. However, as 
indicated above, given the flexibility that the courts have, it is likely that less severe 
cases of bribery will rather be considered to give right to damages only. Whilst 
breaches of the term prohibiting the use of child or forced labour would entail 
significant reputational damage, they would not deprive GlaxoSmithKline of the 
commercial benefit of the contract. The company would therefore procure the right 
to damages in case of a breach of these terms. In any case, GlaxoSmithKline might 
also be able to base a termination right on its terms and conditions which it 
incorporates into the supply contracts, as a clause in the terms and conditions 
allows either party to terminate the agreement in the case that the other party is in 
breach of the agreement and does not remedy the breach within 30 days of notice 
from the other party.824 
GlaxoSmithKline’s terms and conditions confirm the previous finding that employee 
rights and anti-bribery clauses tend to be given a particularly strong position by the 
buyer as they are usually firm and verifiable. However, none of the express terms 
referring to CSR in GlaxoSmithKline’s terms and conditions establishes a principle 
about the protection of the environment. The fact that this company does not even 
refer to its third party code825 in its terms, but rather requires its suppliers to have 
their own ethical and human rights policies, makes environmental considerations 
more or less optional. They are given a much lower standing than employee rights 
and bribery and appear to be a minor consideration.  
Given the traditionally restrictive approach of the courts to granting specific 
performance, it is difficult to foresee if courts would grant this remedy in the three 
cases just analysed. It also depends on the buyer if he seeks an order of specific 
performance since the breach has already occurred by the time a remedy is sought. 
The buyer’s reputation might therefore have already been damaged which could 
make the buyer prefer a termination of the contract or damages. 
Bringing the analysis of the three companies together, it appears as if there is a 
hierarchy of CSR issues in the various documents reviewed. It is noticeable that the 
wording related to bribery is particularly strong. Bribery is therefore at the stronger 
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end of the continuum. This view is supported by the fact that GlaxoSmithKline even 
has a detailed Annex A about bribery which is referred to in the terms and 
conditions.826 It is evident that the company deals in greater detail with bribery than 
with its other CSR policies. The policies of the other companies (Rio Tinto and 
Unilever) are similarly strict regarding bribery. It is likely that the strong stance taken 
by the companies on bribery is influenced by the Bribery Act 2010 which, inter alia, 
creates under certain circumstances an offence for commercial organisations.827 
Domestic statutory provisions therefore seem to have an impact on the use of 
supply chains to promote CSR. Moreover, it can be argued that serious cases of 
bribery are repudiatory as the buyer can incur a fine for the committing of bribery by 
its suppliers. However, the buyer might only procure a right to damages in less 
severe cases of bribery, but that decision depends on the court. 
In contrast, breaches of the principles relating to the use of child labour and forced 
labour are, despite the strict wording of these clauses, unlikely to result in a right to 
repudiation. The reason for this assessment is that such breaches would not deprive 
the buyer of the purpose of the contract, regardless of the reputational damage. The 
buyer would therefore procure a right to damages in case of a breach. Still, although 
not English law, the recently introduced Californian Transparency in Supply Chains 
Act of 2010828 shows how domestic statutory requirements can influence the use of 
the supply chain to promote CSR, including UK multinational companies, in terms of 
forced labour. The Californian Act requires retail sellers and manufacturers to 
disclose their efforts to combat slavery and human trafficking and to eliminate it from 
their direct supply chains.829 The Californian Act might have an impact on some UK 
multinational companies, too, as all retail sellers and manufacturers that do business 
in California and that have annual worldwide gross receipts that exceed one 
hundred million dollars fall within the scope of the Act’s disclosure requirements.830 
Shell, for instance, has therefore published a note about its compliance with this Act 
on its website.831 This Act is another example of how domestic law can influence the 
use of the supply contracts for promoting CSR by imposing liabilities or duties for the 
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Western buyers. It is therefore noticeable that the CSR issues which are dealt with 
in the strictest manner in the supply chain contracts are addressed by domestic 
regulation.832 In comparison to the issues of bribery and forced labour, however, it is 
doubtful if the buyer procures a remedy for environmental pollution at all, given that 
the respective provisions about the environment, for example in Unilever’s code of 
conduct are rather openly worded and, in case of GlaxoSmithKline, not even 
included in an express list of CSR obligations in the company’s terms and 
conditions. The comparison between the issues of bribery, forced and child labour 
as well as environment matters indicates that there is a difference in the way these 
aspects of CSR are addressed. 
In conclusion, the buyer can procure an appropriate remedy for several violations of 
its CSR principles due to the classification of the CSR clauses as innominate terms 
which allows for flexibility based on the particularities of the case. However, the 
question of whether the buyer can procure a remedy at all depends on the question 
of how firmly and verifiably the respective CSR principle is phrased. In the examples 
analysed here the buyers are likely to procure a right to repudiation for the 
committing of bribery by their suppliers. However, the use of forced or child labour 
will only give right to damages. The situation is again different for environmental 
protection, as it will often be difficult to establish a breach of CSR principles referring 
to the environment in the first place.   
4.5 The buyer’s awareness of breaches  
Finally, the Western companies (the buyers) must be sufficiently aware of breaches 
of the terms to at least consider using contract law to promote socially responsible 
behaviour among their suppliers. Entitlements to use contract law to encourage or 
require compliance with CSR obligations are useless in practice if the buyer is 
unaware of a lack of compliance. This part of the chapter will therefore analyse how 
buyers can monitor the supplier’s compliance with their CSR obligations.  
Monitoring serves two purposes: First, it signals the buyer’s commitment to CSR to 
the public and it adds legitimacy to the buyers’ efforts. Secondly, it is an attempt to 
ensure compliance of the supplier with the CSR provisions.833 Monitoring systems 
can be divided into internal and external systems.834 Internal monitoring is 
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undertaken by internal staff of the buyer or even by the staff of the supplier who 
conduct self-audits to assess their own performance. External monitoring or third 
party auditing describes the practice of using consultants external to an organisation 
to conduct the audits. The process of monitoring the supplier’s site through a visit 
can usually be broken down into a physical inspection of the supplier factory, a 
documentation inspection and interviews with workers.835  
Self-auditing still seems to be a popular tool in practice, perhaps because of the high 
number of suppliers which many Western companies have. It facilitates the auditing 
process for them and reduces the cost of monitoring. Unilever, for instance, 
operates a system where existing suppliers must complete an online questionnaire 
and renew their information annually. The system is operated by a third party 
administrator. This system is a mixture of self-auditing by the supplier with external 
review of the data by a third party. Several companies (e.g. M&S) operate a 
combination of self-audits, third party and their own audits of the supplier to assess 
supplier performance. A further tool of self-auditing applied by the companies 
reviewed for this chapter is a system of pre-contractual checks of potential suppliers. 
For instance, Vodafone and Shell operate a qualification process to identify potential 
risks. The emphasis of the regimes is on the filling in of online questionnaires and 
the providing of documents by the potential suppliers themselves, so it is 
questionable how objective the system is and if any supplier is turned away at all. 
Third party auditing by global accounting firms and non-profit organisations has 
increased in recent years, partly because self-auditing was increasingly criticised for 
not being objective enough as staff from the companies themselves conduct the 
monitoring.836 As third-party auditors are independent from the suppliers, these 
audits can be more objective than self-auditing and can help the buyer to become 
aware of breaches in his supply chain more quickly.  However, accounting firms 
which conduct such third party audits have been found to exercise their role 
inadequately due to a lack of training about how to detect instances of non-
compliance with CSR codes.837 They have also often asked the factory manager to 
select the workers for the interview instead of randomly choosing workers 
themselves in order to possibly get a wider range and more objective views. As 
multinational companies tend to develop their own CSR code of conduct, third party 
auditors have to deal with a variety of different CSR codes of conduct which makes 
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it more difficult for them to attain special knowledge about all different codes.838 A 
further criticism is the fact that these firms are instructed by the buyers and are 
therefore dependent on them as they are their clients.839 Non-profit NGOs such as 
the multi-stakeholder initiative Fair Labour Association840 are seen as more 
independent than auditing firms, but they, too, are criticised for commonly lacking 
the capacity to sufficiently monitor the suppliers, especially given the vast number of 
suppliers which are used by multinational buyers.841 These deliberations show that, 
while self-auditing is likely to be limited in its objectivity and in its reach, third party 
audits do not necessarily provide the buyer with a comprehensive picture either, as 
they have their limitations, too. 
Some of the firms reviewed for this chapter have contractually stipulated a right to 
conduct audits such as GlaxoSmithKline: 
21.4. GSK reserves the right upon reasonable notice…to enter upon Supplier’s 
premises to monitor compliance by the Supplier…
842
 
 
Unilever established a similar right in its terms and conditions: 
 13. Business Partner Code 
 …Unilever may from time to time carry out an audit…
843
 
 
These audit clauses provide the Western buyer with a right to conduct an audit 
when the company wishes to do so. 
Although the buyer has the right to audit the supplier, this system faces challenges. 
First, it is important that, if he uses third party auditors, these are skilled and 
independent in order to detect breaches of the CSR codes. The strictest CSR policy 
is essentially ineffective if it is not followed-up by a system of monitoring. The 
inconsistent manner in which companies currently monitor the CSR policies of their 
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suppliers has consequently been criticised.844 Secondly, as the supply chain is a 
private system between companies, there is also the financial factor that must be 
taken into account. Monitoring increases the transaction costs and the high number 
of suppliers used by some companies makes it difficult to put an effective and 
comprehensive monitoring system in place. Unilever, for example, has 160.000 
suppliers.845 Thirdly, a further difficulty is the lack of monitoring beyond first tier 
suppliers. As discussed above, supply chains usually go much deeper below the 
buyers and their first-tier suppliers. However, as sub-suppliers are not encompassed 
by the contract between buyer and their first-tier supplier, the Western buyer usually 
only monitors the compliance of his direct supplier. Monitoring further down the 
supply chain is also difficult to implement, given that the buyers already struggle to 
monitor the high number of their direct suppliers. All in all, despite the different 
means of monitoring the compliance of the suppliers, the system remains patchy.  
Although the buyer has means to monitor the compliance of its suppliers (and often 
even a contractual right to carry out monitoring), the monitoring system is somewhat 
restricted. Among other things, it is difficult for the buyer to monitor a high number of 
suppliers. The Western companies will therefore not always be aware of breaches of 
their CSR terms. The enforcement of contracts is limited as a regulatory strategy 
when the buyer does not know about the lack of compliance with the contract. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that CSR has become an important feature of supply chains 
in recent years. Reports about violations of the basic human rights of employees at 
production sites of the suppliers of well-known multinational companies have led to 
public pressure on Western companies to incorporate CSR policies into their supply 
chain. Due to reputational concerns, multinational companies have increasingly 
incorporated CSR codes of conduct into the supply chain contracts with their 
suppliers using three different mechanisms through which CSR becomes part of the 
contract: First, terms and conditions incorporated into the buyer’s purchase order; 
secondly, expressly negotiated contracts; and thirdly, inclusion of the CSR policy 
into the tenderer process. The signing up to the buyer’s code of conduct by the 
supplier does not make the code part of the contractual relations of the two parties, 
however. The prevalent method in practice is the incorporation of the buyer’s terms 
and conditions, which contain CSR provisions, into the contract. 
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While the buyer’s CSR policy becomes part of the contracts between buyer and 
supplier and hence creates enforceable contractual terms, it is important to note that 
contract law faces severe drawbacks in its ability to promote socially responsible 
behaviour in suppliers in the developing world. First, this situation is particularly due 
to the doctrine of privity of contract which in general confines the contractual reach 
of the supply contract to the buyer and their first-tier supplier and does not allow the 
contract to reach beyond that. The reach of these supply contracts does not expand 
to sub-suppliers. Secondly, although third parties such as the supplier’s employees 
can acquire a right to enforce contractual duties against the promisor, e.g. the right 
to join a trade union, due to the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, this 
right is regularly excluded by the buyer and supplier. This exclusion significantly 
limits the ability of contractual law to promote CSR. This situation that the parties 
can easily exclude liability to third parties reduces the ability of contract law to 
promote greater socially responsible behaviour of corporations. The intended 
beneficiaries of the CSR policies are left without a right of action and the 
enforcement is left to the companies themselves. The purpose of the Contracts 
(Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 to promote the position of third parties is therefore 
effectively contradicted. Thirdly, a further limitation of the use of supply chain 
contracts for the promotion of CSR is that it is impossible for many suppliers to 
monitor all of their suppliers and to always be aware of non-compliance in practice. 
The reason for this difficulty is that many Western buyers use a high number of 
suppliers and that the supply chain relationship is based on private arrangements 
with the intention to derive profits. The effective monitoring of compliance would 
significantly increase the transaction cost of the supply contract. The challenges 
posed by monitoring are therefore a practical limitation of the ability of supply chain 
contracts to promote CSR. Fourthly, the use of supply chain contracts as a means to 
promote CSR and the enforcement of contractual clauses that refer to CSR 
principles all depend on the Western buyers. It is their decision how they include, 
monitor and enforce CSR in their supply chain. The fact that the research for this 
chapter has not shown a single decided case about the breach of CSR terms 
reveals the economic reality of CSR. It is often just not considered as being 
important enough for companies to litigate. The promotion of CSR through supply 
chain contracts between private parties is therefore patchy as the inclusion of CSR 
into supply contracts as well as the enforcement of CSR terms is a matter of choice 
for the Western buyer, although reputational risks are an important factor to 
consider. The limitations of contract law have to be seen in the context of the 
theoretical framing of contract law, however. It is often said that it is the primary 
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function of contract law to facilitate exchange.846 English contract law is said to be 
embedded in the two principal ideologies of ‘market-individualism’ and ‘consumer-
welfarism’.847 The former of the two ideologies focusses on the holding of 
contractors to their freely agreed exchanges whereas the latter pursues a fair deal 
for contractors, in particular consumers.848 These ideologies of contract law focus on 
the rights and interests of the contractual parties, but not on the use of contract law 
to promote the socially responsible conduct of companies for the benefit of the wider 
public good.  
On the other hand, the analysis of the terms and conditions of three multinational 
companies has shown that the buyer would often be able to procure a remedy for 
breaches of CSR principles in supply contracts. The contractual terms referring to 
CSR in the buyer’s terms and conditions are classified as innominate terms which 
allows for flexibility depending on the seriousness of the breach. Among the different 
CSR principles which are incorporated into supply chain contracts, some are given 
more prominence than others. Bribery appears to be the strictest, followed by the 
use of child labour / forced labour. In the middle there are clauses about the 
conditions at the workplace (e.g. the use of inappropriate language). In contrast, 
environmental concerns have so far not resulted in binding contractual provisions. It 
is important to note in this regard that bribery is incidentally subject to the Bribery 
Act 2010 with its newly created statutory offence for commercial enterprises. It can 
be argued that severe breaches of the principles prohibiting bribery are repudiatory 
due to the potential liability that buyers can incur for the conduct of their suppliers. It 
is therefore argued here that liability in the home states of the buyers can have a 
positive impact on the promotion of CSR through supply contracts. Breaches of the 
principles about the use of forced labour and child labour will rather give right to 
damages. Nevertheless, the fact that buyers can procure a remedy for breaches of 
CSR principles in supply chain contracts at all demonstrates that, despite its 
limitations, contract law could promote CSR by making CSR codes of conduct 
contractually enforceable. This situation challenges the common understanding of 
codes of conducts as being purely voluntary. Through contract law, CSR obligations 
can be imposed on suppliers in different countries of the world, particularly in those 
countries which are known to have a weak legal system or a weak law enforcement 
mechanism. 
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Chapter 5: English consumer protection law and 
Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
5.1 The link between consumer protection law and CSR 
Consumers are increasingly a driver of CSR activities of companies.849 Surveys 
have shown that up to 90% of consumers consider corporate responsibility in their 
purchase and consumption behaviour.850 The term ‘ethical consumerism’ denotes 
the situation that consumers care about issues of CSR and are positively influenced 
by a company’s CSR engagement in their purchase and consumption behaviours.851 
Consumers’ perceptions of companies are better if they believe that companies are 
committed to CSR.852 This trend provides an incentive for companies to be socially 
responsible. Companies have responded to ethical consumerism by giving CSR an 
increasingly important role in their marketing activities.853 Brands are portrayed as 
being socially responsible.854 Many companies therefore publicise information about 
their engagement with CSR, including the codes of conduct to which they have 
signed up.855 These codes of conduct account for a significant part of the CSR 
strategy of companies as they usually contain principles of socially responsible 
behaviour with which companies pledge to comply.856 A corporate code of conduct is 
defined as a document which states a number of social and environmental 
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standards and principles that the firm which is a signatory of it is expected to fulfill.857 
Figures show a constant increase of such codes of conduct pertaining to CSR in the 
past few years.858 Consumers can view information about the CSR engagement of 
companies on most corporate websites.859 These documents often also contain 
information about the company’s adherence to a code of conduct.  
It is the purpose of this chapter to analyse to what extent English consumer law 
promotes socially responsible behaviour in corporations. Upon the basis of this legal 
analysis, the chapter also seeks to discuss how English consumer law could better 
encourage greater corporate social responsibility. The structure of the chapter 
reflects these two purposes. It will first address the question to what extent English 
consumer law currently promotes CSR. To that end, the chapter will analyse if 
breaches of CSR policies by companies are encompassed by English consumer law 
at all and, if this is the case, then examine whether consumers may procure an 
appropriate remedy in such a situation. Secondly, the chapter will address the 
question how consumer law could better promote CSR. This section will particularly 
discuss the recent recommendations of the Law Commission about consumer 
redress for misleading and aggressive practices which were published in March 
2012.860 
The rise of ethical consumerism raises the question how reliable the information is 
which companies release about their CSR record and which is targeted, inter alia, at 
their customers. By publicising information about their CSR policies, companies take 
advantage of consumer interest in CSR matters.861 Companies are using CSR as 
part of their marketing strategy to positively influence their image in the perception of 
consumers.862 In return, as there is an indication that consumers are influenced in 
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their purchase decisions by the CSR commitment of companies863, it is important 
that the material which companies release about their CSR policies is accurate. 
Consumers, as the targets of corporate CSR marketing activities, require protection 
against false information. It is against this background that consumer law could 
overlap with CSR, as it is the object of consumer law to address the inequality of 
economic power between consumers and business.864 Consumer law is not directly 
linked to CSR, as it is commonly rather associated with issues such as consumers’ 
revocation rights, for example in case of doorstep sales, or with the protection of 
consumers from the small print in business terms and conditions.865 However, 
consumer law and CSR could be linked as consumer law prohibits misleading 
actions by traders.866 False information by companies about their CSR practices 
could constitute such misleading actions. Consumer law could therefore protect 
consumers in case companies are in breach of their publicly announced CSR 
commitments, for example, if a company violates the principles of its code of 
conduct which it has published on its website and to which it pledges to adhere. 
Consumer law therefore has a potentially important role to play in relation to CSR by 
protecting consumers against false statements made by companies about their CSR 
record. 
Corporate codes of conduct have often been criticised for being purely voluntary 
which means that a code could be used by a company to publicly demonstrate its 
CSR commitment whereas, in reality, the company does not adhere to the principles 
contained in the code.867 It is therefore an important question if the publication of the 
companies’ CSR policies, and particularly the corporate codes of conduct, entails 
any consequences in consumer law if the information is found to be inaccurate.868 
So far, the rise of ethical consumerism and the link between consumers and CSR 
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has been discussed in the management literature.869 In contrast, there has only 
been very little writing in the legal literature about the role of consumer law for the 
promotion of CSR. In fact, there have only been two general overviews in English so 
far which do not even focus on English consumer law.870 This chapter seeks to fill 
this gap due to the potentially important role of consumer law for the protection of 
consumers against the publication of false information about corporate CSR 
practices.  
It is difficult to define the exact scope of consumer protection. About thirty years ago, 
in 1979, Lowe and Woodroffe stated in the preface to the first edition of their 
textbook on consumer protection law, that ‘consumer protection has no precise 
definition’.871 One could argue that the situation has become even more difficult 
since then due to various new legal sources of consumer law which are often EU 
directives.872 Consumer law is therefore ‘susceptible to neither neat nor narrow 
definition’.873 Notably, it encompasses both public law and private law.874 Its scope is 
open-ended.875 Generally speaking, consumer protection is ‘the protection, 
especially by legal means, of consumers’.876 The Consumer Protection from Unfair 
Trading Regulations 2008 which are analysed in this chapter define a consumer as 
‘any individual who in relation to a commercial practice is acting for purposes which 
are outside his business’.877 Due to the overall focus of the thesis on private law, this 
chapter seeks to analyse how the private law aspects of consumer protection law, 
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i.e. the legal rules which govern the relationship between consumers and business 
in private law, promote or could promote CSR. In terms of jurisdictional scope, the 
chapter addresses those situations where English law is applicable.  
5.2 Jurisdictional scope of the chapter 
This chapter will first establish when English courts have jurisdiction to hear the 
merits of the dispute and when English law is applicable. The consumer law issues 
addressed in this chapter are closely related to the sale of goods. Therefore, the 
private international law rules discussed for the previous chapter on supply contracts 
are relevant to some extent here, too. 
When an action based on consumer law is brought against an English company in 
English courts, the courts must apply the Brussels I Regulation in order to determine 
whether they can assume jurisdiction.878 Pursuant to Article 2 (1) of the Regulation, 
persons domiciled in a Member State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the 
courts of that Member State. English companies can therefore be sued in English 
courts by consumers for an alleged breach of consumer law.   
The question if English consumer law is applicable is governed by the Rome I 
Regulation.879 This Regulation governs the choice of law in the European Union 
pertaining to contractual obligations. The Regulation stipulates which law is to be 
used to interpret contracts with a foreign element. Article 6 (1) of the Regulation 
stipulates that consumer contracts shall be governed by the law of the country 
where the consumer has his habitual residence, provided that the entrepreneur 
pursues his commercial or professional activities in this country, too, or if the 
entrepreneur by any means, directs such activities to that country or to several 
countries including that country, and the contract falls within the scope of such 
activities. The parties may also choose the law applicable to a contract which fulfills 
the requirements of Article 6 (2) as long as the law chosen does not deprive the 
consumer of the protection offered to him by the law which would otherwise govern 
the contract pursuant to Article 6 (1). In case the conditions of Article 6 (1) are not 
satisfied, the law governing the contract is determined by Articles 3 and 4 of the 
Regulation. Pursuant to Article 3 of the Regulation, the contract shall be governed 
by the law chosen by the parties. Article 4 establishes rules for the determination of 
the applicable law in specific circumstances where the parties have not chosen a 
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law. Notably, (a) stipulates that a contract for the sale of goods shall be governed by 
the law of the country where the seller has his habitual residence. These rules mean 
that, in practice, consumer disputes involving violations of CSR by a company are 
governed by the following laws: First, where both the consumer and the trader have 
their habitual residence in England or Wales, the contract is subject to English law. 
Secondly, where the trader has his habitual residence in England or Wales, but the 
consumer habitually resides abroad, then the law of the country where the 
consumer has his/her habitual residence is applicable pursuant to Article 6 (1) if the 
trader pursues his commercial activities in that country, too, or directs his 
commercial activities to that country. 
5.3 Does English consumer law promote the socially responsible behaviour of 
companies? 
The following part analyses if English consumer law promotes CSR. It focusses on 
the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 and the law of 
misrepresentation.  
5.3.1 Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 
5.3.1.1 The scope of the Regulations 
Breaches of CSR could be covered by the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading 
Regulations 2008 (hereafter: CPRs) which implement the EU Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive 2005.880 The CPRs primarily address business-to-consumer 
transactions.881 They apply to conduct made before, during and after the contract is 
made. 
As this thesis focusses on private law, it is important to note that the recent report by 
the Law Commission on the introduction of a private remedy in English consumer 
law classifies the CPRs as public law as they only provide for public enforcement; 
and the law of misrepresentation as the private law on misleading and aggressive 
trading practices. However, both the CPRs and the law of misrepresentation will be 
analysed in this chapter with regard to the promotion of CSR through consumer law. 
There are two reasons for this approach despite the classification of the CPRs as 
public law: First, the CPRs and the law of misrepresentation (which is often also 
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called the ‘pre-existing private law’ in respect of consumer protection) extensively 
overlap. Both areas address the protection of consumers from unfair commercial 
actions by business. It would be difficult to understand the effects of one source 
without analysing the other. Secondly, and closely related to this point, is that there 
is an ongoing debate about the introduction of a private remedy in English consumer 
law which would provide consumers with a private right of action where they have 
suffered from an unfair commercial practice under the CPRs.882 Following the report 
by the Law Commission, issued in March 2012, the government now engages with 
the question of whether or not a private remedy for consumers should be 
introduced. The Law Commission recommends the introduction of a private remedy 
for consumers in a separate Act based on the CPRs to provide redress in private 
law to consumers who experience misleading and aggressive practices.883 The 
recommendation would leave the Regulations within the realm of public law as they 
would continue to be subject to public enforcement only. Even if such a private 
remedy is not introduced within the CPRs (as suggested, for example, by Consumer 
Focus), but separately, the new Act would still closely overlap with the CPRs. The 
fact that the new Act would build on and overlap with the CPRs necessitates a legal 
analysis of the CPRs, even in a thesis which focusses on private law, in order to 
understand the recommendations. In fact, the suggested unfair commercial 
practices in the new Act would mirror the CPRs. The discussion of the Law 
Commission’s proposals will therefore refer to the analysis of the CPRs in this 
section. 
5.3.1.2 Are breaches of CSR commitments by companies covered? 
The CPRs prohibit the use of ‘unfair commercial practices’ pursuant to reg 3 (1) 
CPRs. A ‘commercial practice’ is defined in reg 2 (1) CPRs as ‘any act, omission, 
course of conduct, representation or commercial communication (including 
advertising or marketing) by a trader which is directly connected with the promotion, 
sale or supply of a product to or from consumers, whether occurring before, during 
or after a commercial transaction (if any) in relation to the product’. A category of 
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unfair commercial practices is misleading actions.884 Pursuant to reg 5 (3) (b) CPRs 
a commercial practice is a misleading action if it concerns the failure by a trader to 
comply with a commitment contained in a code of conduct with which the trader has 
undertaken to comply. Reg 2 (1) of the CPRs defines ‘code of conduct’ in the 
following way: ‘an agreement or set of rules (which is not imposed by legal or 
administrative requirements), which defines the behaviour of traders who undertake 
to be bound by it in relation to one or more commercial practices or business 
sectors.’ 
In this situation, the following conditions must be satisfied: First, the trader must 
indicate in a commercial practice that he is bound by that code of conduct. 
Secondly, it is required that the commitment is firm and capable of being verified 
and not aspirational. Moreover, the commitment must cause or be likely to cause the 
average consumer to take a transactional decision he would not have taken 
otherwise, taking account of its factual context and of all its features and 
circumstances.  
5.3.1.2.1 Case study: Do breaches of the ETI Base Code constitute misleading 
actions? 
Against this background, it will now be analysed if a breach of the Ethical Trading 
Initiative (ETI) Base Code could constitute a misleading action pursuant to reg 5 (3) 
(b) of the CPRs if it were shown that a company that has adopted this code has not 
followed one or more of its clauses. The ETI is an organisation whose members are 
companies, trade unions and voluntary organisations.885 It promotes ethical trading 
and its aim is to improve working conditions in the supply chains of companies.886 
Companies that join the ETI must adopt the ETI Base Code in full.887 The ETI Base 
Code is based on the Conventions of the International Labour Organisation (ILO).888 
The ETI’s members (that have consequently signed up to the ETI Base Code) 
comprise a range of large English companies in the retail and garment industry such 
as Tesco, Next, River Island, J Sainsbury and Marks & Spencer.889 The ETI Base 
Code was chosen for the case study in this chapter, as it is an important code of 
conduct in terms of the CSR commitments of English companies due to its 
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membership which consists of firms which account for a significant part of the retail 
of food and clothes in England. Many consumers will purchase goods from one or 
more of these companies on a regular basis. Consumers are therefore commonly 
exposed to advertisement of these companies. The companies usually outline their 
CSR commitments in a specific section on their website.890 The ETI Base Code is 
therefore a suitable case study for this chapter which analyses to what extent 
English consumer law protects consumers against misleading information by 
companies about their CSR records. 
The following clauses are examples of the ETI Base Code: 
1. Employment is freely chosen 
1.1. There is no forced, bonded or involuntary prison labour. 
  
2. Freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining are 
respected 
2.1. Workers, without distinction, have the right to join or form trade unions 
of their own choosing and to bargain collectively. 
2.2. The employer adopts an open attitude towards the activities of trade 
unions and their organisational activities. 
 
4. Child labour shall not be used 
4.1. There shall be no new recruitment of child labour. 
 
6.    Working hours are not excessive 
6.2. In any event, workers shall not on a regular basis be required to 
workin excess of 48 hours per week and shall be provided with at 
least one day off for every 7 day period on average. Overtime shall 
be voluntary, shall not exceed 12 hours per week, shall not be 
demanded on a regular basis and shall always be compensated at a 
premium rate. 
 
5.3.1.2.2 Indication in a commercial practice that the company is bound by 
its code of conduct 
The first condition of reg 5 (3) (b) CPRs is that a company must indicate in a 
commercial practice that it is bound by this code. This condition consists of two 
elements: First, there must be a code of conduct in terms of regs 5 (3) (b), 2 (1) 
CPRs. Secondly, a company must have indicated in a commercial practice that it is 
bound by this code. 
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If this route of promoting CSR is to be successful, the ETI Base Code must first be a 
code of conduct pursuant to regs 5 (3) (b), 2 (1) CPRs. In reg 2 (1) CPRs a code of 
conduct is defined in the following way: 
“Code of conduct” means an agreement or set of rules (which is not imposed by 
legal or administrative requirements), which defines the behaviour of traders who 
undertake to be bound by it in relation to one or more commercial practices. 
This definition requires that it is necessary that there is an agreement or a set of 
rules which are not imposed by law, regulation or administrative provision. With its 
clauses pertaining to the working condition, the ETI Base Code contains a set of 
rules. These rules were developed by the ETI without involvement of the state. The 
companies that adopt this code must undertake to be bound by it. What is not 
included in this definition is a clarification of the question of what kinds of codes of 
conduct are encompassed by this definition, i.e. corporate codes of conduct (codes 
of conducts that companies have produced themselves, e.g. Unilever, Code of 
Business Conduct) or codes of conduct developed by third parties. The guidance on 
the CPRs, published by the OFT, does not provide further assistance with the 
question.891 The same applies to the guidance issued by the European Commission 
on the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, which underlies the CPRs.892 
Moreover, this issue has not yet been decided by a court. 
As the guidance does not discuss this issue, one could assume that the CPRs 
encompass both types of code of conduct. However, on a literal reading of the 
definition in reg 2 (1) CPRs, it is important to note the following clause: ‘which 
defines the behaviour of traders…’. The definition therefore refers to codes of 
conduct that are adopted by traders rather than just one trader which is, most of the 
time, the case if a company develops and adopts its own code of conduct. 
Moreover, the example of a breach of a commitment made in a code of conduct 
used by the OFT in its guidance on the CPRs (which is subsequently also used as 
an example by the Commission in its guidance on the Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive which were published later than the document from the OFT) refers to a 
trader who has agreed to be bound by a code of practice that promotes the 
sustainable use of woods and which requires its members not to use hardwood from 
unsustainable sources. This example also refers to members of the code in the 
plural. It is therefore assumed here that, in any case, the CPRs encompass third 
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party codes of conduct that are adopted by more than just one company. The ETI 
Base Code is such a code, as the ETI is an organisation which has several 
members. The ETI has developed the Base Code that its members must adopt. 
However, it could also be argued that the interpretation of ‘code of conduct’ is wider 
and also encompasses the codes developed by one company only, as the definition 
of ‘code owner’ only refers to ‘a trader or a body responsible for…’. It is therefore 
also possible that a code which is developed by one company satisfies the condition 
of reg 2 (1) CPRs, as this code of conduct could later on be adopted by other 
companies, too, hence ensuring that it defines the behaviour of ‘traders’. Howells 
therefore emphasises that the definition makes clear that ‘even a trader or group of 
traders may qualify’ as code owner.893 
Whilst an interpretation that also includes corporate codes of conduct is possible, 
this chapter uses the ETI Base Code as a third party code in accordance with reg 2 
(1) CPRs. Moreover, as already noted, this code is also of a significant relevance in 
commercial practice due to the number of large companies that have adopted it. 
Secondly, it is necessary that a company must have indicated in a commercial 
practice that it is bound by this code. 
 Pursuant to reg 2 (1) CPRs, commercial practice means  
any act, omission, course of conduct, representation or commercial communication 
(including advertising and marketing) by a trader, which is directly connected with 
the promotion, sale or supply of a product to or from consumers, whether occurring 
before, during or after a commercial transaction (if any) in relation to a product.   
It is therefore necessary that the company has declared that it is bound to the ETI 
Base Code in direct connection with the promotion or sale of a product to 
consumers. The example used in the OFT Guidance refers to labels and logos used 
by companies on the product.894 This condition might limit the actual scope of reg 5 
(3) CPRS, as it could be interpreted in a way that the CSR commitments of a 
company are not automatically directly linked to the promotion or sale of a product 
unless the company uses its CSR policies in its marketing policies. Although 
membership of the ETI Base Code is not placed upon products by way of a logo or 
label, it is argued here that information on a company’s website about its CSR 
commitments which is close to the online shopping facilities is closely linked to the 
promotion and the sale of products. This situation applies to the website of the 
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fashion retailer River Island in terms of its ETI membership. Upon River Island’s 
website, there is a section on Corporate Social Responsibility and the Ethical 
Trading Initiative which is very close to the online shop and therefore directly linked 
to the promotion of its goods. In the sections on CSR and the ETI, the company 
outlines its commitment to CSR and to ‘safeguarding and improving the rights and 
working conditions of workers in those factories which supply our products’.895 The 
information provided on the ETI is linked to the promotion and sale of products, as 
the website is used both to promote and to sell the clothes currently offered by River 
Island. As online shoppers do not need to undertake a lengthy search for CSR and 
ETI, it is argued here that this situation satisfies the condition of being ‘directly 
connected with the promotion, sale or supply of a product to or from consumers’. 
For example, River Island publishes the following statement on its website intended 
for public relations: 
Code of Practice: River Island is firmly committed to the adoption and integration of 
the ETI Base Code into our World Wide Ethical Policy, throughout our global supply 
chain and into our core business activities. We feel that by working with the ETI and 
its other members we will be able to draw on the wider pool of experience which 
exists in the collective organisation.
896
 
This statement can be understood as a declaration that River Island is bound by the 
ETI Base Code. The company has indicated its binding to the code in a commercial 
practice connected with the promotion of a product to consumers pursuant to reg 2 
(1) CPRs. 
5.3.1.2.3 The commitment must be firm and verifiable and not aspirational 
The second condition of reg 5 (3) (b) CPRs is that the commitment is firm and 
verifiable and not aspirational. In this respect, it is necessary to distinguish between 
the different exemplary clauses of the ETI Base Code referred to above. The 
clauses pertaining to the prohibition of forced labour897 and the right to join or to form 
trade unions of their own choosing and to bargain collectively898 are firm and 
verifiable. The same applies to the clause that no new child labour will be 
recruited.899  
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Slightly less firm than these clauses is the provision that workers shall not be 
required to work in excess of 48 hours per week due to the limitation ‘on a regular 
basis’.900 This limitation means that it is possible that workers will be required to 
work overtime as long as it keeps within the obligation that overtime shall not 
exceed 12 hours. Finally, in comparison to these clauses, the obligation on 
companies to ‘adopt an open attitude towards the activities of trade unions and their 
organisational activities’ is rather vague.901 Whilst employees are allowed to join or 
to form a trade union, there might still be significant varieties in the ways in which 
companies undertake their ‘open attitude towards the activities of trade unions’. It is 
not prescribed to what extent they actually respect the right of their employees to 
bargain collectively. It is still possible that companies formally allow their employees 
to be members of trade unions, whilst they practically exercise influence on them not 
to negotiate for significant improvements of working conditions or pay increases. A 
company that has adopted the ETI Base Code could therefore still claim to comply 
with the clauses of the code, even if it restricts the collective bargaining of its 
employees. This clause is therefore not firm. Hence, breaches of the clause 
pertaining to the actual enjoyment of the right to collective bargaining are difficult to 
verify. It is therefore unlikely that a company that has adopted the ETI Base Code 
will commit an unfair constitutional practice in accordance with the CPRs for a 
breach of this clause. 
5.3.1.2.4 The commitment must cause or be likely to cause the average 
consumer to take a transactional decision 
The final condition of reg 5 (3) (b) CPRs is that commitments in Unilever’s code of 
conduct which satisfy the first two conditions must also cause or be likely to cause 
the average consumer to take a transactional decision he would otherwise not have 
taken. The two abstract terms which require interpretation are ‘average consumer’ 
and ‘transactional decision’. The High Court has recently construed these concepts 
in Office of Fair Trading v Purely Creative Ltd.902 In this case, the Office of Fair 
Trading applied for an enforcement order in relation to the CPRs. The High Court 
held that ‘it was common ground’ that any decision with an ‘economic consequence’ 
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was a transactional decision. This broad interpretation is based on reg 2 (1) CPRs 
which stipulates that a transactional decision means any decision taken by a 
consumer, whether it is to act or to refrain from acting concerning, inter alia, 
whether, how and on what terms to purchase. Consequently, the term encompasses 
any purchase decision of a consumer which is based on the seller’s CSR record. 
With regard to the concept of an ‘average consumer’, reg 2 (1) CPRs stipulates that 
this term shall be construed in accordance with paragraphs (2) to (6) of reg 2 CPRs. 
Pursuant to s2 (2) CPRs, in determining the effect of a commercial practice on the 
average consumer, account shall be taken of the material characteristics of such an 
average consumer including his being reasonably well-informed, reasonably 
observant and circumspect.903 The paragraphs (3) to (6) are of little use in the 
context here, however, as they only further specify the concept of the average 
consumer in relation to particular groups of consumers. The decision of the High 
Court, inter alia, concerned the question how an average consumer would 
understand the mailing of promotions to consumers which suggests that they had 
won a prize when they had not or would have had to pay to receive the prize.904  In 
this respect, the court held that there is a proposition that the CPRs would protect 
consumers who take reasonable care of themselves rather than ignorant, careless 
or over-hasty consumers.905 Notably, it would not necessarily follow from this 
standard that the average consumer would read the entirety of a promotion.906 The 
High Court’s approach is said to follow the interpretation adopted by the European 
Commission.907 In its guidance on the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (which 
underlies the CPRs), the Commission interprets the ‘average consumer’ as a critical 
person who is conscious and circumspect in his or her market behaviour.908 He or 
she should inform themselves about the quality and price of products and make 
efficient choices. In its preliminary ruling in this case, the ECJ emphasised that it is 
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for the national courts to establish the typical reaction of the average consumer in a 
case.909 So, in summary, the average consumer is one who is informed, observant 
and able to take care of himself.  
Linking the concept back to the final condition of reg 5 (3) (b), the key issue here is if 
firm and verifiable commitments in the ETI Base Code would cause or are likely to 
cause the average consumer to purchase or refrain from purchasing goods from 
Unilever. Studies have shown that up to 90% of consumers consider CSR in their 
purchase and consumption behaviour910, although it is doubtful to what extent this 
consideration has an impact on the actual purchase decision of consumers.911 
However, the issue raised by reg 5 (3) (b) CPRs is not to what extent consumers 
generally make their purchase decision on the basis of the CSR engagement of 
companies. Rather the issue here is if the breach of a CSR commitment in a code of 
conduct which the company has publicly declared to adhere to has an effect on the 
purchase decision of the average consumer. One can assume that a well-informed, 
observant and circumspect consumer would expect a company to comply with the 
CSR commitments that it publicly promises. Such a consumer would be likely to 
make purchase decisions on the basis of this expectation, e.g. if the average 
consumer reads that a company in the garment industry does not employ child 
labour then an informed and observant consumer would expect the company to 
comply with this commitment.  
Further information about the question whether the breach of a code of conduct 
‘causes or is likely to cause the average consumer to take a transactional decision 
he would not have taken otherwise’ can be found in the guidance on the CPRs, 
published by the Office of Fair Trading which is the responsible body for the 
enforcement of the regulations.912 The guidance provides an example of the breach 
of a corporate code of conduct which would constitute a breach of reg 5 (3) (b) 
CPRs. This example is significant from a CSR point of view. It outlines the scenario 
of a trader who has agreed to be bound by a code of practice which promotes the 
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sustainable use of wood. The trader consequently displays the logo of this code in 
advertising campaigns.913 If this code contains a commitment by signatories of the 
code that they will not use hardwood from unsustainable sources, but the trader in 
the example here, in fact, uses hardwood from endangered rainforests he would not 
comply with the code. Consequently, he would breach reg 5 (3) (b) CPRs as the 
commitment he has failed to comply with is a firm and verifiable breach. Moreover, 
the average consumer could expect members of the code to sell products which 
comply with the code and is deemed likely to make a purchase decision on the basis 
of this expectation. The breach of the code of conduct would therefore amount to a 
misleading action which, in turn, constitutes an unfair commercial practice. If one 
applies this approach in the OFT’s guidance to the clause of the ETI Base Code 
used in this section, then consumers would expect a company that has adopted the 
ETI Base Code to comply with the firm and verifiable commitments referring to 
forced labour and child labour as well as the joining of trade unions. Consumers 
would be likely to be deemed to have made purchase decisions on the basis of this 
expectation. Consequently, the condition in reg 5 (3) (b) CPRs that the breach must 
have caused or be likely to cause a transactional decision of an average consumer 
would be satisfied if a company such as River Island that has adopted the ETI Base 
Code were found to be in breach with these commitments.  
This analysis shows that breaches of firm and verifiable commitments in the ETI 
Base Code are likely to constitute an unfair commercial practice under the CPRs as 
long as the company indicates its membership of the ETI in a way that is directly 
linked and connected with the promotion, sale or supply of a product. Unfair 
commercial practices are prohibited by reg 3 (1) CPRs. Consumer law, through the 
CPRs, therefore encompasses breaches of CSR commitments in corporate codes of 
conduct. 
5.3.1.3 Do consumers procure an appropriate remedy for unlawful commercial 
practices? 
However, these regulations only promote CSR in a meaningful way if the consumers 
procure an appropriate remedy where a company is found to have committed an 
unlawful commercial practice by breaching a CSR commitment in its code of 
conduct. 
The CPRs make certain unfair commercial practices a criminal offence (see reg 8 
and reg 9 CPRs). These entail a penalty (reg 13 CPRs). However, as this chapter 
                                                          
913
 ibid, p 33. 
179 
 
focusses on private law this legal consequence is beyond the scope of the analysis 
here. It is nevertheless important to note that breaches of corporate codes of 
conduct pursuant to reg 5 (3) (b) CPRs914 do not constitute offences pursuant to reg 
9 CPRs. On the contrary, all other misleading actions in reg 5 CPRs are 
encompassed by the scope of reg 9 CPRs. The CPRs therefore give breaches of 
corporate codes of conduct a lower level of protection than other unfair commercial 
practices.915 Breaches of corporate codes of conduct pursuant to reg 5 (3) (b) CPRs 
can, however, be enforced through injunctive civil actions.916 The responsible bodies 
for the enforcement of the regulations are the Office of Fair Trading (OFT)917 as well 
as every local weights and measures authority in Great Britain (Trading Standards 
Services).918 Notably, consumers are not given the right to enforce the CPRs. This 
enforcement regime is subject to Part 8 of the Enterprise Act 2002.919 The enforcers 
can bring proceedings for an enforcement order where a business has engaged in 
conduct that constitutes either a domestic or a European Union infringement or is 
likely to engage in conduct that constitutes a European Union infringement.920 The 
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OFT has a variety of means to enforce consumer protection legislation. In its 
statement of the enforcement principles, the OFT emphasises that formal legal 
action is a last resort.921 If the OFT applies for an enforcement order, the court may 
make an enforcement order which must indicate the nature of the conduct to which 
the order applies.922 Such an order requires the cessation of the infringement. 
Failure to comply with the Enforcement Order could be found by a court to be 
contempt of court, which could lead to a fine or imprisonment.923 
An important point in this enforcement regime of the regulations is the position of the 
consumers who are the intended beneficiaries of the Consumer Protection from 
Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 in particular and of consumer law in general. Part 8 
of the Enterprise Act 2002 which provides the enforcement mechanisms for certain 
consumer laws including the CPRs does not allow consumers to initiate injunctive 
civil actions themselves. This power is the right of the enforcement authorities, 
namely the OFT and the trading standard authorities. The civil enforcement of the 
CPRs therefore lies with public authorities. The consequence of this system is that 
injunctive civil actions cannot be brought by the consumers themselves as the 
intended beneficiaries of consumer protection law. Although public authorities have 
possibly more resources to enforce the CPRs than private individuals, it is a serious 
weakness of the CPRs that the enforcement of the provision in reg 5 (3) (b) CPRs, 
with its potential to promote CSR, is subject to the decision of public authorities to 
take action and not down to the consumers. The consumers cannot decide whether 
or not they pursue infringements of codes of conduct. This situation means that, 
where a company has committed an unfair commercial practice through breaching a 
CSR commitment in a code of conduct which it has adopted, consumers must rely 
on the OFT and trading standards in terms of enforcement. The consumers 
themselves do not procure a remedy. 
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The current enforcement regime is a severe limitation for consumers. It does not 
expose traders who have breached consumer laws to litigation by consumers. The 
intention not to open floodgates through the introduction of a private remedy has 
resulted in a situation where the CPRs are only rarely enforced. In its annual report 
2011-2012, the OFT declares that it obtained 13 undertakings and 5 court orders 
through its enforcement of consumer protection laws via its powers in the Enterprise 
Act 2002. All but one court order concerned the breach of the CPRs.924 These 
figures are not particularly high. From a CSR point of view, it can be concluded that 
whilst the CPRs encompass breaches of CSR through the prohibition of misleading 
practices, there is currently no effective enforcement regime in place. The potential 
of the CPRs to promote the socially responsible behaviour of companies, therefore, 
remains unused. 
The background to the absence of a private remedy in English law is that the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive which was implemented through the CPRs gives 
member states some choice of appropriate domestic enforcement remedies for non-
compliance in Articles 11 to 13 of the Directive.925 The Directive left it to the member 
states to decide whether or not to introduce a private remedy.926 It therefore did not 
harmonise the enforcement systems. The UK decided against such a private 
remedy for consumers when it implemented the Directive through the CPRs in 
2008.927 However, this decision has not brought the discussion to an end. The 
absence of an enforcement right for consumers has been subject to much criticism 
                                                          
924
 See the information provided by the OFT in its annual report: OFT, Annual Report 2011-12, Annexe 
A, available at: http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/annual_report/2012/annexe-A.pdf (last accessed: 
23/08/2012). 
925
 Article 11 Enforcement: ‘1. Member States shall ensure that adequate and effective means exist to 
combat unfair commercial practices in order to enforce compliance with the provisions of this Directive 
in the interest of consumers. Such means shall include legal provisions under which persons or 
organisations regarded under national law as having a legitimate interest in combating unfair 
commercial practices, including competitors, 
may: (a) take legal action against such unfair commercial practices; and/or (b) bring such unfair 
commercial practices before an administrative authority competent either to decide on complaints or to 
initiate appropriate legal proceedings. It shall be for each Member State to decide which of these 
facilities shall be available and whether to enable the courts or administrative authorities to require prior 
recourse to other established means of dealing with complaints, including those referred to in Article 
10. These facilities shall be available regardless of whether the consumers affected are in the territory 
of the Member State where the trader is located or in another Member State.’ 
926
 Directive 2005/29/EEC, The Consumer Protection From Unfair Trading Regulations 2008. The 
directive does not preclude member states from conferring a private right of redress on consumers. 
927
 The government asked the Law Commission to consider the issue of private enforcement of the 
regulations. The Law Commission concluded that the introduction of a private remedy for consumers 
could create more problems than it would solve. See: Law Commission, A private right of redress for 
unfair commercial practices? Preliminary advice to the Department of Business, Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform, (November 2008), available at: 
http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/rights_of_redress_advice1(2).pdf (last accessed: 
09/08/2012). 
182 
 
and debate.928 For example, the statutory consumer organisation Consumer Focus 
called for the introduction of a private right of redress in the CPRs for all consumers 
after the implementation of the Directive.929 In its report, Consumer Focus 
highlighted that there were only relatively few prosecutions under the current regime 
despite a large number of violations of the CPRs.930 In a study of the extent of unfair 
commercial practices, 64 per cent of the respondents said that they had fallen victim 
to an unfair commercial practice within the past 24 months.931 Consumer Focus 
therefore argued that there was an enforcement gap of the existing public 
enforcement system.932 This situation would justify providing consumers with a 
private remedy. The consumer organisation concluded that enforcement would be 
more effective if public authorities and consumers ‘worked in tandem’ using both 
private and public enforcement sanctions against misleading and aggressive trade 
practices.933 It would be a distinct advantage of a private remedy that the consumer 
who is the victim of the misleading information of a company obtains a right of 
redress against the trader.934 The existing private law935 would be uncertain and 
complex leading to a situation where ‘only the most competent of lawyers can offer 
satisfactory advice to consumers about their rights in the minefield of common and 
statute law’.936 Notably, the OFT supported the arguments made by Consumer 
Focus that consumers should be given a private right of redress for all breaches of 
the regulations.937 In 2010, the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) 
asked the Law Commission to conduct a review on the issue of consumer redress 
for misleading and aggressive practices. Following the publication of a consultation 
paper in April 2011938, the Law Commission published a report in March 2012 with 
suggestions about the reform of consumer redress for misleading and aggressive 
practices which is, at the time of writing, still subject to a review by the 
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government.939 This report and the recommendations which are made therein will be 
discussed in the final part of this chapter which discusses forward-looking 
suggestions about how English consumer law could better promote CSR.940 
In conclusion, the current enforcement regime of the CPRs with its absence of a 
private remedy to prosecute breaches of consumer laws is severely deficient. 
Although the CPRs encompass breaches of firm and verifiable CSR commitments in 
codes of conduct, the consumers as the intended beneficiaries of the CPRs are left 
without a right of redress against companies. They therefore do not procure an 
appropriate remedy for unlawful commercial practices. 
5.3.2 Law of misrepresentation 
Consumers could also be protected against breaches of CSR commitments by 
companies through the law of misrepresentation. The law of misrepresentation is 
sometimes referred to as the ‘pre-existing private law’941 in respect of consumer 
actions as it predates the implementation of the CPRs.942 It is a separate body of law 
which lies on the boundary of contract, tort and restitution.943 Despite this situation, 
the law of misrepresentation will be addressed in this chapter on consumer law and 
CSR. The reason for this approach is that the law of misrepresentation is said to 
cover similar ground to the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29 in the 
consumer context.944 As the law of misrepresentations covers false statements 
which have induced the party misled into entering into the contract, it could provide 
consumers with redress in the context of breaches of publicly announced CSR 
commitments. In this case the law of misrepresentation would protect consumers 
and hence serve consumer law ends. As the law of misrepresentation could be 
utilised to protect consumers, textbooks on consumer law consequently often 
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contain a section on it.945 This approach is in line with the view that the scope of 
consumer law is open-ended.946 
When the Law Commission was consulted upon the issue of the possible 
introduction of a private remedy for consumers in the process leading to the 
implementation of the CPRs, it discussed the remedies which were already available 
to consumers under the then current legal regime, including remedies based on the 
law of misrepresentation.947 This situation is mirrored in the recent consultation and 
report of the Law Commission on the matter where it again discusses the scope of 
the law of misrepresentation as legal actions in private law.948 The discussion of the 
law of misrepresentation in these documents remains somewhat general, however. 
In particular, it does not apply the law of misrepresentation to matters of CSR, 
including breaches of commitments in codes of conduct. In the discussion about the 
possible introduction of a private remedy, Consumer Focus criticised the complexity 
of the law of misrepresentation.949 It argued that there are gaps in terms of the kinds 
of statements which constitute misrepresentations, for example, statements which 
are literally true, but misleading, are not covered by the law of misrepresentation, 
whereas they are under the CPRs.950 The Law Commission is similarly critical of the 
law of misrepresentation as the private law way of providing redress to consumers 
for misleading and aggressive practices.951 In its final report it states that although 
the law of misrepresentation would, in theory, provide redress for most misleading 
trade practices where consumers suffer detriment, it would be ‘fragmented, complex 
and unclear’.952 Moreover, it would be difficult to apply in a consumer context as it 
primarily evolved to deal with business disputes.953 
This section will apply the law of misrepresentation to CSR. It will analyse whether 
the law of misrepresentation encompasses breaches of corporate CSR 
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commitments in codes of conduct and, if it does, if consumers procure an 
appropriate remedy. 
5.3.2.1 Are breaches of CSR commitments by companies covered? 
Following the case study of the ETI Base Code in the previous section on the CPRs, 
the law of misrepresentation will be applied here to the same clauses of this code, 
used as an example of an important code of conduct to which many English 
companies selling consumer goods are committed.  
The clauses from the ETI Base Code used above are: 
1. Employment is freely chosen 
1.1. There is no forced, bonded or involuntary prison labour. 
  
2. Freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining are 
respected 
2.1. Workers, without distinction, have the right to join or form trade 
unions 
of their own choosing and to bargain collectively. 
2.2. The employer adopts an open attitude towards the activities of trade 
  unions and their organisational activities. 
 
4.    Child labour shall not be used 
4.1.  There shall be no new recruitment of child labour. 
 
6.    Working hours are not excessive 
6.2.  In any event, workers shall not on a regular basis be required to 
work in excess of 48 hours per week and shall be provided with at 
least one day off for every 7 day period on average. Overtime shall 
be voluntary, shall not exceed 12 hours per week, shall not be 
demanded on a regular basis and shall always be compensated at a 
premium rate. 
A misrepresentation can be defined as an unambiguous, false statement of fact or 
law which is addressed to the party misled, which is material and which also induces 
the contract.954  
5.3.2.1.1 An unambiguous, false statement of fact 
The first condition is that there is an unambiguous, false statement of existing fact or 
law.955 There is no further definition of ‘statement of fact’ in cases dealing with 
alleged misrepresentations other than that these statements are distinguished from 
the following statements which do not constitute statements of fact: statements of 
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opinion, ‘mere puffs’ and statements of intention or promises.956 Companies 
commonly communicate their CSR policies on their website, in brochures or other 
public relations material.957 The CSR communication is easily available by 
consumers. In these documents companies make statements about how they 
behave in socially responsible ways. As mentioned above, codes of conduct usually 
form a core element of the CSR policy of companies.958 These codes of conduct 
regularly contain a list of CSR commitments to which companies pledge to comply. 
It depends on the way the commitments are phrased themselves, if they are to be 
regarded as statement of facts for the purpose of the law of misrepresentation or if 
they are rather statements of intention or promises (which, even if untrue, could not 
qualify as misrepresentations). In the above examples from the ETI Base Code, the 
clauses pertaining to the prohibition of forced labour and the recruitment of new 
child labour as well as the granting of the right to join a trade union are all firm and 
verifiable statements and not just statements of intention. They therefore constitute 
statements of fact. The assessment of the principle referring to the activities of trade 
unions leads to a different outcome, however. The wording ‘open attitude to the 
activities’ is not as definite as the previous examples. A company such as River 
Island could claim that it pursues this goal even though it does exercise certain 
restrictions on these activities in practice in a perhaps more subtle way. In 
conclusion, breaches of the clause pertaining to the activities of trade unions are 
hard to verify. It would be difficult to prove that this clause was a false statement. 
This clause can therefore rather be interpreted to be a promise. 
Overall, this analysis mirrors the assessment of the same principles of the ETI Base 
Code with regard to the CPRs. If a company such as River Island was found to be in 
breach of the commitments pertaining to the use of child labour or forced labour or 
the right to join a trade union, then this breach would constitute an unambiguous, 
false statement of fact. 
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5.3.2.1.2 The representation must have been addressed to the party misled 
The second requirement of misrepresentations is that the representation must have 
been addressed to the party misled. The statement can be addressed through direct 
communication of the misrepresentation or alternatively by addressing it to a third 
party with the intention of it being passed on to the claimant.959 The CSR policies of 
the companies are publicly communicated in order to enhance the brand reputation 
vis-à-vis the companies’ (present and potential) customers, for example the section 
on the ETI on River Island’s website. This condition is satisfied whenever 
information about the companies’ CSR policies is directed to consumers.  
5.3.2.1.3 The representation must have induced the other party to enter into 
the contract 
The third condition is that the representation must have induced the other party to 
enter into the contract and possibly it must have also been a material 
misrepresentation.960 The misrepresentation does not need to be the sole 
inducement; it is sufficient to be an inducement which was actively present to the 
representee’s mind.961 It must represent a fact which would positively influence a 
reasonable person who considers entering the contract to decide positively in favour 
of so doing.962 The consumer will be unable to show that the representation induced 
the contract where the consumer was unaware of the existence of the 
representation, where he knew that the representation was untrue and where he did 
not allow the representation to affect his judgment. The latter is the case where the 
claimant regards the representation as being unimportant.963 A study has shown that 
up to 90% of consumers consider the CSR record of companies in their purchase 
and consumption behaviours.964 Although other studies have revealed that the 
actual purchase decision is only rarely based on CSR considerations965, it is proven 
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that CSR generally positively influences consumers. CSR commitments are 
therefore facts which would positively influence a reasonable person in favour of 
entering a contract which the person considers entering into anyway. It is therefore 
likely that CSR commitments are considered to be representations which have 
induced the other party into the contract. 
In conclusion, the law of misrepresentation encompasses breaches of CSR 
commitments by companies, if customers can prove that they were influenced in 
their purchase decision by the CSR commitments of a company. The important 
condition is that the CSR commitment in question must be a false statement of fact. 
As shown in the analysis of the ETI Base Code this condition is not satisfied in 
respect of all CSR principles in this code of conduct. The results in relation to the 
scope of the law of misrepresentation and the CPRs is similar, as the same CSR 
commitments were found to be encompassed by the two different legal sources. 
This finding seems to confirm the contention found in the Law Commission’s review 
that the law of misrepresentation would cover the breaches of CSR commitments in 
private law which are prohibited by the CPRs.966  
However, it is important to consider that the existence of a misrepresentation 
depends on whether the consumer has been induced to enter into a contract. 
Private law claims based on misrepresentation therefore presuppose that a contract 
was formed in the first place.967 This situation is a difference to the CPRs which only 
require that the failure to comply with a commitment in a code of conduct ‘causes or 
is likely to cause the average consumer to take a transactional decision he would 
not have taken otherwise’. Injunctions against companies for breach of the CPRs, 
following the violation of their codes of conduct, are therefore possible without a 
previously formed contract if the breach was likely to cause the average consumer 
to make a purchase decision on this basis. In contrast, misrepresentations only exist 
where a consumer has indeed purchased a good. The law of misrepresentation 
therefore does not encompass breaches of CSR to the same extent as the CPRs. 
Finally, another important point to consider with regard to claims in private law is 
that complaints should be raised with the retailer who then passes the issue up the 
chain. The reason for this situation is that the contract is not formed between the 
consumer and the company which is in breach of its CSR commitments, but 
between the consumer and the retailer. If, for instance, the consumer obtains a right 
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to rescind the contract, then the retailer will have to follow this up with the 
manufacturer.  
5.3.2.2 Do consumers procure an appropriate remedy for a misrepresentation? 
The law of misrepresentation only promotes CSR in a meaningful way if consumers 
procure an appropriate remedy where a company is found to have committed a 
misrepresentation by breaching a CSR principle in its code of conduct. It is 
necessary to distinguish which type of misrepresentation is at issue in order to 
determine the remedial consequences of the breach. A distinction is made between 
fraudulent misrepresentations968, negligent misrepresentations in common law, 
misrepresentations which are liable under section 2 (1) of the Misrepresentation Act 
1967 and innocent misrepresentations which are neither fraudulent, nor negligent.969  
5.3.2.2.1 Right to rescind the contract 
All types of misrepresentation entitle the representee to rescind the contract (i.e. 
setting aside the contract which was subject to the misrepresentation), but not all 
types of misrepresentation give rise to an action for damages.970 A 
misrepresentation renders the contract voidable.971 If a contract is voidable, the 
representee can decide either to rescind or to affirm the contract.972 The availability 
of the right to rescind the contract, upon finding a misrepresentation, is a powerful 
tool for consumers. It enables them to decide whether or not to keep the contract. 
Consumers have the right to be put back into the position they were in before 
entering into the contract under the influence of the misrepresentation, i.e. the false 
belief that a company complies with its CSR commitments, although, in fact, it does 
not adhere to these. The company, on the other hand, faces a severe consequence 
in case of such a misrepresentation, i.e. to lose its contracts with consumers who 
considered the accuracy of the company’s CSR commitments to be an important 
aspect for their purchase decision. The law of misrepresentation therefore provides 
an appropriate remedy in case of breaches of CSR commitments through the 
availability of the right to rescind the contract.973  
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5.3.2.2.2 Right to damages 
Apart from rescission the other principal remedy for misrepresentation is damages. 
A claim for damages cannot be based on contract unless the misrepresentation has 
been subsequently incorporated into the contract as a term, in which case damages 
can be claimed for breach of contract. But damages can be recovered in tort where 
the misrepresentation was made fraudulently or negligently.974 Fraud will be difficult 
to prove in respect of breaches of CSR commitments, however, as this would 
presuppose that the company has made the false statements ‘knowingly, or without 
belief in its truth, or recklessly, careless whether it be true or false’.975 Negligent 
misrepresentations are misrepresentations made without due care. They can either 
be based on common law or on the Misrepresentation Act 1967. Those which are 
based on common law require the existence of a duty of care.976 This requirement of 
a duty of care establishes an extra hurdle which a consumer must overcome who 
makes a claim for damages. Such a special relationship is not necessary for a 
misrepresentation pursuant to s2 (1) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 which 
entitles the representee to damages.977 Provided that there is no double recovery, 
the right to damages is additional to the right to rescission.978 This Act also reverses 
the burden of proof to the advantage of the consumer. Once the consumer (the 
representee) has established the existence of a false statement of fact which 
induced him into entering into the contract, the defendant (the representor) must 
prove that that he had ‘reasonable ground to believe and did believe up to the time 
the contract was made that the facts represented were true’.979 This reversal of the 
burden of proof is a considerable advantage for the representee (consumer) who 
makes a claim to be awarded damages. The final category is innocent 
misrepresentations. These are false statements which were neither made 
fraudulently nor negligently.980 Victims of innocent misrepresentations are entitled to 
rescission of the contract, but they have no right to damages.981 However, the court 
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has discretion under s2 (2) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 to award damages in 
lieu of rescission in this instance. 
Damages compensate the consumer for the financial loss he has suffered.982 It is 
necessary to distinguish between the different types of misrepresentation in order to 
consider the entitlement of a consumer to damages.983 With regard to the 
Misrepresentation Act 1967 as the most likely base for such a claim, the measure of 
damages is the reliance measure.984 The claimant is put into the same position he 
would have been in had the misrepresentation not been made as he relied upon the 
truth of the statement. It is, however, doubtful if there are many instances where 
consumers would need to claim damages in order to be restored to their original 
position if they have been the victim of a misrepresentation. In most cases where a 
consumer has purchased a product from a company, he would be able to claim back 
the money he paid for the good as a consequence of the rescission. The return of 
the purchase price will commonly put the consumer back into his original position. 
For instance, where a consumer purchases a product from River Island because of 
River Island’s commitment not to use forced labour, he would be able to claim back 
the purchase price through rescission if River Island were to be found to be in 
breach of this commitment. The return of the purchase price would put the 
consumer back into the position he was in prior to the purchase of the good from 
River Island. 
However, a hypothetical situation where a consumer would not be fully restored to 
his original position through rescission is where the consumer incurred further 
expenses when purchasing a good from a company which he believes to have a 
positive CSR record due to the information released by that company. In this 
example, further expenses might be incurred if the product from this particular 
company is not available in the city where the consumer lives, but only further away 
and if the consumer then travels to that place for making the purchase. This 
situation might occur in respect of the garment industry in case of expensive high-
end clothes which have a smaller customer base and are therefore not sold as 
widely as cheaper competitors. It is unlikely that this situation would occur in relation 
to goods produced by a company such as Unilever as these are mainly foods, 
refreshments, homecare or personal care, hence products used on a daily basis 
which are usually available in most supermarkets. So, if in this hypothetical example 
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a CSR-conscious consumer who lives in Sheffield deliberately choses to buy clothes 
from a particular brand which is only sold in London, then this consumer incurs 
further travel expenses. If the company which has produced the clothes and which 
proclaims to have a good CSR record is later on found to be in breach of its CSR 
commitments, then the consumer would have suffered a loss through the extra 
travel expenses which will not be recoverable by rescission.  
The fact that consumers not only procure a right to rescind the contract, but also to 
damages where they have made a loss as a consequence of the misrepresentation 
provides the consumers with an appropriate range of remedies. If they have fallen 
victim to a company which is in breach of CSR commitments that it has undertaken 
to comply with, then the consumers will be able to be restored into their position 
prior to the misrepresentation. However, in most cases, consumers will not need to 
use the right to damages in relation to the breach of CSR commitments as the 
rescission will put them back into their original position and as double recovery is not 
permitted.  
5.3.2.3 The ability of the law of misrepresentation to promote CSR 
Although this analysis has shown that the law of misrepresentation covers breaches 
of CSR commitments by corporations and also provides an appropriate remedy for 
consumers in such a situation, the ability of the law of misrepresentation to promote 
consumer protection is limited. Both Consumer Focus and the Law Commission are 
right in their criticism that the law of misrepresentation is a somewhat complicated 
way for consumers to procure a remedy for misleading practices such as breaches 
of CSR commitments by companies. The analysis in this section has shown that the 
main drawback of the law of misrepresentation is its rather abstract nature. Its 
sources can mainly be found in the common law with some codification in the 
Misrepresentation Act 1967. The law of misrepresentation is therefore less 
accessible than a designated Consumer Act in this field would be. In comparison, 
the CPRs are written in a very detailed manner and their sole purpose is to protect 
consumers. There is also guidance on the application of the CPRs with examples, 
provided by the OFT, which makes it easier both for laypeople and lawyers to 
consider their application to business to consumer transactions. The law of 
misrepresentation is therefore a less obvious legal basis for consumer claims. 
Although consumers can use the law of misrepresentations as a means to procure 
private redress, the complex nature of this legal area is likely to limit its ability to 
promote CSR meaningfully. It is therefore noticeable that the research for this 
chapter has not found a single case where a consumer has made a claim for a 
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misrepresentation based on the breach of a CSR commitment by a company. The 
absence of applicable case law in respect of breaches of CSR commitments is an 
indication that the law of misrepresentation seems to be difficult to understand and 
to apply in this area. It would be preferable for consumers if the CPRs or a new Act 
based on the CPRs would provide consumers with the private remedies which are 
currently only found in the law of misrepresentation. 
5.3.3 Business Protection from Misleading Marketing Regulations 2008 
Advertisement regulation, particularly the Business Protection from Misleading 
Marketing Regulations 2008985, also address misleading advertisement practices in 
corporate communications. These laws could also encompass the breach of a CSR 
commitment by a company with which it publicly declares to comply. However, as 
the Business Protection from Misleading Marketing Regulations 2008 apply only to 
business-to-business relationships they are not part of consumer law and hence 
beyond the scope of this chapter.  
5.4 How could English consumer law better promote CSR? 
This chapter has shown that English consumer law provides some private law 
protection for consumers through the law of misrepresentation. However, the law of 
misrepresentation is less accessible than a designated Act such as the CPRs would 
be. The situation that the CPRs only protects consumers against breaches of 
publicly made CSR commitments by companies through public enforcement is a 
serious drawback for the ability of English consumer law to promote the socially 
responsible behaviour of companies. As indicated above, there is an ongoing 
discussion about the question of whether a private remedy for consumers should be 
introduced into English consumer law. This section will discuss how English 
consumer law could better promote CSR in private law. The discussion will 
particularly engage with the recommendations which were made by the Law 
Commission in March 2012. 
5.4.1 Background to the recommendations of the Law Commission 
Calls for the introduction of a private remedy for consumers for misleading and 
aggressive practices were not just made domestically by Consumer Focus and the 
OFT, but also at the European Union level. For example, the European Parliament 
passed a resolution in January 2009 which asks member states ‘to consider the 
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necessity of giving consumers a direct right of redress in order to ensure that they 
are sufficiently protected against unfair commercial practices’.986 And in July 2010, 
the European Parliament’s Internal Market and Consumer Protection Committee 
identified a private right of redress as one of the options for improving the 
enforcement of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive.987 The Law Commission 
published preliminary advice on the issue in November 2008 before the 
implementation of the Directive into domestic English law.988 The Law Commission 
then stated that a private right of redress could be beneficial to consumers, seeing 
that Ireland had included such a private remedy in its implementation of the 
Directive.989 Nevertheless, the Law Commission was concerned that such an 
introduction could cause significant problems.990 It rather suggested improving and 
simplifying the existing law of misrepresentation. In February 2010, BIS asked the 
Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission to advise, inter alia, on the possible 
restatement and simplification of the law of misrepresentation and to reconsider the 
introduction of a private right of redress where there is clear evidence that 
consumers have suffered loss as a result of an unfair commercial practice and 
where no private remedy currently exists.991 The Law Commission then consulted on 
the introduction of a private remedy and published a consultation paper to that effect 
in April 2011.992 The respondents overwhelmingly supported the view of the Law 
Commission that reform was needed and that a private right to redress was missing 
under the existing law. The Law Commission has now published its report in March 
2012 which, at the time of writing, is under review by the government.993 At about 
the same time, the European Commission reviewed the application of the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive, as stipulated by Article 18 of the Directive. In its 
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communication and the accompanying report, published in March 2013, the 
Commission concludes that it would be inappropriate to amend the Directive as the 
enforcement experience in the Member States was still too limited.994 However, 
whilst the Commission notes that, generally, member states and stakeholders 
consider the enforcement of the Directive at national level to be ‘appropriate and 
effective’, some would be critical of the ‘lack of resources of national enforcers’, the 
‘complexity/length of enforcement procedures’ and the ‘insufficient deterrent effect of 
the penalties’.995 
In its review, the Law Commission recommends ‘targeted reform’.996 It is suggested 
that consumers should not automatically have a private right of redress because 
there has been a breach of the Regulations, but only ‘where there is a clear problem 
in the marketplace’.997 The recommendations propose the introduction of a new 
statutory right of redress for a consumer against a trader in private law for 
consumers who have suffered from misleading and aggressive trade practices. The 
new law should be simple and accessible.998 The consumer would need to show a) 
that the trader carried out a misleading or aggressive practice, b) that this was likely 
to cause the average consumer to take a decision to enter into a contract or make a 
payment they would not have taken otherwise and c) that the misleading or 
aggressive practice was a significant factor in the consumer’s own decision to enter 
into the contract or make the payment.  The definition of misleading practices in reg 
5 (2) (a) CPRs would be followed in its substance in that a commercial practice is 
misleading if it contains false information, or if it is likely to mislead the average 
consumer in its overall presentation. The average consumer is ‘reasonably well-
informed, reasonably observant and circumspect’.999 The Law Commission is of the 
opinion that the recommended new right covers substantially the same ground as 
the Misrepresentation Act 1967. Under these proposals the common law of 
misrepresentation would remain, but the proposed legislation should replace the 
provisions of the Misrepresentation Act insofar as they cover business-to-consumer 
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transactions. Under the proposals consumers would have two tiers of remedies.1000 
Tier 1 remedies would be the standard remedies and they would apply on a strict 
liability basis. The consumer would have the remedy to rescind the contract, i.e. 
both parties are released from their obligations (if any) and the consumer would get 
a refund, up to three months, provided some element of the product is either 
returned or rejected. After three months, or if the product is fully consumed, the 
consumer would be able to claim a discount on the price. The amount of money 
would be based on the price paid and would not require evidence of loss. The 
claims could be used both in civil courts and alongside enforcement action, for 
example in criminal compensation orders. Tier 2 orders would only be available 
where the consumer proves additional loss. These tier 2 orders cover indirect 
economic losses and provide damages for distress and inconvenience. The tier 2 
orders are also subject to the trader’s due diligence defence. The recommendations 
suggest that consumers should only have a claim where they have entered into a 
contract with the business in the first place.  
The new Act with the recommended changes made by the Law Commission would, 
if implemented, not replace the CPRs.1001 These would continue to govern public 
enforcement in relation to aggressive and misleading practices. The new Act, 
however, would cover the private law consequences when traders are found to act 
in ways which are found to be aggressive or misleading. This new regime would 
apply to business-to-consumers transactions only.1002 This situation would mean 
that whilst the CPRs themselves will not gain a private law dimension, they would be 
complemented by a new private law regime based on them. The Law Commission 
stated in its report that it hoped that the recommendations, including the private 
remedy, would be included in the planned Consumer Bill of Rights.1003 
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In essence, the proposals would provide consumers with a private remedy if they 
are victims of misleading trade practices. This will primarily be the right to rescission, 
but if the consumers prove additional loss they would also have a right to damages. 
5.4.2 Does the recommended liability regime encompass breaches of CSR 
commitments? 
From a CSR point of view, the important issue is if the proposed changes will 
encompass breaches by companies of their CSR commitments (as the CPRs do) 
and if the consumers will also procure an appropriate remedy in such a situation 
(which they do not under the CPRs). 
The proposed changes will establish liability of companies if the consumer can show 
the following: 
(1) The trader carried out a misleading or aggressive practice. 
 
(2) This was likely to cause the average consumer to take a decision to enter into a 
contract or make a payment they would not have taken otherwise. 
 
(3) The misleading or aggressive practice was a significant factor in the consumer’s own 
decision to enter into the contract or make the payment. 
 
First of all, breaches of the CSR commitments of a company would need to be a 
misleading practice. Under the regime of the CPRs a misleading practice is, inter 
alia, the failure of a trader to comply with a commitment contained in a code of 
conduct with which the trader has undertaken to comply, if certain further 
requirements pursuant to reg 5 (3) (b) CPRs are met.1004 The Law Commission 
proposes that the new Act would follow the substance of the definition of misleading 
practice in reg 5 (2) CPRs by stating that a commercial practice is misleading if it 
contains false information, or if it is likely to mislead the average consumer in its 
overall presentation.1005 The Law Commission opined that whilst examples may be 
useful to explain new concepts, the idea of a misleading practice was well-
established. Hence, it recommends keeping the new definition of misleading 
practices short and general. In its view, the lists of matters about which misleading 
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representations may be made should not be replicated.1006 It argues that there was 
no need to make ‘separate provision for codes of practice’.1007 So, whilst these 
deliberations of the Law Commission suggest that the new definition is unlikely 
again to contain the example of a misleading practice through breach of a 
commitment in a corporate code conduct currently found in reg 5 (3) (b) CPRs, such 
breaches would continue to be a misleading practice. A breach of a firm and 
verifiable commitment in a code of conduct is false information. However, it is 
questionable if the definition of misleading practices is indeed as well-established as 
claimed, particularly as consumers do not enjoy any private remedy under the 
CPRs. While the Law Commission is right that the list of matters in reg 5 CPRs 
makes the definition of misleading actions longer, it is doubtful whether this situation 
is necessarily negative, particularly from a CSR point of view. The examples in the 
CPRs provide guidance to both lawyers and laypeople about the instances which 
constitute misleading actions, including the breach of a commitment in a code of 
conduct. As such a breach of a commitment in a code of conduct has so far not led 
to any case law, it is, from a CSR point of view, a negative development if codes of 
conduct are no longer explicitly mentioned in the proposed new definition. There is a 
danger that consumers might not be aware that such breaches can constitute 
misleading actions. Hence, the recommended short and general definition of 
misleading actions could, in fact, make the law less accessible and reduce the 
likelihood of claims being brought for breaches of CSR commitments despite the 
Law Commission’s contention that the same kind of actions would continue to be a 
misleading action. 
The second condition of the proposed definition of misleading actions focusses on 
the impact of the misleading practice on the average consumer. It must be likely that 
the misleading action has caused the average consumer to take a decision to enter 
into a contract or make a payment they would not have taken otherwise. The term 
‘average consumer’ mirrors the requirement in the CPRs which stipulates that the 
‘average consumer’ is ‘reasonably well informed, reasonably observant and 
circumspect.’1008 The Law Commission recommends keeping this definition of an 
average consumer under the new Act.1009 Breaches of CSR commitments in codes 
of conduct must have caused this hypothetical consumer to take a decision he 
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would otherwise not have taken. This standard is an objective one.1010 In Office of 
Fair Trading v Purely Creative Ltd1011, the High Court emphasised that there is a 
proposition that the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, which underlies the 
CPRs, would protect consumers who take reasonable care of themselves.1012 As the 
Law Commission recommends basing the requirements for misleading actions 
under the new Act on the existing law in the CPRs, the example in the guidance of 
the OFT in relation to reg 5 (3) (b) CPRs regarding the breach of a commitment in a 
code of conduct would continue to apply. This example states that an average 
consumer would expect code members to sell products which comply with their 
code and that an average consumer would buy these products on that basis.1013 
Moreover, as studies have revealed that the majority of consumers consider CSR 
issues in their purchase decisions, one can assume that, as a reasonably well-
informed person, the average consumer would expect a company to comply with its 
publicised CSR commitments when deciding whether or not to purchase goods from 
that company. Breaches of codes of conduct will therefore satisfy this second 
condition under the new regime. 
The third condition of the new Act, i.e. that the misleading practice was a significant 
factor in the consumer’s own decision to enter into the contract, requires the 
consumer to prove that his individual purchase decision was significantly influenced 
by the CSR commitments publicised by that particular company. The consumer 
must be able to prove the importance he has attached to the socially responsible 
conduct of the company from which he chose to purchase the product. Consumers 
who would make a claim for rescission and/or damages in private law due to the 
breach of CSR commitments are likely to have been significantly influenced in their 
personal purchase decision by the company’s CSR record. Moreover, reg 5 (3) (b) 
CPRs stipulates that the breach of a firm and verifiable commitment has caused or 
is likely to cause the average consumer to take a transactional decision would not 
have taken otherwise. The condition under the new Act would therefore not impose 
a higher threshold. 
In conclusion, although the suggested new liability regime in private law would 
mirror the CPRs in most respects, there are some slight differences which are 
significant from a CSR point of view. First of all, as mentioned above, the 
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recommended short definition of misleading actions would be shorter than the 
current, rather detailed definition. As breaches of codes of conduct have so far not 
been adequately followed up under the CPRs, it is not to be expected that many 
lawyers, let alone consumers, know that such conduct constitutes a misleading 
action. The recommended short definition is therefore likely to reduce the chances 
that claims based on breaches of codes of conduct are brought. Secondly, whilst it 
is sufficient under the CPRs that the breach of a code of conduct ‘causes or is likely 
to cause’ the average consumer to make a purchase decision, the proposed new 
Act would require the formation of a contract in the first place for misleading 
actions.1014 This change will reduce the number of potential claims. Breaches of 
commitments made in codes of conduct will therefore not constitute misleading 
actions to the same extent as the CPRs do.  
5.4.3 Does the recommended liability regime provide an appropriate remedy? 
However, the important question in terms of the ability of this new Act to promote 
CSR through consumer law is if consumers would also procure an appropriate 
remedy for breaches of CSR commitments. The key difference to the CPRs is that 
the new Act would be subject to private enforcement. The principal right of the 
consumer to rescind the contract under this proposed regime would be a strong tool 
as a rescission puts the consumer into the position he would have been had he not 
entered into the contract. The right to rescind the contract for consumers would also 
constitute some form of deterrent for traders not to engage in misleading and 
aggressive practices. The alternative right for consumers to a discount where three 
months have lapsed or the good has been consumed appears to be reasonable, 
taking into account the interest of the company which has sold the good and the 
consumer who has had time to make his claim or who has already consumed the 
good. The division into two tiers of remedies creates a balanced system. The 
additional remedy under the second tier of remedies to damages for indirect 
economic losses, including distress and inconvenience, presupposes that the trader 
can prove that the misleading practice caused actual loss. The fact that this remedy 
is more difficult to procure does not constitute a significant disadvantage for the 
position of consumers. If the consumer has, in fact, suffered a detriment from 
purchasing a good then he should be able to obtain a right to damages under this 
system and, where he has not suffered a loss, it would be reasonable for him to 
make a claim for rescission only. The analysis above has shown that, in most cases, 
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the consumer will only have a right to rescission and not a further right to damages. 
The proposed new Act would therefore provide consumers with appropriate 
remedies in case of a breach of CSR commitments by a company. Although the new 
Act would significantly overlap with the law of misrepresentation which already 
covers such breaches of CSR commitments and provides similar remedies, the key 
difference will be that the new Act would be more accessible for laypeople and 
lawyers alike. 
It is a weakness of the recommend regime that it does not suggest the introduction 
of civil injunctions for consumers against companies for the breach of commitments 
in codes of conduct. Under the CPRs, the OFT and trading standards procure the 
right to injunctions. As discussed above, this power has so far not been used widely 
by the public authorities, however. Consumers would be able to promote CSR much 
more meaningfully, if they could enforce compliance with CSR commitments through 
civil injunctions (i.e. stopping companies from making false claims about their 
compliance with CSR commitments in codes of conduct). The advantage of such a 
remedy would be that consumers could directly take action against companies for 
false claims about their CSR record. Due to the publicity that such actions entail, 
companies could be expected to take CSR commitments more seriously.1015 
5.5 Conclusion 
Consumers are increasingly interested in the CSR record of companies. This 
development is known as ethical consumerism. Many companies have addressed 
this trend by developing their own CSR policies which they use in their marketing 
activities to positively influence their image in the perception of consumers. There is 
an indication that consumers are influenced in their purchase decisions by the CSR 
commitment of companies. Consumers therefore require protection from false 
information by companies about their compliance with their CSR commitments. It is 
against this background that consumer law overlaps with CSR, as it is the object of 
consumer law to address the inequality of economic power between consumers and 
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business and to protect consumers. The link between consumer law and CSR is that 
consumer law prohibits misleading actions by traders. False information by 
companies about their CSR practices could constitute such misleading actions. 
Hence, there is potential for consumer law to promote the socially responsible 
behaviour of corporations. 
However, this chapter argues that the way in which consumers are currently 
protected in private law against false information of companies about their CSR 
commitments is inadequate. The analysis here has shown that English consumer 
law currently only promotes CSR to a limited extent. The most obvious way of doing 
so, the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 (CPRs), are 
outside the scope of private law as they are only subject to public enforcement by 
the OFT and local trading standards. Consumers are not able to pursue private 
redress as they are left without a remedy. This situation is a missed opportunity from 
a CSR point of view, given that reg 5 (3) (b) CPRs explicitly makes the breach of a 
commitment in a code of conduct a misleading action, if some further requirements 
are satisfied. CSR is therefore explicitly brought into the scope of the CPRs. Under 
the current public enforcement regime of the CPRs the intended beneficiaries of the 
CPRs, the consumers, are neglected.  If consumers are left without a right of action, 
then it is unlikely that the law will meaningfully promote their position. Consumers 
are currently in the hands of public institutions. 
The law of misrepresentation, as private law, encompasses similar situations to the 
CPRs and therefore provides protection for consumers, but it is nevertheless a 
complex area of the law which is difficult to access. The fact that there has so far not 
been a single case for a misleading action for a breach of CSR commitments in a 
code of conduct, based on the law of misrepresentation, shows that this law does 
not sufficiently promote CSR. The recommendation made by the Law Commission 
in its report from March 2012 to introduce a private remedy as part of a new Act, 
based on the CPRs, is therefore a step into the right direction. With regard to CSR, 
the proposals would encompass the same situations as reg 5 (3) (b) CPRs, but with 
the difference that consumers would have a private remedy to enforce this new Act. 
The recommendations of the Law Commission contain proposals for appropriate 
remedies for consumers. The principal right to rescission for consumers would be a 
powerful tool for the promotion of CSR commitments. In most cases, a rescission 
will put the consumer into the position he was in before he purchased the good. 
And, if the consumer has suffered additional loss (something which will probably 
203 
 
only rarely occur in relation to the purchase of goods based on false information 
about the sellers’ CSR record), he would be able to make a claim for damages. 
However, there is a danger that the new Act will limit the number of claims brought 
for breaches of commitments made in codes of conduct. The proposed short 
definition of misleading actions would exclude the current explicit mentioning of 
breaches of codes of conduct. This proposal is a reason for concern from a CSR 
point of view, given that breaches of codes of conduct have so far not been followed 
up in practice, so consumers are unlikely to be fully aware that such behaviour 
would continue to fall under the new definition. Moreover, the fact that the new Act 
would require the formation of a contract in the first place for misleading actions is a 
further aspect that will reduce the number of potential claims. The sole fact that a 
company does not meet its CSR commitments in codes of conduct does not suffice 
for an action in consumer law. It can therefore be concluded that breaches of 
commitments made in codes of conduct will therefore not constitute misleading 
actions to the same extent under the new Act as they do under the CPRs. Moreover, 
consumers would be able to promote CSR much more meaningfully, if they could 
enforce compliance with CSR commitments through injunctions, irrespective of the 
formation of a contract. 
So, whilst the recommendations of the Law Commission about a new Act would 
improve the ability of English consumer law to promote the socially responsible 
conduct of companies, there is a danger that the potential of consumer law will not 
be fully used due to wording of the definition of ‘misleading practices’ and due to the 
requirement to form a contract in the first place. Moreover, a final limiting factor to 
consider is that, as with the supply contracts analysed in the previous chapter, the 
particular challenge for the promotion of CSR through consumer law is the conduct 
of sub-suppliers further down the supply chain. CSR commitments made by 
companies about the conduct of their sub-suppliers are usually worded in a rather 
aspirational way which will make it difficult for consumers to follow this conduct up 
through consumer law. 
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Chapter 6: English tort law and Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
 
6.1 The link between tort law and CSR 
The conduct of companies can harm people. For instance, employees might be 
injured due to poor health and safety standards at their workplace or members of 
the local community in the vicinity of factories might suffer from pollution of the 
environment. These examples would constitute violations of Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR). It is possible that actions by companies which violate CSR 
also constitute torts.1016 CSR and the law of torts overlap where tort law protects the 
interests that form part of the CSR principles such as the protection of the 
company’s employees, its consumers or the environment.1017 According to the 
definition of CSR adopted in this thesis, CSR requires companies to comply with 
their legal obligations and to pursue objects advancing the interests of all groups 
affected by their activities, including employees, consumers, suppliers, creditors and 
local communities.1018 These interests are not just economic, but also include 
environmental, human rights and ‘quality of life’ concerns. It is difficult to find a 
comprehensive definition of tort law as writers tend not to agree on an all-embracing 
definition of the law of tort.1019 The reason is that there are several different forms of 
torts such as negligence, nuisance, libel, slander, trespass, assault and battery.1020 
Therefore, Giliker and Beckwith suggest defining the law of tort as the law of civil 
wrongs. Tort law is concerned with behaviour which is legally classified as ‘wrong’ or 
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 V Harpwood, Modern Tort Law (6
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 edn, Cavendish Publishing 2005) para 1.1. 
1020
 P Giliker and S Beckwith, Tort (4
th
 edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2011) para 1-002. 
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‘tortious’ and which entitles the claimant to a remedy.1021 This chapter will focus on 
those ‘civil wrongs’ which could cover violations of CSR, for example the tort of 
negligence where a company fails to have adequate safety measures in its 
production site in place resulting in harm to its employees and the local community. 
This chapter will analyse to what extent English tort law promotes the socially 
responsible behaviour of companies. Upon the basis of this analysis, the chapter 
also seeks to discuss how English tort law could better encourage greater corporate 
social responsibility. The chapter will first establish the link between tort law and 
CSR. To that end, a case study of corporate conduct that violates CSR principles 
will be used in order to analyse if and, if so, how causes of action in tort overlap with 
CSR principles. This section will also question if tort victims procure an appropriate 
remedy for violations of CSR. The chapter will then address challenges of using tort 
law as an instrument for the promotion of CSR, for example, the existence of 
corporate group structures. 
The liability of parent companies in tort to the employees of their subsidiaries has 
recently become very topical due to the decision in Chandler v Cape plc.1022 In this 
case it was held that a parent company may be directly liable in negligence to the 
employees of its subsidiary (to whom it may owe a direct duty of care) irrespective of 
the separate legal personality of its subsidiary.1023 The decision is significant in 
terms of CSR promotion, as the use of corporate group structures poses a hurdle for 
the liability of parent companies in tort. The chapter will, therefore, discuss the 
question to what extent Chandler v Cape plc establishes principles for the future 
liability of parent companies in tort to the employees of their subsidiaries 
The accountability of corporations for violations of CSR has been on the political and 
academic agenda for a while.1024 Due to the protection that tort law offers for 
personal interests such as health and property, it has been identified as a possible 
means of promoting CSR. Private individuals could use civil claims based on tort to 
promote greater social responsibility of corporations. Consequently, there have been 
some discussions in the literature on CSR and law about the liabilities of companies 
in tort for the pollution of the environment or the treatment of employees 
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 ibid. 
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 [2012] EWCA Civ 525. 
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 There have been some comments in the literature about the case, see for example: J Fulbrook, 
‘Chandler v Cape: personal injury: liability: negligence’ [2012] Journal of Personal Injury Law C135; E 
McGaughey, ‘Donoghue v Salomon in the High Court (Case Comment)’ (2011) 4 Journal of Personal 
Injury Law 249. 
1024
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entities. 
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(particularly, as the protection of human rights is considered to be part of CSR).1025 
However, so far, the debate about corporate liabilities in tort for violations of CSR 
mainly focusses on transnational tort litigation for torts committed abroad and the 
liability of parent companies for the conduct of their subsidiaries.1026 This literature 
mainly deals with the territorial application of substantive English tort law which is, 
however, primarily, an issue of private international law and not English private 
law.1027 The potentially applicable torts for violations of CSR are often only briefly 
mentioned.1028 Hence, the focus of that literature is more on the applicability of 
English tort law in an international context than on substantive tort law itself. In 
contrast, this chapter focusses on the use of tort law as an instrument for the 
promotion of CSR by addressing both the ability of tort law to promote greater 
socially responsible conduct of companies as well as the challenges of using tort law 
to that end. 
6.2 Jurisdictional scope of the chapter 
This section will give a brief overview of the jurisdictional scope of the chapter. 
Questions about the extraterritorial application of English tort law are relevant in a 
CSR context, as many violations of CSR which involve Western companies (either 
directly or through their subsidiaries) occur in developing countries. The conduct of 
multinational companies in developing countries is a matter of concern from a CSR 
point of view due to reports about human rights abuses in factories in these 
countries such as the use of child labour and forced labour or the imposition of 
excessive working hours.1029 However, the question when English tort law is 
applicable or should be applicable is primarily a matter of private international law. 
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Apart from the overview in this section, it will therefore not be addressed in detail in 
this chapter.1030  
The first issue is when English courts have jurisdiction to hear the merits of the 
dispute. It is likely that tort victims will bring an action for tort at English courts even 
where the tort was committed abroad. English courts will be a popular choice due to 
their independence as well as the reputational damage that a proceeding in England 
entails for the English company that is sued. The court must apply the Brussels I 
Regulation in order to determine whether it can assume jurisdiction.1031 Pursuant to 
Article 2 (1) of the Brussels I Regulation No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and recognition 
of enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (‘Brussels I 
Regulation’), persons domiciled in a member state shall, whatever their nationality, 
be sued in the courts of that member state. This rule means that English companies 
could be sued for their own conduct or the conduct of their subsidiaries in other 
countries before English courts.1032  
It is a different question, however, if English tort law is applicable where the tort was 
committed abroad. Generally, the law applicable to non-contractual obligations is 
determined by the Rome II Regulation.1033 Pursuant to Article 4 (1= of the 
Regulation, the law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of a 
tort/delict shall be the law of the country in which the damage occurs, irrespective of 
the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred and irrespective of 
the country or countries in which the indirect consequences of that event occur. The 
place where the damage occurs is ‘narrowly circumscribed’.1034 This means that, 
when the tort is committed outside England and Wales, the liability is usually 
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 C Clarkson and J Hill, The Conflicts of Law (4
th
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determined by the foreign law of the place where the tort occurred, although there 
are some exceptions, for instance, for environmental damage1035.1036  
6.3 Causes of action in tort law for violations of CSR 
This section will analyse if and, if so, how causes of action in tort contribute to the 
promotion of CSR in English private law. The previous chapters on contract law and 
consumer law referred to examples of bribery, environmental pollution and CSR 
violations that occur in the employment context (use of forced and child labour, 
access to trade unions, working hours). This chapter will use a hypothetical case 
study of a company that has emitted toxic gases that resulted in harm to some of its 
employees, the local community and environmental pollution. The reason for using 
this case study is that it covers the same groups affected by corporate conduct as in 
the previous example, i.e. harm suffered by employees and the environment, whilst 
avoiding the need to analyse in detail the different issues of bribery, environmental 
pollution and the use of forced and child labour from a tort perspective. These 
scenarios would raise very different actions in tort and therefore go beyond the 
scope of this chapter. The one case study here will be used as an example for the 
promotion of CSR in tort.1037 At first sight, there is a strong overlap between CSR 
and several causes of action in tort, as torts protect personal interests such as 
health and property that are often violated where companies act in an irresponsible 
way. Health and property are protected by the torts of negligence, breach of a 
statutory duty, private and public nuisance. Moreover, other causes of action in tort 
provide redress for interference with the person. These are the torts of trespass to 
the person, i.e. battery, assault and false imprisonment.1038 Examples often referred 
to in the CSR literature where these torts can be applicable are the use of forced 
labour and child labour as well as corporal punishment at the workplace. 
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As companies are an artificial legal entity, they can only commit torts through the 
acts of their employees or agents.1039 Companies are liable in tort through vicarious 
liability which is not a tort in its own right, but a rule of responsibility.1040 Vicarious 
liability denotes the liability of a company for actions of other people.1041 Companies 
can commit torts through vicarious liability for the wrongful acts of an employee or 
agent acting during the course of his employment or scope of his authority.1042 
Company directors fall under either or both of these categories, so a company can 
be vicariously liable for their torts.1043 Vicarious liability does not mean that the 
tortfeasor (e.g. company director) is exempt from his personal liability, but it provides 
the tort victim with a choice as to whom he sues.1044 In such a situation the 
defendant will often be the employer (the company), as he usually has better 
financial means than the employee who committed the tort.1045  
6.3.1 Case study on the promotion of CSR in tort law 
As indicated, the analysis of the promotion of CSR in tort law will be based on a 
fictitious case. The scenario used here concerns a company that has breached 
health and safety standards and has consequently emitted toxic gases from its 
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factory. This emission of gases has injured some employees at the production site, 
and they have been subsequently been hospitalised. The toxic gases have also 
caused injury to the health and property (e.g. plants in the garden) of the local 
community. Moreover, the emission has generally resulted in pollution of the local 
environment. The emission of toxic gases due to a breach of health and safety 
standards is an example of irresponsible corporate conduct and therefore a suitable 
example of a breach of CSR principles. 
Insofar as the employment context is concerned, it is necessary to distinguish 
between claims of an employee based on tort and in contract, as there is a 
contractual relationship between employers and their employees through the 
employment contract. Employment contracts contain terms which impose duties 
upon the employers and the employees.1046 Moreover, there are also tortious duties 
imposed on employers, primarily in statutes and through the general duty of care in 
negligence. When an employee is injured at the workplace, then his employer faces 
concurrent liability in contract and in tort.1047 In Hagen v ICI Chemicals and Polymers 
Ltd1048 and in Lennon v Metropolitan Police Commissioner1049, it was held that 
employees are entitled to sue in contract and in tort at common law.1050 The claimant 
can therefore decide whether to sue in contract or in tort.1051 Whilst the decision of a 
claimant whether to sue in contract or tort will be influenced by the individual 
circumstances, this section analyses the liability of employers to their employees in 
tort law due to the focus of the chapter on tort law.1052  
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212 
 
6.3.1.1 The tort of negligence 
In this case study, the interests of the company’s employees and the local 
community can particularly be protected through the torts of negligence, breach of a 
statutory duty as well as private nuisance and public nuisance.1053 This section will 
only apply the example of the tort of negligence to the case study.1054 This choice is 
based on three main reasons. First, the tort of negligence provides compensation for 
harm to the interests affected in the case study here (i.e. the health of the 
employees as well as the health and the proprietary interests of the local 
community).1055 Secondly, the tort of negligence is the most widely used tort.1056 
Thirdly, although the torts of breach of a statutory duty, private nuisance and public 
nuisance could also be used in this scenario, their scope overlaps with negligence in 
terms of the interest of the claimants affected here.1057 An analysis of these torts, 
too, is therefore not necessary for the purpose of this chapter. Instead of providing 
an exhaustive study of all torts that are potentially relevant here, this chapter rather 
aims to examine the strengths and limitations of tort law in the promotion of CSR 
based on the example of the tort of negligence. Where necessary, differences 
between the tort of negligence and other torts will be pointed out.  
In short, the main conditions of claims in negligence are the following: First, there 
must be a duty of care which is owed by the defendant to the claimant; secondly, the 
defendant must have been in breach of his duty; and thirdly, there must have been a 
sufficient causal link between the tort and the harm the claimant has suffered.1058 
Fourthly, there must be damage.1059 The tort of negligence, based on a breach of a 
duty of care owed by the defendant to the claimant, was established in Donoghue v 
Stevenson.1060 Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable 
man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of 
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human affairs, would do, or doing something harmful which a prudent and 
reasonable man would not do.1061 
In terms of the first condition, a duty of care exists either where the action in 
question is covered by precedent or, otherwise, following the decision in Caparo v 
Dickman1062, where the following factors can be established: foresight, proximity and 
justice.1063 These three factors mean that the type of harm in question must have 
been reasonably foreseeable to the tortfeasor, that a relationship of proximity exists 
between the parties (such a relationship, can, for instance, be based on a 
professional relationship as in an employment situation) and that it must be fair, just 
and reasonable that the law imposes a duty of care upon a party for the benefit of 
the other (this criterion encompasses a broad range of considerations such as public 
policy implications, e.g. human rights issues). In the case on which the analysis in 
this section is based, it can be argued that harm to both the employees and the local 
community resulting from the emission of toxic gases is reasonably foreseeable for 
companies which use toxic gases in the manufacturing process and which breach 
health and safety standards. Proximity can be established here, for example, based 
on the employment relationship or the vicinity of the neighbours to the factory. 
Finally, fairness concerns justice between the parties and the legal system as a 
whole. The imposition of a duty of care on the company in the example here is fair, 
just and equitable due to the potential danger that toxic gases can pose to the 
employees and the community. Where a company keeps toxic gases, it must 
carefully follow safety standards. The consideration of public policy in this context 
overlaps with CSR, as the socially responsible conduct of companies is in the public 
interest. It is likely that CSR will increasingly influence the public policy implications 
in this respect to the extent that the concept gains importance in the public debate 
about the role of business in society. Therefore, a duty of care owed by the 
company to the employees and the local community not to expose these to toxic 
gases can be established here.   
Secondly, the claimant will only be successful in his claim, if the defendant has 
breached his duty of care. The test that is, traditionally, applied in this respect is the 
‘reasonable man’ test.1064 This test is, as far as possible, objective.1065 Different 
versions of this test have been developed by judges over the years. For instance, in 
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Blythe v Birmingham Waterworks1066 it was held that ‘negligence is the omission to 
do something harmful which a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations 
which ordinarily regulate human affairs, would do, or doing something which a 
prudent and reasonable man would not do.’ Where a profession is concerned, the 
standard expected would take into account the standards that are deemed 
reasonable for that profession.1067 In the example here, the company whose factory 
has emitted toxic gases was in breach of health and safety requirements, so its 
behaviour has clearly fallen below that to be objectively expected from the company 
in the running of its manufacturing process. A duty of care has therefore been 
breached in the example. Generally, the ‘reasonable man’ test overlaps with CSR 
principles, as irresponsible conduct by companies, for example in case of 
environmental pollution or the breach of the human rights of employees, is likely to 
fall below the objective standard of behaviour required from companies. 
Thirdly, the people who suffered from the exposure to toxic gases must establish a 
sufficient causal link between the negligent act and the harm suffered. The 
claimants must therefore prove that the negligent act of the defendant caused or 
materially contributed to the damage complained of.1068 The relationship between 
the act and the damage is usually established by the ‘but for’ test, i.e. the test is 
satisfied when the harm would not have occurred ‘but for’ the defendant’s act.1069 
The establishment of causation can be difficult where the defendant can argue that 
further factors could have caused the harm of the claimant. In the example here, it is 
therefore necessary to prove the link between the injuries suffered by the company’s 
employees as well as the members of the local community and the emission of toxic 
gases. The action will fail where the court finds that the likelihood that the injury 
would have occurred without the defendant’s negligence is higher than 50%.1070 The 
focus is therefore on the balance of probabilities. In a case that concerns the 
exposure to asbestos, Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd1071, the House of 
Lords accepted the causal link where only an increased risk of an injury could be 
proven vis-à-vis the defendant.1072 For the negligence actions of the employees and 
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members of the local community to succeed it is therefore necessary to prove the 
causal link between the injury and the breach of duty, i.e. the emission of toxic 
gases. Where the injuries are suffered immediately, it is probable that this causal 
link can be established. 
Fourthly, the damage that the claimant suffered must not be remote. Remoteness 
can be established where an intervening act breaks the ‘chain of causation’.1073 The 
test applied is if the way the harm occurred was reasonably foresseable.1074 In the 
situation here, the damage to health caused by those exposed to the toxic gases 
that emitted from the company’s factory is foreseeable. 
Finally, the claimants must have suffered harm due to the negligent act of the 
tortfeasor. Here, the employees and the members of the local community have 
sustained damage to their health and property. Both physical (bodily) harm and 
damage to property are covered by the tort of negligence.1075 
In conclusion, the tort of negligence provides a possible cause of action in tort for 
both the employees and the members of the public who have suffered injuries to 
their health and property, following the exposure to toxic gases that were emitted by 
the company in breach of health and safety requirements.  
6.3.1.2 Remedies 
In order to meaningfully promote the socially responsible conduct of companies, tort 
law would also need to provide the claimants with an appropriate remedy. In 
principle, the remedies which are relevant for the claimant are damages and 
injunctions. 
The tort victims in this case study have all suffered damages to their health and/or 
property as a result of the tort committed by the company. Tort victims primarily 
seek compensation for their injuries resulting from the wrongful act.1076 The aim of 
the award of damages is to put the claimant into the position in which he would have 
been had the harm or damage not occurred.1077 There are different kinds of 
damages which are awarded for torts. Most damages are of a compensatory nature 
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which means that the aim is to compensate the claimant for loss he has suffered.1078 
Damages which can be calculated exactly are called special damages; if the amount 
of damages cannot be assessed exactly, then they are called general damages.1079 
If tort victims have sustained personal injury, then they are able to receive damages 
in compensation for pain and suffering and loss of amenities of life.1080 They will also 
be able to recover in damages the loss of earnings and the medical expenses which 
they incur as a consequence of the physical harm.1081  
Courts may also award punitive or exemplary damages for torts.1082 If exemplary 
damages are awarded, then the courts award additional damages on top of the 
compensatory damages in order to punish the wrongdoer and also in order to deter 
others from committing similar acts. However, exemplary damages are only 
awarded in rare circumstances, as established in Rookes v Barnard1083: First, where 
servants of the government act in an oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional way; 
secondly, where the defandant’s conduct was intended to profit from the tort; thirdly, 
where a statute forming the basis of the tortious act expressly permits the payment 
of exemplary damages. In the case study underlying this chapter the only potentially 
relevant category is where the defendant intended to profit from the tort. This 
situation might be possible in cases of environmental pollution where a company 
decides to go ahead with its production which pollutes the environment in order to 
raise its profits, having calculated that the profits resulting from the act will be higher 
than the potential compensation payable in tort. The reason why exemplary 
damages are only awarded very rarely in English law is that the main object of 
damages is to put the claimant into the position in which he would have been had 
the tort not occurred. The main argument against the award of exemplary damages 
is that they would confuse the objects of the civil side (to compensate) and the 
criminal side (to punish) of law; however, the Law Commission argued that civil 
punishment, if put on a principled basis, would serve an important function.1084 
Exemplary damages are available at the moment, but they are very limited in use. 
As with most tort victims, the people suffering from the tort in the case study 
underlying this chapter will primarily seek compensation for the injuries that they 
have sustained. Tort law is able to put these people back into their original position 
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through the award of damages. They will all be compensated in tort for the harm that 
they have suffered to their health and property. Damages offer a strong attraction to 
the injured party as they compensate financially for the injury sustained.1085 
Therefore, tort law fulfils an important object of claims, namely compensation for the 
injury. In that respect, damages are an appropriate remedy for people who have 
suffered from a tort which also constitutes a violation of CSR. It is unlikely though 
that the claimants will also obtain exemplary damages. 
Tort victims can also seek to be granted an injunction against the tortfeasor to 
prevent him from committing the tort again.1086 Injunctions could be an appropriate 
remedy in the case studies analysed in this chapter. The employees and the local 
community have an interest not to be exposed to hazardous substances again 
resulting from further health and safety breaches in the future. However, the 
availability of injunctions is limited. Injunctions are an equitable remedy which is 
subject to the court’s discretion even if the claimant proves the case.1087 This 
remedy cannot be requested as of right.1088 Injunctions will not be awarded where 
damages are not appropriate or where it would not be equitable to award them.1089 
The general rule is that, pursuant to s50 of the Senior Courts Act 1981, courts may 
award damages in addition to, or in substitution for, an injunction or specific 
performance. Injunctions can be divided into mandatory injunctions which enable the 
court to order the defendant to undo or remedy the damage or prevent further 
damage from occurring and prohibitory injunctions which order the defendant not to 
continue with the wrongful act.1090 Injunctions are more likely to be awarded for the 
tort of private nuisance than in response to other torts. This remedy will only be 
refused where the nuisance is trivial.1091 The claimants in the case study would 
therefore probably need to bring an action in nuisance, if they were to be granted 
the remedy of injunction. However, in principle, it will be difficult for them to receive 
an injunction as it is an equitable remedy. 
6.4 The contribution of tort law to the promotion of CSR 
With its protection of individual interests such as the health and property of the 
employees and the local community in the case study here, the tort of negligence 
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overlaps with CSR. Generally, the interests that causes of action in tort protect 
largely overlap with the interests that CSR aims to enhance, e.g. the protection of 
private individuals from battery, assault, false imprisonment and indeed other 
causes of harm to their health and/or property. Tort law therefore provides several 
groups of people, who are, by definition, encompassed by CSR, with a remedy in 
tort for violation of their interests. Through the provision of remedies, tort law is a 
means of enforcing CSR principles. Moreover, as tort law develops incrementally, it 
can be influenced by CSR. If the idea of CSR gains wider public acceptance, for 
instance, resulting from the UK government’s endorsement of the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights, then it is possible that the criterion ‘just, 
fair and equitable’ for the imposition of a duty of care, as well as the standard 
applied to breaches of duty of care, would be further influenced by CSR 
considerations. The idea of socially responsible conduct of companies could have 
an impact on the general perception of what duties of care a company has and 
when it breaches these duties. Finally, the overlap between tort law and CSR 
provides arguments against those who argue that CSR was a purely voluntary 
concept. This case study has further shown that CSR is, at least in part, law.  
Tort law therefore already makes an important contribution to the promotion of CSR 
in a number of ways.  
Nevertheless, tort law has a number of weaknesses in its ability to promote the 
socially responsible conduct of companies. First of all, where actions are brought in 
tort (e.g. negligence), the limitation is the two-party relationship between the 
claimant and the defendant. The action in tort will only resolve the dispute between 
these two parties, but not comprehensively for the society as a whole.1092 Although 
the dispute might encompass CSR principles and, consequently, have a wider 
impact on society by making a company liable for violations of CSR, the limitation of 
using tort law for promoting CSR is, nevertheless, the case-by-case development 
which depends on private parties bringing a case to court. Tort law only develops 
incrementally. In contrast, public law regulation, for example about the environment, 
could comprehensively impose and enforce duties on companies in an area of law. 
In private law, CSR issues such as the protection of the environment are not 
necessarily comprehensively regulated in such a way.1093 
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Secondly, although the case study only looked at the tort of negligence it 
nevertheless showed obstacles that a claimant in torts needs to overcome in the 
promotion of CSR. Generally, in civil claims the claimant must prove the conditions 
of his claim which can be difficult, for example, in environmental torts it may be 
difficult to prove that the damage was caused by the defendant (e.g. by the 
defendant’s emission of gases).1094 Other reasons may have caused the damage, 
too. Thirdly, as torts are based on damage to personal interests, only parties with 
such interests can bring an action.1095 Tort actions are, by and large, aimed at 
protecting private interests.1096 On the contrary, there is no action in tort for the 
pollution of the environment per se.1097 The environment is only protected by tort law 
to the extent that the tort has violated private interests. The environment does not 
gain standing itself and will not be covered per se in the damages payable. The 
remedy will be granted to the claimant and, therefore, not to the environment. 
Consequently, in the case study used in this chapter the environmental pollution will 
only be remedied by the action in tort to the extent that personal property (e.g. land) 
of claimants was harmed, but not to the extent that the environment was generally 
polluted. There is no remedy that requires the companies which pollute the 
environment to fully remedy the negative impact their actions had on the 
environment generally, other than the damage to personal property. Tort law is 
therefore restricted in its ability to protect the environment. Fourthly, tort law is only a 
reactive tool that is brought after the tort has occurred in the first place, although it is 
acknowledged that the danger of having to pay damages in tort might also act as 
deterrent.1098 
Finally, the remedies provided in tort for violations of CSR are also limited in their 
ability to promote the socially responsible conduct of companies. Due to their 
compensatory nature, damages for violations of CSR will only be awarded where 
the claimant has suffered a health injury or damage to property in the first place. The 
claim is therefore reactive rather than preventive although it is acknowledged that 
the remedy of damages provides deterrence for potential tortfeasors.1099 The award 
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of exemplary damages could be a particular deterrent for companies not to engage 
with irresponsible activities. Whilst the primary aim of tort is to compensate the tort 
victim for the harm suffered, the promotion of CSR through tort law could be 
enhanced if companies were more frequently to face the payment of exemplary 
damages for particularly irresponsible acts such as environmental pollution. 
Similarly, whilst it is acknowledged that the payment of compensation is often of 
particular importance for the claimant who has usually suffered a loss, the criticism 
can be made from a CSR point of view that injunctions are difficult to obtain. As 
injunctions are an order on the defendant not to continue with a certain act or to 
undo the damage, they would be particularly useful for violations of CSR. For 
example, an injunction to stop an act that causes environmental pollution would 
serve the needs of the local community that suffers from the pollution as well as 
better protect the interests of the environment. The injunction could be granted in 
addition to damages. Injunctions are therefore a potentially powerful tool in response 
to violations of CSR as they directly affect the behaviour of the tortfeasor.1100 For tort 
law to be a more effective means of promoting CSR, it would be necessary to further 
develop and expand the use of injunctions as a remedy, although this remedy is an 
equitable remedy which is at the discretion of the courts. 
It can therefore be concluded that despite the undeniable overlap between causes 
of action in tort and CSR, tort law is restricted in a number of ways in its ability to 
promote greater socially responsible conduct of companies. But despite its 
limitations, tort law already makes an important contribution to the promotion of CSR 
and it could make an even better contribution if some of its weaknesses (e.g. the 
limited use of injunctions) were addressed.   
6.5 The challenge of using tort law as a means to promote CSR 
The particular challenge for using tort law as an instrument to promote greater CSR 
is often not tort law itself, but rather the access to using tort law against companies. 
The following section will therefore look at challenges for tort victims who want to 
use tort law against companies. 
6.5.1 The use of corporate group structures 
The promotion of CSR in tort faces a particular challenge through the use of 
corporate group structures. Many companies create sophisticated group structures 
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consisting of a parent company with several subsidiaries.1101 As the subsidiaries are, 
in law, separate entities, the parent company is not responsible for their liabilities, 
unless the corporate veil is pierced which happens only rarely.1102 Group structures 
therefore enable parent companies to reduce their liability risk in tort.1103 
Consequently, tort victims of a subsidiary company (e.g. the local community 
suffering from the emission of hazardous substances) might not be able to recover 
the loss from the subsidiary, particularly as, in practice, the parent company is often 
in a better financial position to compensate tort victims than some of its 
(undercapitalised) subsidiaries.1104 So, if an undercapitalised subsidiary is unable to 
cover the loss of a tort victim, the tort victim (as an involuntary creditor1105) faces the 
danger of being left with nothing.1106 
The following section will therefore review to what extent parent companies are 
liable in tort for violations of CSR principles by their subsidiaries, either directly or 
vicariously.1107 
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6.5.1.1 The primary liability of a parent company to the employees of its 
subsidiary in tort 
Parent companies could be directly liable in tort to the employees of their 
subsidiaries.1108 Whereas companies are generally vicariously liable in tort to 
members of the public for the conduct of their employees, the specific question 
underlying this section is whether a parent company can owe a direct (primary) duty 
of care to the employees of its subsidiaries for their working conditions.1109 If the 
parent company does owe such a duty of care itself, then it could be directly liable to 
the employees of its subsidiaries through the tort of negligence. This tort could, for 
example, provide a cause of action where employees of a subsidiary suffer injuries 
to their health at the factory of a subsidiary due to a breach of health and safety 
standards. If the employees could, in such a situation, gain a remedy against the 
parent company, too, then they would be in a much stronger position to recover their 
loss. The law would then recognise that parent companies are responsible for the 
conduct of their subsidiaries. As a consequence of that recognition, CSR could not 
simply be avoided by setting up (undercapitalised) subsidiaries.  
A parent company can only be directly liable in the tort of negligence, if it owes a 
direct duty of care to the employees of its subsidiaries. There are some cases where 
English courts have held that it is, in principle, possible to show that a parent 
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company owes a direct duty of care in tort to anybody injured by a subsidiary 
company in a group.1110 In Connelly v RTZ1111, an English parent company was sued 
in relation to injuries in a uranium mine operated by its Namibian subsidiary. The 
action failed as it was time-barred. However, the court held that, in principle, the 
parent company could have been under a direct duty of care to the employees of its 
subsidiary as it had taken on responsibility for devising and operating the policy for 
health and safety.1112 In Lubbe and Others v Cape plc1113, it was mentioned that a 
parent company can, in principle, owe a direct duty of care to employees of its 
subsidiaries.1114 However, the case was stayed on the basis of forum non 
conveniens as it was held that South Africa was the more appropriate forum. In a 
further case, Ngcobo and Others v Thor Chemicals1115, it was again held that it was 
arguable that a parent company may owe a duty of care to employees of its 
subsidiaries. This case was, however, ultimately settled. 
The question of whether a parent company can owe a primary duty of care in 
negligence to the employees of its subsidiary was eventually decided in the recent 
case Chandler v Cape plc.1116 Prior to this case that question had never been finally 
decided by a court as the cases were either settled or struck out for other 
reasons.1117 Chandler v Cape plc concerned the question of whether the parent 
company (Cape plc) was directly and jointly liable with its subsidiary (which had 
been dissolved in the meantime) in negligence for asbestos-related injuries inflicted 
on the subsidiary’s previous employee (the claimant). The employee had contracted 
asbestosis as a result to his exposure to asbestos. Both the parent company and 
the subsidiary were based in the UK and the conduct in question occurred in the 
UK.1118 The case is relevant in terms of CSR, as it concerns the health of an 
employee which is an issue that is addressed by CSR. 
In Chandler v Cape plc, the Court of Appeal confirmed the High Court’s decision that 
a parent company and a subsidiary could be jointly and severally liable to pay 
damages for breach of the duty of care which they owed to the subsidiary’s 
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employee.1119 The test for a duty of care (foreseeability, proximity and fair, just and 
reasonableness) was satisfied in the courts’ opinion. The duty of care was imposed 
on the parent company Cape plc on the basis of an assumption of responsibility. 
The parent company had superior knowledge of the asbestos-related risks in 
general and it could and did exercise control over the business behaviour of its 
subsidiaries. Moreover, the parent company Cape plc dictated the overall health and 
safety policy. Whilst the subsidiary kept some discretion and independence in this 
respect, the parent company had the ability to intervene in these issues. Cape plc 
could therefore foresee the dangers related to asbestos and it had due proximity to 
the employees of its subsidiary in order to establish a duty of care. The imposition of 
a duty of care on the parent company was also considered to be fair, just and 
reasonable in this situation. Whilst confirming the High Court’s decision, the Court of 
Appeal further outlined ‘appropriate circumstances’ in which ‘the law may impose on 
a parent company responsibility for the health and safety of its subsidiary’s 
employees’: 
In summary, this case demonstrates that in appropriate circumstances the law may 
impose on a parent company responsibility for the health and safety of its 
subsidiary’s employees. Those circumstances include a situation where, as in the 
present case, (1) the business of the parent and subsidiary are in a relevant respect 
the same; (2) the parent has or ought to have superior knowledge on some relevant 
aspect of health and safety in the particular industry; (3) the subsidiary’s system of 
work is unsafe as the parent company knew, or ought to have known; and (4) it is 
not necessary to show that the parent is in the practice of intervening in the health 
and safety policies of the subsidiary. The court will look at the relationship between 
the companies more widely. The court may find that element (4) is established 
where the evidence shows that the parent has a practice of intervening in the trading 
operations of the subsidiary, for example production and funding issues.
1120 
The courts emphasised that this issue was distinct from any question of piercing the 
corporate veil between a parent company and its subsidiaries which are in law 
separate legal entities.1121 So, following the decision in Chandler v Cape plc, parent 
companies can owe a duty of care to the employees of their subsidiaries. In order to 
be liable in tort, it is necessary that the parent company has breached this duty of 
care and that it has caused the harm of the claimant.1122 This decision is significant 
for the promotion of CSR, as the conduct of the defendant in this case violated the 
CSR principle to advance the interests of the employees. 
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The important question for the promotion of CSR in English tort law generally is to 
what extent this case constitutes a precedent according to which parent companies 
are now liable in tort to the employees of their subsidiaries.1123 As indicated, 
previous cases had only mentioned that a parent company could owe a duty of care, 
but never finally decided this issue.1124 Chandler v Cape plc is therefore an 
important ‘incremental step’ in establishing a duty of care owed by a parent 
company to an employee of a subsidiary.1125 
First of all, it is clear from the reasoning of the court that parent companies will, in 
similar situations, not be vicariously liable for the liabilities of their subsidiaries as the 
case did not constitute a piercing of the corporate veil. This distinction is important, 
as one might wonder if the parent company was held to be liable for the mistakes of 
its subsidiaries here. The situation here is different from the piercing of the corporate 
veil, as it is the conduct and the knowledge of the parent company itself which gives 
rise to a duty of care. The decision does therefore not affect the way courts treat the 
separate legal status of the parent company and its subsidiaries in corporate 
groups. Secondly, the Court of Appeal rejected the idea of restricting the situations 
which can give rise to a duty of care within a group of companies. The court did so 
by stating that the way in which groups of companies are run differs significantly.1126 
This approach did not limit, for future cases, the circumstances in which a parent 
company can be liable for actions of its subsidiaries. The kind of relationship 
necessary for a duty of care to arise between the parent company and an employee 
of a subsidiary is therefore difficult to predict. The court emphasised that Cape plc 
as the parent company assumed responsibility by involving itself in issues relevant 
to health and safety policy at the subsidiary. Moreover, the court referred to Cape’s 
superior knowledge about asbestos-related risks and asbestos management. This 
situation means that parent companies are potentially exposed to liability depending 
on their superior knowledge of health and safety issues and their involvement in the 
operation of the subsidiary (it is not necessary that this engagement consists of an 
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intervention in the health and safety policies of the subsidiary). Upon that basis, an 
important consequence of the court’s reasoning is that a parent company with 
superior knowledge of health and safety issues cannot avoid liability purely by not 
engaging with such matters of the subsidiary if it is or ought to be aware of 
circumstances that could create such a risk (e.g. when the parent and the subsidiary 
company are doing business in the same area) and when it gets involved in some 
aspects of the operation of the subsidiary. 
Consequently, the precedent set by Chandler v Cape plc makes the CSR principle 
of providing a safe workplace a much more important consideration for parent 
companies within corporate groups as they are not able to avoid liability in tort 
purely by setting up several subsidiaries. The possibility that parent companies can 
be primarily liable in tort for the conduct of their subsidiaries significantly enhances 
the position of CSR within companies. The decision impacts on the way parent 
companies must administer risks within their group.1127 Parent companies cannot 
easily avoid responsibility for the employees of their subsidiaries. The decision 
provides potential for English tort law to better promote the socially responsible 
conduct of companies, as tort victims can sue the parent company (which is often 
more solvent) in the tort of negligence. However, it is unlikely that the precedent set 
by Chandler v Cape plc expands to parent companies that do not get involved in the 
running of their subsidiaries at all. Moreover, it is not possible to foresee to what 
extent the decision in Chandler v Cape plc has paved the way for an increased 
liability of parent companies for the violation of CSR principles other than the health 
and safety at the workplace, for example, where the subsidiary interferes with the 
physical integrity of its employees. After all, the Court of Appeal did not establish a 
duty of care owed by the parent company to the employees of its subsidiaries purely 
on the grounds of it being the parent company. A final point is that the case has 
potential to expand the liability of English parent companies to the employees of 
their subsidiaries abroad, if the criteria of the above-mentioned test for the duty of 
care are met. However, if a court will indeed be prepared to establish a duty of care 
in such a situation is not foreseeable yet. The case is therefore a first step in the 
right direction in terms of holding parent companies accountable, but it remains to 
be seen to what extent it will promote the socially responsible conduct within a 
corporate group overall. 
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6.5.1.2 The vicarious liability of a parent company for the tort liabilities of its 
subsidiaries (piercing the corporate veil) 
The direct liability of parent companies in tort to the employees of their subsidiaries, 
discussed in the previous section, needs to be distinguished from the issue of 
whether a parent company can be vicariously liable for the tort liabilities of its 
subsidiaries through the mechanism of piercing the corporate veil. If the corporate 
veil is pierced, then the parent company would be required to cover the liabilities of 
its subsidiaries. The idea behind such a claim is that parent companies often 
establish diversified group structures with many wholly-owned subsidiaries in order 
to reduce their liability risk.1128 The ability to hold parent companies vicariously liable 
could significantly improve the ability of tort victims to obtain compensation, 
especially when subsidiary companies are undercapitalised.1129 Such vicarious 
liability of parent companies could therefore promote CSR, as parent companies 
would no longer be able to avoid their liability in tort for conduct which violates CSR 
principles through the setting up of subsidiaries, for example where their 
subsidiaries commit human rights abuses. 
In law, the subsidiaries are separate legal entities from the parent company 
following the decision in Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd.1130 The decision in Salomon 
v Salomon established that a company is a legal entity separate and distinct from its 
shareholders.1131 The members of the company are only liable for the debts of the 
company in the amount of their non-paid up share capital.1132 The legitimacy that the 
courts gave to single-man companies in the Salomon decision has been expanded 
to corporate groups.1133 The legal position is that all companies in a group of 
companies are separate legal entities, even in case of wholly-owned subsidiaries 
with only little paid-up share capital and a board of directors which predominately or 
solely consists of directors who are also directors of the parent company.1134 Parent 
companies are vicariously liable for the torts committed by their subsidiary 
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companies when the courts are prepared to ‘pierce the corporate veil’ which means 
that the separate legal personality of a company is disregarded and the 
shareholders are liable for the company.1135 The question of the separate legal 
status of subsidiary companies has undergone a mixed review in the case law. In 
DHN Food Distributors Ltd v Towler Hamlets BLC1136, the Court of Appeal treated a 
group of tightly controlled companies as an economic unit and consequently ignored 
the separate legal personality of the companies. It was held that the share 
ownership of the parent company and its influence on its subsidiaries provides an 
argument that, in reality, these companies are ‘one economic unit’.1137 This 
approach was subsequently criticised by the House of Lords in Woolfson v 
Strathclyde Regional Council1138 where the court stated that it had ‘some doubt 
whether in this respect the Court of Appeal had properly applied the principle that it 
is appropriate to pierce the corporate veil only where special circumstances exist 
indicating that it is a mere façade concealing the true facts’. The House of Lords did 
not overrule the DHN case, but distinguished it on the facts.1139 According to the 
mere façade test it is appropriate to pierce the corporate veil only where special 
circumstances exist which indicate that the company is a mere façade which 
conceals the true facts. The liability of parent companies for the conduct of their 
subsidiaries was then comprehensively reviewed by the Court of Appeal in Adams v 
Cape Industries plc.1140 The defendant, Cape Industries plc, operated a network of 
subsidiaries which were involved in asbestos mining. The Court of Appeal applied a 
strict approach to the question of piercing the corporate veil and dismissed the idea 
of a single economic unit between the parent company and its subsidiaries. This 
concept could not justify any departure from the principle that companies in a group 
of companies are separate legal entities. The court held that it is appropriate to 
pierce the corporate veil only where special circumstances exist indicating that the 
corporate veil is a mere façade concealing the true facts, i.e. where the corporate 
structure is used to evade rights of relief that third parties may in the future acquire. 
Moreover, the court held that the situations where a subsidiary can be considered to 
be the agent of a parent company (which would also enable courts to pierce the 
corporate veil) must be confined to those instances where this was factually justified. 
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The court emphasised that it would be difficult to prove an agency relationship 
where there was no express agreement.1141  
Slade LJ noted: 
There is no general principle that all companies in a group of companies are to be 
regarded as one. On the contrary, the fundamental principle is that “each company 
in a group of companies (a relatively modern concept) is a separate legal entity 
possessed of separate legal rights and liabilities”: see The Albazero [1975] 3 All ER 
21, 28.
1142
 
Moreover, Slade LJ stated that the use of the corporate group by a parent company 
as a means to ensure that legal liability and the risk of enforcement of that liability in 
respect of future activities of the group will fall on another member of that group was 
‘inherent in our corporate law’.1143 
The consequence of accepting that parent companies can use a corporate group 
structure to ensure that the liability will fall on its subsidiaries as ‘inherent’ in English 
law means that tort victims will not be able to hold parent companies vicariously 
liable for the conduct of their subsidiaries unless the subsidiary is a mere façade or 
there is an agency relationship. Parent companies can therefore usually avoid 
liability for violations of CSR by their subsidiaries. Given that the use of corporate 
group structures is now widespread, the approach by English courts to the issue of 
group liability puts tort victims as involuntary creditors at a severe disadvantage.1144 
It is difficult to justify that a solvent parent company can easily limit its potential 
liability by founding several (undercapitalised) subsidiaries. The ability of a tort victim 
of a company within such a corporate group to fully recover the loss resulting from a 
tort depends on which company of that group has committed the tort.1145 Villiers 
therefore notes that 
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the combination of limited liability with separate legal personality makes a lethal 
cocktail for victims of harmful endeavours in terms of their ability to pursue a 
company or its shareholders for compensation.
1146
 
The parent company will be shielded from any liability.1147 Instead, in case of tort 
victims, the risk is allocated to the poorer risk taker.1148 This situation appears 
particularly unsatisfactory with regard to closely held companies in a corporate 
group which are all wholly-owned by the parent company. Limited liability was 
developed in the 19th century in order to promote economic activities, particularly to 
enable investors to provide assets without the risk of incurring liabilities.1149 It can be 
argued that the reality of corporate group structures in the 21st century which are 
used to diversify risks has nothing in common with the reasons for granting limited 
liability in the first place. 
Violations of CSR by subsidiary companies within a group therefore pose a 
particular challenge for the promotion of CSR through tort law. The corporate group 
structure can ensure that parent companies, despite close factual relations with their 
subsidiaries, do not have to cover for their subsidiaries’ tort liabilities, for example, 
where the subsidiary is liable to its employees for assault, battery, false 
imprisonment or negligence. The denial of the ‘single economic unit concept’ by the 
Court of Appeal in Adams v Cape Industries plc severely restricts the ability of 
English tort law to promote CSR. The criticism can be made that this approach is 
outdated, given that in the more than twenty years which have gone since that 
decision, the use of corporate groups by parent companies has significantly been 
expanded. In fact, the widespread use of corporate groups often serves the very 
function of avoiding liability.1150  
Therefore, a case can be made that, within a group, the parent company should be 
made responsible to satisfy the tort obligations of its subsidiaries. It has been 
suggested to introduce a statutory rule that attributes liability to the parent company 
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for the negligent acts of the subsidiary on the basis of the enterprise liability 
principle.1151 This approach would provide tort victims suffering from a tortious act 
which violates CSR principles, for example, environmental pollution resulting in 
damage to property, with a much better chance of receiving damages. The parent 
company could then not simply avoid liabilities by setting up subsidiary companies 
to carry out the risky activities. This concept would be a move towards the single 
economic unit concept (also called enterprise based approach) that takes account of 
the economic realities within the corporate group.1152 The imposition of liability on 
parent companies for their subsidiaries to involuntary tort creditors can be justified 
by the argument that parent companies exercise de-facto control over their 
subsidiaries (and thereby benefit from the profits), but, currently, do not face any 
liability for the conduct of their subsidiaries.1153 Moreover, whilst, at least in theory, 
contractual creditors can contract out of limited liability by securing personal 
guarantees, tort creditors do not have the opportunity to choose who their creditors 
are going to be.1154 This argument further supports the imposition of liability on 
parent companies for torts committed by their subsidiaries. It is disappointing that 
the Company Law Review Steering Group, when discussing the Companies Act 
2006, opted against a change in the law with respect to the liabilities of the parent 
company for its subsidiaries. The Steering Group did so, even though it conceded 
that the arguments in favour of the legal status quo (allowing companies to take 
advantage of limited liability by forming subsidiaries) were less strong in terms of tort 
victims than in relation to contracts voluntarily entered into by the contractual 
partners.1155 Nevertheless, the Steering Group decided not to address the issue of 
group liability as it did not find evidence that parent companies abuse the corporate 
status in order to avoid liabilities: 
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The under-capitalisation of subsidiaries, and their operation in a way which creates 
undue risks of insolvency, are matters best dealt with by insolvency law. We do not 
therefore propose any reforms in this regard.
1156 
In the wake of the global economic and financial crisis, it has become apparent that 
this position taken by the Steering Group was based on a false assumption. The 
group accounts which a parent company must now prepare pursuant to s399 (2) CA 
2006 are a consolidated balance sheet and consolidated profit and loss account for 
the whole group.1157 They provide for some disclosure, but do not provide any help 
for the involuntary tort creditor of a subsidiary as he cannot check the accounts of a 
group of companies before he becomes their tort victim. It is therefore argued here 
that English law could better promote CSR if it abandoned its current approach to 
corporate groups, according to which parent companies are only liable for the 
liabilities of their subsidiaries in rare circumstances (e.g. where the corporate veil is 
pierced). Instead, the parent company should be liable to compensate the tort 
creditors of those subsidiaries which are unable to pay the damages. The fact that 
parent companies must prepare consolidated group accounts under the Companies 
Act 2006 already recognises the close relationship within the corporate group and 
further supports this view. 
The use of complex corporate group structures in an international context by 
Western multinational companies further complicates the issue of holding parent 
companies to account for torts committed by their subsidiaries. However, it must be 
noted that this chapter (as does the thesis overall) focusses on the ability of English 
private law to promote the socially responsible conduct of companies whenever 
English law applies. It is therefore beyond the scope of this chapter to analyse under 
what circumstances English tort law is applicable for torts committed abroad, 
particularly in countries of the developing world which often have a lower standard of 
workplace health and safety.1158 The issue of extraterritorial application of English 
tort law, particularly for human rights abuses committed either directly or through 
subsidiaries in the developing world, is an issue that cannot be addressed 
                                                          
1156
 ibid, para 10.59. See for a critical assessment of the Steering Group’s approach: P Muchlinski, 
‘Holding multinationals to account: recent developments in English litigation and the Company Law 
Review’ (2002) Company Lawyer 168, 173. 
1157
 S404 CA2006. 
1158
 The territorial reach of English tort law is of particular interest, as there are many reported 
violations of CSR principles by the subsidiaries of English companies in the developing world, for 
example, human rights abuses. See: The Guardian, ‘Apple factories accused of exploiting Chinese 
workers’, 30 April 2011, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/apr/30/apple-chinese-
factory-workers-suicides-humiliation?INTCMP=SRCH; The Independent, ‘Leading article: The 
gruesome reality of sweatshops’, 1 October 2010, available at: 
http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/leading-articles/leading-article-the-gruesome-reality-of-
sweatshops-2094318.html?origin=internalSearch (last accessed: 21/04/2013); R Locke et al., ‘Beyond 
corporate codes of conduct: Work organization and labour standards at NIKE’s suppliers’ (2007) 146 
(1-2) International Labour Review 21, 21. 
233 
 
adequately within the space available in this thesis. 1159 It would be an interesting 
topic for subsequent research. This chapter has therefore not discussed to what 
extent the decision in Chandler v Cape plc has created a way to sue English 
multinational companies for the torts committed by their overseas subsidiaries. 
6.5.2 Access to civil litigation 
Apart from the existence of corporate group structures, the other main challenge of 
using tort law as a means to promote greater corporate social responsibility is the 
access to civil litigation for claimants. This section will address two particular issues 
that restrict the access to civil litigation for tort victims, namely the availability of 
class actions and the funding of civil litigation. 
6.5.2.1 Mass torts: Class actions 
Corporate conduct that violates CSR principles may well harm more than just one 
person. For example where a company has, as in the hypothetical scenario used for 
this chapter, emitted toxic gases, it could easily harm the health of numerous 
employees as well as several members of the local community. The number of 
people who suffer injuries from coming into contact with these toxic gases could 
easily reach hundreds or more. In such a situation the use of tort law as an 
instrument of promoting greater CSR would be more effective where those tort 
victims who have been injured under similar circumstances could bring a class 
action. 
Where there are several claims related to similar issues of fact or law, civil 
procedure laws provide a system for the management of such cases called Group 
Litigation Order (GLO).1160 Pursuant to Rule 19.10 Civil Procedure Rules, a GLO 
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of the country in which the damage occurs irrespective of the country in which the event giving rise to 
the damage occurred and irrespective of the country or countries in which the indirect consequences of 
that event occur. Generally speaking, the law applicable to torts is usually the local law of the place 
where the damage occurs. See: C Clarkson and J Hill, The Conflicts of Law (4
th
 edn, OUP 2011) 265. 
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means an order made under rule 19.11 to provide for the case management of 
claims which give rise to common or related issues of fact or law (the ‘GLO issues’). 
The Senior Master and the Law Society maintain a list of GLOs.1161 There are 
several procedural requirements for GLOs. The main features of GLOs were 
summarised by Lord Walker in Autologic Holdings plc v Commissioners of Inland 
Revenue.1162 According to this summary, a GLO identifies the common issues which 
are a pre‐condition for participation in a GLO, it provides for the establishment and 
maintenance of a register of GLO claims and it gives the managing court wide 
powers of case management and issuing directions. If the group loses the case, 
each group member is liable for that member’s share of the common costs of the 
proceedings and for any individual costs specifically incurred with respect to his 
claim.1163 The GLO system has particularly been criticised for the requirement that 
claimants need to ‘opt in’, as it would prevent claimants from being part of the GLO 
and as it would reduce the overall number of GLOs.1164 The current system is 
therefore criticised for restricting access to justice, particularly in light of the few 
GLOs that have been made since the introduction of this system in the year 
2000.1165 Consequently, the Civil Justice Council1166 published a report in 2008 in 
which it recommended, inter alia, that England and Wales should introduce a 
generic collective action and adopt an opt‐out system of collective action, capable of 
awarding aggregate damages.1167 In its response to the report, the government did 
not support the introduction of a generic right of collective action.1168 It rather 
suggested that such rights should be considered for specific sectors only.1169 
Similarly, the government was of the view that the opt-out systems should only be 
                                                                                                                                                                    
continued, by or against one or more of the persons who have the same interest as representatives of 
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introduced for specific sectors rather than as a full opt-out model.1170 As part of this 
‘sector-specific’ reform, the Department for Business Innovation and Skills (BIS) 
published a consultation paper in April 2012 which, inter alia, considered the 
introduction of wider collective actions and different collective redress models in 
competition law.1171 Following the consultation, the government has now decided to 
introduce a limited opt-out collective actions regime, albeit only for competition 
law.1172 At the same time, the European Commission is currently also considering 
the area of collective redress in competition law.1173 All these developments have in 
common that the move towards amending the currently rather restricted system of 
class action so far only focusses on competition law. Changes to actions in tort by 
multiple claimants, e.g. for physical injury, are not likely to be introduced in the 
foreseeable future. This situation limits the ability of tort law to effectively promote 
CSR by providing a means of redress for groups of people who have suffered harm 
as the consequence of irresponsible corporate conduct. 
6.5.2.2 Funding of actions in tort 
With regard to the cost of litigation, civil claims in personal injury cases are often 
funded by conditional fee agreements.1174 These agreements have become popular 
since the public funding for personal injury claims had been significantly reduced 
through the Access to Justice Act 1999.1175 Under these conditional fees 
arrangements, commonly known as ‘no win-no fee’ system, the claimant’s lawyer 
will not charge any fees if his client loses the case, but may charge an uplift of up to 
100% of his normal fees from the other party if he wins.1176 This system is important 
for claimants with limited financial resources due to the restricted availability of 
public funding for civil litigation.1177 Whilst the party that has lost a case generally 
pays its own costs as well as the costs of the successful party1178, the main hurdle 
for claimants is to fund the costs of their claim in the first place. The purpose of this 
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conditional fee agreement is therefore to encourage lawyers to accept greater risks 
and hence to promote access to justice.1179 However, the government has now 
made significant changes to this system with the enactment of the Conditional Fee 
Agreements Order 2013. Under the new regulation, solicitors may still enter into a 
Conditional Fee Agreement with their clients, but the clients, if successful with their 
claim, will no longer be able to recover their solicitor’s success fee from the 
defendant.1180 If their claim is successful, they will be forced to pay their solicitor’s 
success fee (on a contingency fee basis).1181 It is to be expected that, as a 
consequence of this change, solicitors will find it less attractive to accept cases 
where the claimant cannot afford the initial cost of litigation.1182 The number of 
claims in personal injury cases for torts is therefore likely to decline. This situation is 
particularly dissatisfying, given that in personal injury cases that concern 
irresponsible conduct of companies, there is often the private individual with limited 
financial means on the one side and the company with far better financial means on 
the other side.1183 
Consequently, the access to civil litigation for tort victims is limited. The restricted 
use of class actions for tort victims through GLOs has, so far, only resulted in few 
orders being made. Moreover, following the changes to the conditional fee 
agreement system, the number of tort victims who will be able to bring a claim 
against the tortfeasor is likely to decline. The potential of tort law to promote greater 
corporate social responsibility is therefore likely not to be fully used because of the 
difficulties with accessing civil litigation for private claimants. In order to better 
promote CSR it would be necessary to expand the use of class action by providing 
an ‘opt out’ system and to overcome the financial hurdle that the initiation of civil 
litigation currently establishes. 
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6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that, despite its limitations, English tort law already makes 
an important contribution to the promotion of CSR in private law. Tort law and CSR 
overlap where tort provides causes of action for the violation of CSR principles, for 
example the health and property of some of the company’s stakeholders such as its 
employees or the local community. Tort law provides several groups that are, by 
definition, encompassed by CSR, with a remedy in tort for the violation of their 
interests (which overlap with CSR) such as the employees and the local community. 
Through the provision of legal remedies, tort law is a means of enforcing CSR 
principles. Moreover, as tort law develops incrementally, it can be influenced by 
CSR, as the idea of the socially responsible conduct of companies can increasingly 
influence the standard of breach of duty and considerations of when it is ‘fair, just 
and equitable’ to impose a duty of care. The findings of this chapter further 
challenge the view that CSR is purely ‘voluntary’.  
As tort law can therefore be used as an instrument to enforce the socially 
responsible conduct of companies, it appears, at first sight, to be a strong tool for 
the promotion of CSR. However, in fact, tort law is restricted in its ability to enhance 
greater social responsibility of corporations in a number of ways. First, despite its 
contribution to the promotion of CSR, tort law protects personal interests such as 
health and property. The right to action is limited to those persons whose property or 
other personal interests have been harmed. In consequence, the pollution of the 
environment is only addressed by tort law to the extent that natural or legal persons 
have suffered harm. The environment itself does, therefore, not receive 
compensation in tort that would require the company (the tortfeasor) to restore the 
harm done or to balance the harm by investing in environmental protection 
measurements elsewhere. This dependence on private interests severely limits the 
ability of tort law to control the pollution of the environment, which is a key aspect of 
CSR. 
Secondly, tort law is primarily reactive and compensatory. The primary objective of 
tort law remains to provide compensation for the tort victim who suffers from a civil 
wrong committed by another party.1184 Actions in tort are brought when the tort has 
already occurred and the main aim of tort is to compensate the tort victim for the 
injury sustained. Exemplary damages which could deter companies from 
irresponsible conduct are only rarely awarded. As torts are primarily compensatory 
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the interests that CSR aims to promote are only promoted to the extent that the 
claimant is compensated. The restricted use of injunctions further limits the ability of 
tort law to promote CSR, as in many situations an injunction would be an 
appropriate remedy in order to stop the company from continuing with committing 
the tort. Due to their direct impact on the behaviour of a company, the more frequent 
award of injunctions would be a powerful tool for the promotion of CSR. 
Thirdly, the ability of private parties to make use of the potential of tort law as an 
instrument to promote greater CSR is limited due to the difficulty with accessing 
justice. This situation is down to two issues: The restricted availability of class 
actions in tort and the recent changes to the funding of civil litigation. Finally, the 
particular challenge for using tort law in the context of CSR is that many companies 
operate corporate group structures in order to diversify their risk of incurring liability. 
The strict adherence to the Salomon v Salomon principle within corporate group 
structures, i.e. that each company is a separate legal entity and not liable for the 
liabilities of the other companies, does not pay sufficient regard to the fact that, in 
reality, the parent company often controls the subsidiary and uses the subsidiary as 
a tool to gain profit for the parent without the need to compensate for its losses. This 
situation is not fair for a tort victim of a subsidiary whose claim cannot be 
compensated by that subsidiary, particularly where subsidiaries are 
undercapitalised. The enforcement of CSR standards through tort law is therefore 
restricted by legal and financial hurdles. 
The recent decision in Chandler v Cape plc with its imposition of a primary duty of 
care on the parent company in specific circumstances is a first step into the right 
direction in terms of holding parent companies accountable. Following this 
precedent, tort law now has a wider reach in respect of violations of CSR principles. 
It is, however, unclear to what extent this decision will pave the way for violations of 
CSR principles other than the breach of health and safety standards at a production 
site run by a subsidiary. Moreover, the level of engagement that is required by a 
parent company in the running of the subsidiary is not clarified, thus leaving it open 
to speculation if this case is, in practice, going to enable many more successful 
lawsuits against parent companies. 
Tort law could better promote CSR, if some of its weaknesses were addressed. The 
fundamental step would be to introduce a more integrated approach to liability within 
corporate groups where parent companies could be made liable for tort liabilities of 
their subsidiaries. Moreover, injunctions and exemplary damages should be more 
frequently available, as these are particularly suitable for the promotion of CSR. 
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Finally, the access to civil litigation for tort victims must be facilitated. To that end, 
the demise of the conditional fee agreements must be reversed and the provision of 
class actions be expanded. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion - The promotion of CSR in 
English private law 
 
7.1 Introduction: Private law and CSR 
It was argued at the beginning of this thesis that, for too long, CSR has been 
captured in binary debates between a voluntary (soft law) and a mandatory (hard 
law) approach.1185 Particularly business organisations have argued and continue to 
argue that CSR is a purely voluntary concept, beyond the law1186, although, as this 
thesis has shown, law and CSR are, in fact, related in a number of ways. The 
dichotomy about voluntary or mandatory approaches to CSR is not only a superficial 
and inaccurate account of the relationship between law and CSR1187, but it has also 
restricted the developing understanding of CSR in law.1188 This thesis is based on 
the argument that the literature on CSR and the law has, so far, largely neglected 
the contribution that private law1189 makes or could make to the promotion of 
CSR.1190 The four areas of private law that were analysed in this thesis have 
demonstrated that private law plays an important role for CSR in various ways, for 
example, through director’s duties and the business review in company law, the 
incorporation of CSR standards into supply chain contracts, the liability in tort for 
violations of CSR principles and, if the recommendations of the Law Commission 
are implemented, also through a private remedy of consumers in relation to 
misleading business practices. 
Whilst it is accepted that there are limitations to the promotion of CSR in English 
private law, it is argued in this thesis that private law has made and can continue to 
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make an important contribution to the promotion of CSR and that it could make an 
even better contribution if these limitations were addressed. This chapter will follow 
the structure of this argument: It will first discuss the limitations of private law in the 
promotion of CSR and then the contribution that private law makes to the promotion 
of CSR. The chapter will then discuss future research on CSR and the law, following 
the conclusion of this thesis. Finally, the chapter will provide a list of substantive 
recommendations for changes to English law that result from the analysis. Within 
the discussion of the limitations and the strengths of private law in the promotion of 
CSR, this chapter will also address the secondary research question to what extent 
English private law could contribute to the implementation of the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights into English law.1191 The analysis of this 
question is supported by the conclusions of the substantive chapters. 
7.2 The limitations of private law in the promotion of CSR 
First of all, it must be recognised that there are deficiencies in the promotion of CSR 
in English private law. CSR could be better promoted in English private law if these 
limitations were addressed. The following part will address the limitations of private 
law under three headings: First, the continuing dominance of the shareholder value 
theory; secondly, the patchy coverage of private law; and thirdly the weaknesses of 
private law remedies. 
7.2.1 The continuing dominance of the shareholder value theory limits the 
promotion of CSR 
It is important to recognise that the contribution that private law makes or could 
make to the promotion of the CSR concept depends, to a large extent, on company 
law and corporate governance. Company law and corporate governance are the 
basis for the pursuing of objectives by companies. Within the company 
law/corporate governance framework, the company’s board of directors decides the 
direction the company takes; the aims that it pursues and how it pursues those 
aims. 
The UN Guiding Principles emphasise the role of domestic corporate laws for the 
state’s duty to protect human rights.1192 With regard to Principle 3 (b), the 
commentary highlights the importance of corporate laws for enabling business 
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respect for human rights.1193 The link between corporate laws and human rights is 
said to remain ‘poorly understood’ and there is a ‘lack of clarity in corporate and 
securities law regarding what companies and their officers are permitted, let alone 
required, to do regarding human rights’.1194 Corporate law should provide sufficient 
guidance in this respect and have sufficient regard to the role of existing governance 
structures such as corporate boards. Guidance should advise on methods such as 
human rights due diligence.1195 It was further added that communication from 
business enterprises on how they address their human rights impacts could range 
from informal engagement with affected stakeholders to formal public reporting. 
The analysis of English company law in this thesis has shown that the promotion of 
CSR is restricted by the continuing fixation of English company law and corporate 
governance with the shareholder value doctrine. The way in which a company 
internalises CSR depends on the fundamental question in whose interest the 
company is run and also on the people who make the business decisions (within the 
framework of the directors’ duties).1196 Whilst the enlightened shareholder value 
doctrine has opened up the decision-making process of directors to consider other 
factors than purely the maximisation of shareholder value through s172 (1) CA, the 
doctrine continues to ultimately equate the interest of the company with the 
maximisation of the financial interests of shareholders.1197 English company law is 
still firmly embedded in the shareholder value theory. Whilst directors are permitted 
to take stakeholder interests into account in the decision making process, they are 
not yet sufficiently required to do so. Against this background, it can be concluded 
that the criticism in the Guiding Principles that corporate laws often do not provide 
sufficient guidance in relation to the duty to protect human rights applies to English 
company law. 
Moreover, the interests of stakeholders are also subordinated under the interests of 
shareholders in the business review in s417 CA.1198 Reporting about CSR matters is 
a voluntary exercise for directors, as s417 (5) and (6) CA make it optional for 
companies to include information about environmental matters, the company’s 
employees as well as social and community issues in the business review as long 
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as the company states which of those kinds of information the business review does 
not contain. This situation conflicts with Principle 3 (d) of the Guiding Principles 
which recommends that states should ‘encourage and, where appropriate require, 
companies to communicate how they address their human rights impacts’. The 
commentary to this principle expressly includes ‘formal public reporting’.1199 It is 
more than questionable if the business review (s417 CA), in its current form, 
sufficiently implements this principle. In fact, the business review is seriously flawed 
in its ability to promote the socially responsible conduct of companies.1200 The 
commentary on Principle 3 (d) suggests that a requirement for such reporting ‘can 
be particularly appropriate where the nature of business operations or operating 
contexts pose a significant risk to human rights’. A relevant example of business 
operations that pose a significant risk to human rights is the use of suppliers in 
developing countries. There are numerous reports about gross human rights abuses 
in the factories of such suppliers, as described in chapter 4 on supply chain 
contracts.1201 In terms of this example, the reporting about the company’s human 
rights due diligence should contain information about the selection and monitoring of 
suppliers and, if necessary, the enforcement of the CSR commitments in supply 
contracts. The business review falls short of the recommendation insofar as it does 
not require companies to communicate how they address their human rights impact. 
It can be concluded that in the regulation of the business review, as with the s172 
(1) CA duty, the financial interests of shareholders are given preference over the 
interests of the various stakeholders. Here, English law needs to be further 
developed, if the Guiding Principles are to be implemented adequately. The 
strategic report that has been proposed to replace the business review will not alter 
things for the better in terms of promoting CSR.1202 Whilst the strategic report will 
explicitly require quoted companies to report on human rights issues, this reporting 
duty will continue to be subject to the limitation that the company must only include 
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information about these issues ‘to the extent necessary for an understanding of the 
development, performance or position of the company’s business’. The situation 
would be improved if the proposed EU Directive on disclosure of nonfinancial and 
diversity information, with its mandatory reporting requirements on environmental, 
social and employee matters as well as respect for human rights, anti-corruption and 
bribery issues were to be introduced.1203 The proposed Directive goes beyond both 
the business review and the proposed strategic report in terms of CSR reporting. If 
introduced, the Directive would increase the amount of CSR reporting, but it remains 
to be seen to what extent the quality of the reporting, with its adherence to the 
‘comply or explain’ approach, would improve. 
The continuing dominance of the shareholder value doctrine in English company law 
and corporate governance thus degrades CSR to a secondary issue in the duty to 
promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole in 
s172 (1) CA and in the business review in s417 CA.1204 Without a redirection of the 
corporate objective in English law, CSR will not be sufficiently supported through 
company law and corporate governance.1205 This situation might change if it is 
agreed that the corporate irresponsibility that has come to light in the recent financial 
and economic crisis would require a change to a more pluralistic understanding of 
the company. Similarly, it is argued in this thesis that a more diversely composed 
boardroom (e.g. consisting of more female directors and non-executive directors 
that represent the various stakeholders of the firm) could lead to more 
considerations of CSR in the decision-making process. A more diverse board might 
open up discussions in the boardroom and overcome traditional patterns of thought. 
Still, the directors would need to operate within the framework of the Companies Act 
2006. 
Consequently, despite significant overlaps of the Companies Act 2006 with CSR, 
the ability of private law, through company law and corporate governance, to 
promote CSR is currently limited. These deficiencies also limit the ability of English 
law to implement the UN Guiding Principles. 
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7.2.2 Private law is patchy in its coverage 
Private law differs significantly from public law regulation of companies because the 
undertaking of CSR commitments and the enforcement of CSR principles depends 
on the relationship between companies and private parties. 
With regard to the former, CSR can only be promoted in contract law and consumer 
law, if companies decide to undertake CSR commitments in the first place, for 
example, by adopting a CSR code of conduct or by agreeing to the compliance with 
CSR principles in a supply chain contract. Those companies that do not incorporate 
CSR policies into their supply contracts cannot procure a remedy against suppliers 
and those companies that do not choose to sign up to a code of conduct cannot be 
liable for violation of CSR principles. The coverage of CSR commitments, by private 
law, is therefore patchy. 
Moreover, the enforcement of CSR principles depends on the decision of private 
parties. The challenge that the enforcement of CSR principles in private law faces is 
that private parties need to decide whether they want to make a claim if a company 
has violated CSR principles. In private law, by definition, this function is not 
exercised by public authorities. Moreover, the enforcement of CSR commitments 
presupposes that there are enforcement mechanisms in place. In fact, the different 
substantive chapters of this thesis have shown that the enforcement of CSR 
principles in private law is limited in five main ways. 
First, in contract law, only the parties to the contractual relationship are able to 
enforce contractual commitments. A particular weakness of contract law is that the 
enforcement of CSR obligations in supply contracts is, almost without exception, 
limited to the contractual parties due to the doctrine of privity of contract. This 
doctrine, in general, confines the contractual reach of the supply contract to the 
buyers and their first-tier suppliers and does not allow the contract to reach beyond 
that. In the context of global trade patterns, this situation is a significant limitation of 
the reach of the CSR policies, as many suppliers use sub-suppliers. Moreover, 
although third parties to the supply contract such as the supplier’s employees can in 
theory acquire a right to enforce contractual duties against the promisor, e.g. the 
right to join a trade union, due to the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, 
this right is regularly excluded by the buyer and supplier.1206 The intended 
beneficiaries of the CSR commitments in supply contracts such as the supplier’s 
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employees are, therefore, in practice, often barred from enforcing these 
commitments. It is a severe weakness in the promotion of CSR that the parties to a 
contract can exclude the applicability of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 
1999. In actual fact, this exclusion contradicts the aim of the Act, namely to provide 
third parties with a right of enforcement. The intended beneficiaries of CSR policies 
are left without a right of action. The possible exclusion of the rights of third parties 
limits the enforcement of contractual CSR obligations and hence reduces the ability 
of contract law to promote more socially responsible behaviour of corporations. This 
situation also conflicts with Principle 26 of the Guiding Principles which recommends 
that states should take appropriate steps to reduce legal barriers that could lead to a 
denial of access to justice in relation to human rights abuses by companies. 
Secondly, the ability of consumers to enforce consumer protection rules which make 
misleading actions by companies unlawful is currently inadequate.1207 The 
Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations (CPRs) 2008 are outside the 
scope of private law as they are only subject to public enforcement by the OFT and 
local trading standards.1208 Consumers are not able to pursue private redress as 
they are left without a remedy in the CPRs. This situation is a missed opportunity 
from a CSR point of view, as CSR is brought into the scope of the CPRs due to reg 
5 (3) (b) CPRs which explicitly makes the breach of a commitment in a code of 
conduct a misleading action, if some further requirements are satisfied. Under the 
current public enforcement regime of the CPRs, the intended beneficiaries of the 
CPRs, the consumers, are neglected. Consequently, consumers will be unable to 
promote the socially responsible conduct of companies through the CPRs. Although 
the law of misrepresentation, as private law, encompasses similar situations to the 
CPRs and therefore provides protection for consumers, it is a complex area of the 
law which is difficult to access. The fact that there has so far not been a single case 
for a breach of CSR commitments in a code of conduct, based on the law of 
misrepresentation, shows that this law does not sufficiently promote CSR. The use 
of consumer law as a means to enforce CSR commitments that companies have 
publicly made is therefore currently limited at best. Again, the current legal situation 
conflicts with the recommendations made in Principle 26 of the Guiding Principles. 
Thirdly, the enforcement of CSR is also limited in company law and corporate 
governance. Where a director is in breach of one or more of his duties (e.g. the duty 
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to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a 
whole1209), it is, first and foremost, down to the board to decide whether to pursue a 
claim against that particular director.1210 The significant limitation of the enforcement 
of s172 (1) CA is that the intended beneficiaries, the various stakeholders enlisted in 
this duty, do not procure a right of action, as they do not have legal standing.1211 The 
duty in s172 (1) CA has therefore been called ‘a right without a remedy’.1212 This 
situation limits the ability of company law to promote CSR, as s172 (1) CA overlaps 
with CSR. The ability to enforce the s172 CA duty is even more limited, as the test 
applied to the section is likely to be a subjective one (as directors must act in a way 
which they consider in good faith to be in the best interest of the company for the 
benefit of its members (i.e. the shareholders) as a whole.1213 The fact that the 
various stakeholders who are enlisted in s172 (1) CA do not procure a remedy also 
conflicts with the third pillar of the Guiding Principles, which highlights the need for 
states to provide sufficient access to effective remedies for victims of business-
related human rights abuses. 
Where the company decides not to pursue a claim against a director who has 
breached his duty pursuant to s172 (1) CA, a shareholder can bring a derivative 
action pursuant to ss260 CA in respect of a cause of action vested in the company 
and seeking relief on behalf of the company. However, the members of the company 
can also decide to ratify the breach of duty, pursuant to s239 CA, in which case no 
derivative action can be brought. Where shareholders bring a derivative action, they 
face significant thresholds before they will succeed with a claim as the courts apply 
several tests before allowing the application for a derivative action to continue. 
When exercising their discretion whether or not to give the claimant permission to 
continue with the claim, courts seem to focus on the commercial interests of the 
company. Moreover, they are traditionally unwilling to second-guess business 
decisions. In practice, it is unlikely that claimants will succeed with derivative claims 
based on alleged disregard for stakeholder interests in s172 (1) CA. Similarly, 
despite the recent emphasis on the role of institutional investors in the ensuring of 
good corporate governance of companies, one can only expect little in terms of the 
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promotion of CSR. The UK Stewardship Code contains only little recognition of 
social and environmental matters. It rather focusses on the monitoring of the 
investee companies than the pursuit of CSR goals. The enforcement of CSR 
principles in company law is therefore severely limited. 
Fourthly, in tort law, although several causes of action overlap with CSR principles 
and therefore, in principal, apply to all companies, tort victims still need to decide if 
they want to make a claim for the tort. In particular, the ability of tort law to promote 
the socially responsible conduct of companies is restricted due to the approach to 
corporate group liability in English law, which treats all companies in a corporate 
group as separate legal entities. The use of corporate group structures enables 
parent companies to reduce or even to avoid liability, as confirmed in Adams v Cape 
Industries plc1214. This situation is particular unfair for involuntary tort creditors of 
undercapitalised subsidiaries of a parent company, e.g. tort creditors who have 
suffered from an abuse of their human rights. If the UK government seeks to 
implement the Guiding Principles adequately, that would be an opportunity for the 
legislator to re-consider the approach towards liability in corporate groups. The 
current approach towards liability in corporate groups in English law does not 
provide effective judicial mechanisms, as tort creditors of (undercapitalised) 
subsidiaries may not be able to be successful with their claim against a subsidiary 
irrespective of the financial status of the parent company, even where the parent 
company is the sole shareholder of the subsidiary and where both the parent and 
the subsidiary company have the same directors. This situation conflicts with the 
third pillar of the Guiding Principles, which, as we have already seen, emphasises 
the need to provide effective remedies for victims of business-related human rights 
abuses. In particular, the commentary to Principle 26 explicitly refers to the example 
of the avoidance of appropriate accountability due to the way in which legal 
responsibility is attributed among group members of a corporate group under 
domestic criminal and civil laws.1215 
Fifthly, as the enforcement of private law depends on private parties, it is important 
that they have access to effective civil litigation mechanisms. The cost and time 
involved is often a barrier for private parties to bring civil litigation. The chapter on 
tort law has shown that recent proposals by the government about changes to the 
system of funding cases might make it less likely that private claimants will bring an 
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action at all.1216 The planned changes to the conditional fee agreement system (the 
so-called “no win-no fee” system) by the government will make it less attractive for 
solicitors to accept cases where the claimant cannot afford the initial cost of 
litigation.1217 This situation is particularly dissatisfying, given that the company 
usually has far better means than the private individual brining the claim. The 
proposed changes are likely to reduce the number of claims brought in tort against 
companies.1218 The changes will consequently conflict with the above-noted 
recommendation of Principle 26 of the Guiding Principles that states should provide 
effective remedies against business-related human rights abuses (third pillar). The 
effectiveness of civil litigation is also limited by the rather restrictive use of multi-
party actions in English law.1219 Group litigation orders are the main approach of the 
English system’s treatment of multiparty litigation (they are an ‘opt‐in’ system). Due 
to the various procedural requirements of group litigation orders and the need for 
each individual to ‘opt-in’, the restricted use of group litigation further limits the ability 
of private law to promote the socially responsible conduct of companies. This 
situation, too, is a legal barrier and therefore conflicts with Principle 26 of the 
Guiding Principles. The commentary to this principle explicitly refers to the example 
of ‘inadequate options for aggregating claims or enabling representative action 
(such as class action and other collective action proceedings)’.1220 
In conclusion, the promotion of the socially responsible conduct of companies in 
English private law is patchy in its coverage. Companies need to agree on the 
incorporation of CSR obligations into contracts or they must decide to adopt CSR 
principles. Moreover, the enforcement of CSR commitments depends on the 
decision of private parties. The enforcement mechanisms for CSR policies in the 
substantive areas of private law analysed in this chapter are currently limited at best. 
7.2.3 Weaknesses of private law remedies 
Although the strength of private law is that it enables private parties to enforce CSR 
commitments, the remedies that are awarded in private law claims are, first and 
foremost, intended to promote the interests of the claimant. Hence, the remedies in 
contract are repudiation and damages, in tort the remedies are primarily damages 
                                                          
1216
 Ministry of Justice, Civil justice reforms, available at: http://www.justice.gov.uk/civil-justice-reforms 
(last accessed: 10/12/2012). 
1217
 R Meeran, ‘Multinationals will profit from the government’s civil litigation shakeup’, The Guardian, 
24
th
 May 2011, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/libertycentral/2011/may/24/civil-
litigation-multinationals (last accessed: 05/03/2013). 
1218
 ibid. 
1219
 See for an introduction into the topic: N Andrews, ‘Multi-Party Actions and Complex Litigation in 
England’ (2012) 23 E.B.L.Rev., 1. 
1220
 Commentary, Principle 26, Guiding Principle. 
251 
 
with some injunctions and in consumer law (through the law of misrepresentation) 
the remedies are the right to rescind the contract and damages. In company law and 
corporate governance, if a claim for breach of directors’ duties is successful, then 
the remedies are the same civil consequences under the Companies Act 2006 as 
would apply if the corresponding common law rule or equitable principle applied.1221 
Those remedies are claims for losses and claims for profit and they are only 
awarded to the company.1222 They would therefore not promote the interests of the 
stakeholders affected by a breach of s172 (1) CA. The prevalent remedy in private 
law actions is therefore damages which are awarded in order to account for the 
losses of the claimant. The underlying aim is to put the claimant back into the 
position, in which he would have been, had the event giving rise to the claim not 
occurred.  
Whilst these remedies might be appropriate for the claimant, they are not 
necessarily the most effective means for the promotion of CSR. In particular, these 
remedies do not directly cover the interests of the stakeholders who have suffered 
from the violation of CSR principles. This situation is particularly evident in tort law 
which is closely connected to the protection of personal interests such as health and 
property. The causes of action in tort are bound to personal interests. Consequently, 
the pollution of the environment is only addressed by tort law to the extent that the 
claimant has suffered harm to his personal interests such as health or property. The 
environment is therefore not protected per se, but only indirectly as a proprietary 
interest of a person. The compensatory nature of remedies in tort law somewhat 
limits the promotion of CSR. It is a weakness of the current tort system that 
exemplary damages, which could deter companies from irresponsible conduct, are 
only rarely awarded. The restricted use of injunctions which are an equitable remedy 
further limits the ability of tort law to promote CSR, as an injunction would be an 
appropriate remedy in many situations where what is desired is to stop the company 
from continuing with the violation of CSR principles. Injunctions would prohibit 
companies from continuing with acts that violate CSR principles. 
Consequently, despite the ability of private law to provide remedies for the 
enforcement of CSR commitments, the remedies themselves have deficiencies in 
their ability to promote the socially responsible conduct of companies. In particular, 
the focus on compensatory damages restricts the ability to promote CSR. 
                                                          
1221
 S178 (1) CA 2006.  
1222
 B Hannigan, Company Law (3
rd
 ed., OUP 2012) para 13-8. 
252 
 
7.3 The ways in which private law plays an important part in the promotion of 
CSR 
Notwithstanding its limitations, the thesis has shown that English private law does 
play a significant role in the promotion of CSR. The following part will first address 
the overlap between CSR and private law before looking at the mechanisms that 
private law provides for the incorporation and enforcement of CSR. Finally, it 
addresses the contribution of private law to hybrid regulatory systems of CSR. 
7.3.1 CSR is, at least in part, law 
First of all, the analysis in the substantive chapters has shown that CSR is, at least 
in part, law. This finding contradicts the common understanding of CSR as being 
‘above and beyond the law’ which is often the position adopted by business 
organisations.1223 Buhmann notes that this understanding of CSR ‘has led to an idea 
that CSR and law are distinct’.1224 In fact, this thesis has shown that there are direct 
overlaps between CSR and provisions in company law and causes of action in tort 
law with CSR whereas contract law and consumer law rather provide means for the 
incorporation and enforcement of CSR commitments, e.g. in supply chain contracts. 
This section will therefore address company law and tort law due to their more direct 
overlap with CSR. 
Company law and corporate governance, within the framework of the enlightened 
shareholder value doctrine, at least in theory have potential to promote the socially 
responsible conduct of companies.1225 Company law and corporate governance 
overlap with CSR in terms of the duty to promote the success of the company for the 
benefit of its members as a whole1226 and the business review.1227 There is a strong 
correlation between the list of factors in the duty for directors to promote the success 
of the company in s172 (1) CA and CSR, as directors are required to take various 
factors into account when discharging this duty, e.g. the interests of the company’s 
employees, the need to foster the company’s business relationships with suppliers, 
customers and others, as well as the impact of the company’s operation on the 
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community and the environment. The stakeholders enlisted in s172 (1) CA are 
coterminous with the groups encompassed by the CSR definition adopted in this 
thesis.1228 One could therefore argue that CSR is legally embodied through s172 (1) 
CA. Moreover, CSR is further embedded in the Companies Act through the 
businesses review in s417 CA which requires directors to report on how they have 
performed their duty under s172 (1) CA. This reporting duty in s417 CA creates 
transparency on the discharge of the s172 duty and therefore enables others to 
inform themselves if and, if so, how the interests of the stakeholders enlisted in s172 
(1) CA were taken into account in decisions of the directors.1229 
 
There is also an overlap between several causes of action in tort law and the 
concept of CSR, for example, negligence, private nuisance, public nuisance, breach 
of a statutory duty and breach of strict product liability provisions. Tort law overlaps 
with CSR where torts encompass violations of CSR principles. The hypothetical 
scenario used in the chapter on tort law and CSR has shown how companies can be 
liable in tort to their employees and the local community for tortious acts which 
violate CSR principles, such as the breach of health and safety standards and 
environmental. Tort law therefore provides a tool to promote the socially responsible 
conduct of companies. 
 
In summary, CSR and English private law overlap in a number of ways. CSR is, at 
least in part, law, despite continuing claims of the opposite. Claims that CSR is 
purely voluntary and beyond the law are, consequently, a superficial and an 
inaccurate account of the legal situation pertaining to CSR. 
7.3.2 Private law provides mechanisms to incorporate CSR  
Through contract law, private law also provides a mechanism for incorporating CSR 
commitments into contracts and thus giving legal effect to these commitments.1230 
Multinational companies increasingly incorporate CSR codes of conduct into their 
contracts with their suppliers.1231 They do so by using three different mechanisms 
through which CSR becomes part of the supply contracts: First, terms and 
conditions incorporated into the buyer’s purchase order, secondly expressly 
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negotiated contracts and thirdly inclusion of the CSR policy into the tenderer 
process. In practice, the most common form of the three different mechanisms is the 
incorporation of the buyer’s terms and conditions, which contain CSR provisions into 
the contract between the buyer and the supplier.1232 
Contract law therefore differs from company law and tort law insofar as there is no 
contract law rule per se which overlaps with CSR; rather contract law provides a tool 
for private parties to incorporate CSR commitments into their legal relationship. 
Contract law rules enable the buyer to impose duties on the supplier to comply with 
CSR commitments, such as the obligation not to commit bribery, not to use child or 
forced labour and to allow its employees to be member of a trade union. Contract 
law is therefore able to make CSR codes of conduct, which are commonly perceived 
of as being voluntary, contractually enforceable. Therefore, through the use of 
contract law, CSR commitments which are voluntarily undertaken by Western-based 
multinational companies, often due to public pressure, can become contractual 
terms and are consequently enforceable against the supplier. Contract law therefore 
provides tools to give legal effect to CSR commitments, if parties choose to 
incorporate these commitments into their contract. Through contract law, CSR 
obligations can be imposed on suppliers in different countries of the world, 
particularly in those countries which are known to have a weak legal system or a 
weak law enforcement mechanism. This extended territorial reach of contractual 
CSR commitments is a strength of private law. 
7.3.3 Private law provides means to enforce CSR commitments 
Private law also provides persons with remedies for breach of their rights.1233 The 
substantive chapters of this thesis have shown that private law is a tool to enforce 
CSR commitments. A distinction can be made between the ability of companies to 
enforce CSR commitments and the ability of private individuals to do so. 
First of all, despite the criticisms of the enforcement of s172 (1) CA discussed 
above, this duty with its significant overlap with CSR can be enforced by the board 
of directors or, alternatively, by shareholders through a derivative action. English 
private law, through company law, therefore, provides a tool to enforce this duty 
which embodies CSR. Directors who have breached this duty are potentially 
accountable for the loss that the company has suffered as a consequence of the 
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director’s conduct. Secondly, the strength of contract law is that it enables the buyer 
to incorporate CSR obligations into the supply contract, and hence to create 
enforceable contractual terms. That way, duties of socially responsible behaviour 
can be imposed on the supplier in private contracts and these duties can be 
enforced by the buyer. Where the CSR commitments are conditions or, in case of 
innominate terms, where breaches are repudiatory, the buyer will procure a right to 
repudiate the contract. This right is a powerful tool for buyers, as the supplier would 
then lose the contract as a consequence of his violation of contractual CSR 
obligation. Thirdly, although the enforcement of consumer law provisions that make 
it unlawful to violate publicly announced commitments in a code of conduct is 
currently only to a very limited extent subject to private enforcement (i.e. the law of 
misrepresentation), there is potential for a significant improvement if the government 
were to introduce a private remedy for consumers, as recommended by the Law 
Commission.1234 Consumers could, consequently, gain a right to terminate the 
contract where companies fall short of their publicly announced CSR commitments. 
As companies commonly portray their brands as being socially responsible in order 
to positively influence the perception that consumers have of them1235, the right to 
rescission would constitute a deterrent for companies not to violate the CSR 
commitments that they have made to the public. Fourthly, tort law provides causes 
of action for tort victims who suffer from a tort which also violates CSR principles.1236 
Tort law provides the stakeholders who are the intended beneficiaries of CSR, such 
as the company’s employees, with a remedy. Tort law is therefore a particularly 
effective means of enforcing the socially responsible conduct of companies. 
On the whole, it is a strength of private law that it enables private parties to enforce 
CSR commitments. In all four areas of private law analysed in this thesis, private 
parties procure a remedy where a company has violated CSR commitments. The 
prevalent remedy in private law actions is damages. Despite its limitations in the 
promotion of CSR, addressed above, damages are nevertheless a remedy that 
accounts for the loss that a private party has suffered from a violation of CSR 
commitments. Whilst the cause of action in company law and contract law is 
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primarily vested in companies, tort law (and potentially also consumer law) provides 
private individuals, who are the intended beneficiaries of CSR commitments, with 
means to enforce CSR principles. Private law remedies are therefore an important 
instrument for the promotion of the socially responsible conduct of companies.  
7.3.4 Private law contributes to hybrid regulatory approaches to CSR 
A further way in which private law plays an important role in the promotion of CSR is 
its contribution to hybrid regulatory systems.1237 Based on the conclusions in the 
previous sections (i.e. CSR is, at least in part, law; private law provides means to 
incorporate and to enforce CSR principles), it can be argued that private law is one 
part of a regulatory system in which private law, public law, soft law standards 
developed by private actors as well as international organisations and private 
regulation by and between companies, all interact with each other, in order to 
promote CSR. 
Within this integrated, hybrid regulatory system, the various areas of private law 
analysed in this thesis serve different functions at various levels. First, company law 
and corporate governance, within the framework of the enlightened shareholder 
value theory, set the foundation for the company’s CSR engagement through 
directors’ duties and expectations in disclosure rules. Secondly, through contract 
law, private law provides a mechanism for companies to incorporate and to enforce 
CSR commitments (which can be based on soft law standards developed at the 
international or national level by international organisations or non-governmental 
organisations). The wide-spread incorporation of the same international CSR 
standards into supply contracts could create a level playing field between 
companies. Thirdly, if the recommendations of the Law Commission concerning the 
introduction of a private remedy in consumer law were implemented, then private 
law would provide a further tool of enforcement for consumers. They could ensure 
that companies comply with their publicly adopted CSR commitments. Fourthly, tort 
law imposes civil liability within the system for conduct of companies that violates 
CSR principles. 
One overall contribution of this thesis is to show that the effectiveness of this 
regulatory system in promoting CSR can be enhanced by regulation through public 
and criminal law of companies in their home state, in combination with national 
private law. The substantive chapters have shown that bribery as well as the use of 
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forced labour and child labour are the aspects of the CSR agenda which are worded 
in the strictest way in the CSR codes of conduct and in CSR commitments included 
into supply chain contracts. Commitments about the protection of the environment, 
in contrast, are commonly phrased in a more aspirational and less definite way. 
While the use of child and forced labour is of particular reputational concern for 
companies, bribery is now covered in a wide-reaching domestic sanction system in 
English law since the introduction of the Bribery Act 2010. This Act makes a 
company potentially liable in criminal law for the failure to prevent bribery by a 
person associated with the company, including the company’s employees, agents or 
subsidiaries.1238 Although not English law, an example where companies are 
required to address certain CSR issues in their supply chain is the California Supply 
Chain Transparency Act which requires disclosure about the way a company deals 
with slavery and human trafficking in its supply chain.1239 This example also 
demonstrates that the home state of multinational companies can have an impact on 
the way companies address CSR issues, as it requires retail sellers and 
manufacturers to disclose their efforts to combat slavery and human trafficking and 
to eliminate it from their direct supply chains.1240 It is to be expected that the 
proposed EU Directive on the disclosure of nonfinancial and diversity information, 
once introduced, would enhance the disclosure of the policies that companies have 
on issues such as human rights, the environment and bribery.  
The hierarchy that currently exists in the way different aspects of the CSR agenda 
are dealt with in codes of conduct and/or commitments in supply contracts therefore 
seems to be influenced by both reputational and liability (especially criminal liability) 
risks. The different treatment of the various CSR aspects by companies is 
interesting in so far as the signing up to or drafting of CSR codes of conduct, as well 
as the incorporation of CSR commitments into supply contracts, is voluntary in the 
first place (notwithstanding their subsequent legal effects once adopted by a 
company or incorporated into a contract). So, the companies themselves decide 
how strictly they phrase these commitments. Particularly, the strict manner in which 
companies deal with bribery in their business relationships seems to be positively 
influenced by liability risks resulting from the Bribery Act 2010. It is therefore argued 
here that the way companies deal with CSR issues within their company and vis-à-
vis their suppliers can be enhanced where these CSR principles are supported by 
domestic sanctions, especially in criminal law. The Bribery Act 2010 shows that it is 
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possible to establish liability in the home state of multinational companies for the 
conduct of their employees, agents or suppliers. The voluntary use of CSR 
commitments within a hybrid regulatory system of CSR can therefore be improved, 
where it is required by domestic law and where violations of CSR commitments are 
punishable by sanctions at the domestic level. The advantage of regulatory 
measures such as the Bribery Act 2010 or the California Supply Chain 
Transparency Act is also that they ensure that all companies need to address 
bribery and/or the use of forced labour and that, consequently, loopholes are closed. 
Stronger EU disclosure laws about CSR policies (despite their ‘comply or explain’ 
approach) are therefore likely to positively influence the way in which companies 
engage with CSR through the voluntary adoption of a code of conduct and the 
incorporation of CSR policies into supply chain contracts. The likely consequence of 
such domestic requirements and/or sanctions is that they initiate the undertaking of 
CSR commitments by companies as well as promoting compliance. The interaction 
between domestic sanctions and private law is therefore likely to enable private law 
to better promote CSR. 
The particular advantage of private law within such a hybrid regulatory system is 
that it enables CSR commitments to reach beyond the territory of the home state of 
the company (i.e. England or Wales here). For example, the incorporation of CSR 
commitments into supply chain contracts can bind contractual partners across the 
world. English private law can therefore cross national boundaries and expand the 
reach of CSR commitments beyond the English territory. Supply chain contracts can 
consequently be used as a tool to bind companies which are based in countries with 
lower standards of legal protection and/or law enforcement to comply with certain 
CSR commitments. Contract law can interact with soft law CSR standards, thereby 
utilising standards developed by private actors or international organisations and 
providing the means to incorporate and to enforce these. Once the private remedy 
for consumers is introduced into consumer law, it, too, will enable consumers to 
enforce compliance by companies with their publicly declared CSR commitments in 
a more accessible way than currently possible under the law of misrepresentation. 
Depending on the way in which CSR commitments are phrased, their enforcement 
through consumer law could also affect the conduct of English companies in other 
countries or the way their agents and suppliers act. This situation would again lead 
to an interaction between voluntarily adopted CSR commitments with private law, 
with the latter enforcing the former. 
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These different regulatory tools together promote the socially responsible conduct of 
companies. Private law and public law, soft law and hard law are not conflicting tools 
in the promotion of CSR; they are rather complementing elements in this hybrid 
system of regulation. The important point here is that the thesis has shown that 
private law plays a key role in this hybrid regulatory system. 
7.4 Limitations of this research and scope for subsequent research 
The analysis in this thesis has brought to light several questions about the 
relationship between CSR and law. This section will give an overview of some of 
these areas as well as outline the scope for subsequent research, building on the 
conclusions of this thesis. 
First of all, it was beyond the scope of this thesis with its substantial doctrinal 
analysis to sufficiently engage with socio-legal theoretical frameworks, such as 
reflexive governance or meta-regulation, as approaches to the understanding of the 
regulatory environment of CSR and private law.1241 A different thesis could have 
addressed the various ways in which mandatory duties, imposed by the state, 
interact with the voluntary undertaking of CSR commitments by private actors from 
these socio-legal perspectives. These approaches could be utilised for the 
discussion about the further ways of regulating CSR (labelled as ‘hybrid approaches’ 
here) in order to review the possible effects of CSR regulation on the conduct of 
companies. The strengths of these theoretical frameworks is that, for example, the 
theory of reflexive governance is a process-oriented legal theory which looks at the 
learning and exchange between different social subsystems.1242 The various layers 
of CSR regulation (e.g. private law, international law, private regulation) provide a 
suitable tool for such a process-oriented understanding. Equally, a socio-legal study 
based on empirical data, such as interviews with company directors, or indeed 
consumers, could have revealed how CSR works in practice, and whether legal 
frameworks affect behaviour even without actual enforcement through legal 
remedies. Such approaches would complement the doctrinal perspective taken 
here. The strength of the doctrinal approach used here is that, with its systematic 
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analysis, exposition of and commentary on cases and statutes as well as secondary 
sources such as academic literature, Law Commission papers and CSR reports of 
companies, it provided a suitable method to answer the underlying primary research 
question, i.e. to what extent English private law already promotes Corporate Social 
Responsibility. The doctrinal method enabled the research to reveal the significant 
role that private law plays in the promotion of CSR which has so far not been 
sufficiently reflected in the legal literature. Moreover, on the basis of this method, it 
was also possible to identify the weaknesses and strengths of private law, at least in 
principle, in the promotion of CSR. Overall, by using a doctrinal method, it was 
possible to conduct a detailed analysis of the legal aspects of CSR which are the 
focus of this thesis.  
Secondly, the thesis incidentally contributes to the broader debate on the question 
of the extent to which private law has a regulatory function.1243 The regulatory 
function of private law is understood as the ability to address market failures.1244 The 
way in which private law promotes CSR raises the question of whether the 
traditional understanding of private law as purely regulating the legal relationships 
between private individuals, without pursuing any goals for the benefit of wider 
society, is still tenable.1245 In the promotion of CSR, private law does not purely 
facilitate the use of individual rights between private parties, but it also de facto 
pursues public policy goals. It arguably now directly advances the common good 
through the imposition of the duty in s172 (1) CA to promote the success of the 
company for the benefit of its members as a whole, as this duty requires directors to 
take into account in their decision-making process the interests of various 
stakeholders. By providing mechanisms in contract law for the incorporation and 
enforcement of CSR commitments by private actors, private law indirectly also 
promotes the general public interest. Moreover, by creating liability for violations of 
CSR principles, tort law also pursues the benefit of wider society. It can therefore be 
argued that, with its contribution to the promotion of the socially responsible conduct 
of companies, private law holds a regulatory function. It has been contended in the 
debate about the goals of private law that, with its combination of individual rights 
and policy considerations, private law changes its nature to a mixture of corrective 
                                                          
1243
 See for the notion that private law can have a regulatory function: H Collins, Regulating Contracts 
(OUP 1999) 56 – 93. 
1244
 F Cafaggi and H Muir-Watt, ‘Introduction’ in F Cafaggi and H Muir-Watt, Making European Private 
Law Governance Design (Edward Elgar 2008) 2. 
1245
 See for example: S Hedley, ‘Looking Outward or Looking Inward? Obligations Scholarship in the 
Early 21
st
 Century’ in A Robertson and T H Wu (eds), The Goals of Private Law (Hart Publishing 2009) 
193; S Hedley, ‘Is private law meaningless?’ (2011) 64 (1) Current Legal Problems 1. 
261 
 
justice and distributive justice.1246 The ways in which private law interacts with CSR 
are a prime example of this changing nature of private law. Whilst private law 
continues to provide a tool for private individuals to seek compensation for losses 
which they have suffered (e.g. for torts and breach of contract), it is directly and 
indirectly also a means to promote social policy goals through the various ways in 
which it requires, enables or enforces the socially responsible conduct of 
companies. The hybrid system of CSR regulation outlined above illustrates the 
changing nature of private law, as the system combines the traditional regulatory 
use of private law within private legal relationships with its ability to promote the 
public good. In future research, the implications of this regulatory system of CSR 
can be further explored in order to engage with those who deny a regulatory function 
of private law.  
Thirdly, because of its jurisdictional focus on English private law, it was not possible 
to fully explore the various private international law issues that this thesis raises. By 
its nature, the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility addresses the conduct of 
companies worldwide. In particular, it focusses on the impact companies from the 
North / West have on people and the environment in the southern hemisphere of the 
world, either directly, through their subsidiaries or their suppliers. The focus on 
English private law in this thesis therefore raises the question to what extent the four 
areas of English private law addressed in this thesis are applicable to the conduct of 
English multinational companies in countries of the developing world, either directly 
or through their subsidiaries and / or suppliers. These issues were briefly addressed 
in each chapter; however, it was not possible to fully explore the various 
circumstances that might determine the question in which English law is applicable, 
for example, in relation to tort law.1247 A detailed analysis of all the circumstances 
when English law is applicable in relation to violations of CSR principles that occur 
outside the territory of England and Wales is thus a matter for subsequent research. 
This analysis would contribute to the discussion as to whether the current private 
international law framework, for instance in relation to torts committed abroad, 
needs to be changed in order to better promote the socially responsible conduct of 
companies.1248  
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Fourthly, in this thesis, the analysis of the possible implementation of the UN 
Guiding Principles into English law could only address private law. However, the UK 
government will necessarily need to review both public and private law when it 
develops its national plan on the implementation of the Guiding Principles into 
domestic English law. The topic of the implementation of the Guiding Principles into 
English law deserves further exploration in more detail in subsequent research. 
However, due to the overlap between the research underlying this thesis and some 
of the points raised by John Ruggie in the Guiding Principles the thesis included a 
preliminary analysis of the links between the two. 
Finally, the CSR concept is particularly prominent in the USA and the UK where the 
traditional understanding of company law and corporate governance is firmly 
embedded in the shareholder value doctrine. In comparison, the debate about CSR 
is still relatively recent in Germany with its more stakeholder value (pluralist) 
conception of company law.1249 This observation raises two interesting questions for 
future comparative research, particularly given the relationship between corporate 
theory and the approach to CSR that was shown in this thesis: First, the approaches 
to CSR in legal systems with different underlying corporate doctrines should be 
compared. Secondly, at a more foundational level, it should be examined to what 
extent the underlying approach to company law and corporate governance in 
different legal systems impacts on the need/public pressure for CSR commitments. 
Is there, perhaps, less of a need for companies following a stakeholder value 
approach to publicly commit themselves to CSR principles, as these companies 
already pursue a more socially responsible agenda by their nature? Are discussions 
at board level perhaps already more inclusive and pluralist in companies which are 
subject to the German system of co-determination, where employee representatives 
constitute up to 50% of the members of the supervisory board of companies? This 
future comparative research will provide arguments for the debate about the 
corporate theory in English law and the question of whether the theoretical framing 
of the company in English law could change towards a more pluralist conception. 
7.5 Substantive recommendations for changes to English private law to 
improve its contribution to the promotion of CSR    
This thesis has shown that, despite its limitations, English private law already makes 
an important contribution to the promotion of CSR. However, if it were to make an 
even better contribution then some changes would be needed to the areas of private 
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law analysed in the substantive chapters. Based on the analysis of the extent to 
which CSR is already promoted in English private law, the substantive chapters also 
discussed suggestions as to how the respective areas of law could be further 
developed in order to better promote CSR. The thesis will conclude with a list of 
substantive recommendations for changes to English private law that result from the 
analysis. It is not possible to fully develop the recommendations, as that is rather a 
matter for future research, based on this thesis. 
The substantive recommendations for changes to English private law are: 
- The fundamental limitation of English private law is the fact that the enlightened 
shareholder value theory is still firmly embedded in the goal of maximising 
shareholder value. It is unlikely that the situation will improve much without a 
redirection of the corporate objective in English law to a more pluralistic 
understanding of the firm. It was beyond the scope of this thesis to sufficiently 
engage with the question whether or not the underlying corporate doctrine in 
English company law should change. However, it is submitted here that the 
analysis has shown that the continued prioritisation of shareholder value in the 
enlightened shareholder value model severely restricts the promotion of CSR. 
Therefore, proposals about changes to English private law for a greater 
promotion of CSR will necessarily have to engage with the issue of the 
underlying corporate doctrine. A change to a more pluralistic understanding of 
the firm would inevitably have ramifications for the framing of directors’ duties in a 
way that directors have more discretion to recognise the interests of 
stakeholders. 
 
- The business review and its proposed replacement, the strategic report, leave 
too much discretion for directors to decide if and, if so, to what extent they report 
on CSR matters. The proposed EU Directive on the disclosure of nonfinancial 
and diversity information, if introduced, is likely to improve the amount of 
reporting on CSR. Its introduction is therefore important. However, the potential 
that the Directive has for promoting CSR is likely to be restricted by its adherence 
to a ‘comply or explain’ approach. Instead, the reporting duties about the CSR 
matters contained in the directive should be made compulsory and a greater 
focus on quality of reporting should be implemented. 
- The thesis argues that it is important to focus on the board in order to better 
promote CSR. Non-executive directors would need to better exercise their 
function to monitor and to challenge decisions in the boardroom. Moreover, more 
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diverse boards consisting of directors that better represent the companies’ 
stakeholders are likely to challenge traditional patterns of thought (often referred 
to as ‘group think’) and to move the decision-making more towards including 
CSR considerations. 
 
- The ability for contractual parties to exclude the applicability of the Contracts 
(Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 should be abolished. Third parties who are 
expressly identified in contractual clauses in supply contracts as the intended 
beneficiaries of CSR obligations, for example the supplier’s employees, should 
have a right to enforce these CSR obligations, such as the right to join a trade 
union. If the contractual parties incorporate CSR obligations benefitting third 
parties, they should expect these duties to be enforced by these third parties. 
 
- In consumer law, the government should follow the recommendation made by the 
Law Commission to introduce a private remedy for consumers. This remedy 
would enable consumers to enforce compliance of companies with their publicly 
declared CSR commitments. 
 
- Whilst the proposed private remedy for consumers is positive from a CSR point of 
view, two proposed changes to the law should not be introduced, however, as 
they are likely to restrict the enhancement of greater CSR. First, the proposed 
short definition of misleading actions would exclude the current explicit 
mentioning of breaches of codes of conduct in the definition used in reg 5 
Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008. The proposal to use 
a shorter definition is a reason for concern from a CSR point of view, given that 
breaches of codes of conduct have so far not been followed up in practice, so 
consumers are unlikely to be fully aware that such behaviour would continue to 
fall under the new definition. It is therefore important to keep the existing 
definition of misleading actions in reg 5 Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading 
Regulations 2008. Secondly, the fact that the new Act would require the 
formation of a contract in the first place for consumers to gain a remedy is a 
further aspect that will reduce the number of potential claims. The sole fact that a 
company does not meet its CSR commitments in codes of conduct should be 
sufficient for an action in consumer law. 
 
- Tort law could better promote CSR if a more integrated approach to liability within 
corporate groups were introduced where parent companies could be made liable 
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for tort liabilities of their subsidiaries. This change would ensure that companies 
can no longer avoid liability by setting up undercapitalised subsidiaries to the 
detriment of tort creditors. 
 
- Access to civil litigation for tort victims must be facilitated. The changes to the 
funding of civil litigation and the restricted use of class actions in personal injury 
claims limit the promotion of CSR in tort law. Therefore, it is necessary that the 
demise of conditional fee agreements is reversed and that the provision of class 
action is expanded. 
 
- Finally, the remedies available in private law for violations of CSR are deficient in 
their ability to promote the socially responsible conduct of companies. The 
remedies that are awarded for violations of CSR need to take better account of 
CSR. Consumers would be able to promote CSR much more meaningfully, if they 
could enforce compliance with CSR commitments through injunctions instead of 
terminating their contract with the company under the regime recommended by 
the Law Commission. The buyers in supply contracts would be able to better 
enforce CSR if they could more easily procure the remedy of specific 
performance. This remedy would compel the obligor to perform the agreed 
obligation. However, the award of this remedy is within the discretion of the 
courts as it is an equitable remedy. It is therefore only rarely granted. The 
situation is similar for tort victims. Whilst they are compensated for the damages 
that they suffered due to the tort, it would be more beneficial for the promotion of 
CSR if injunctions (to stop the tort or to undo the harm) and exemplary damages 
(to punish the tortfeasor) were more frequently awarded. 
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